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INTRODUCTION TO THE PORTFOLIO.
This Portfolio contains work submitted over a three year period in partial fulfilment of 
the requirements for the Practitioner Doctorate in Psychotherapeutic and Counselling 
Psychology. It is divided into three sections: Academic, Therapeutic and Research.
The Academic Section contains papers which were part of the work conducted for the 
following courses: Theoretical Models of Therapy, Advanced Theory and Therapy, and 
Issues in Counselling Psychology.
The Therapeutic Section refers to therapeutic and other work carried out in the three 
one year clinical placements.
The Research Section contains three research papers, which involve a literature review 
and two empirical studies, together with a reference of a conference presentation.
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ACADEIV1IC SECTION
INTRODUCTION
This section contains three essays selected from academic work completed for the 
following courses: Theoretical Models of Therapy, Advanced Theory and Therapy, 
and Issues in Counselling Psychology. It also includes two reports produced for the 
courses of The Context of Counselling Psychology and Issues in Counselling 
Psychology. In selecting these particular essays and reports, an emphasis was 
placed on the consideration of issues which have a direct relevance to 
considerations of theory-practice links and of issues which have a direct relevance 
to the practice in counselling psychology.
Psychoanalytic practitioners place a lot of emphasis on the 
therapeutic frame. Describe its core components and discuss the 
psychological reasons for its importance.
The therapeutic frame constitutes one of the distinctive features of psychoanalysis, 
both at a theoretical and practical level. In this essay an attempt will be made to 
illustrate its psychological, therapeutic, significance. In the sections that follow there 
will be 1) A review of the concept’s evolution. This will involve how different analyst’s 
have defined frame and the nature of therapeutic importance that they have 
attributed in maintaining it. 2) The particular therapeutic significance of the various 
aspects of the frame. 3) A discussion about the phenomenon of braking the frame 
(deviations).
A brief historical overview of the concept’s evolution.
Towards a definition and an understanding of its psychological significance.
Freud’s papers on “technique” constitute the basis from which the concept of frame 
evolved. In these papers he develops a series of technical rules for practising 
psychoanalysis. These rules were mainly seen as a means to structure the analytic 
situation so as to establish a “workable” or “safe” therapeutic situation, to safeguard 
the growth of an analysable transference neurosis , to exclude “suggestion” and 
maybe to establish the fixed parameters required in any scientific enterprise that 
tests causal hypothesis. In the course of these papers, Freud discussed such 
matters as the fee, length of sessions confidentiality, neutrality, abstinence, the use 
of sofa and free association. (Livingston-Smith 1991; Langs 1981).
Freud makes explicit that he arrived at these rules through trial and error and that 
he offers them as “recommendations” or “advises”. In his 1912 paper he states that 
“ the observance of them [technical rules] will spare physicians practising analysis 
much unnecessary effort and guard them against some oversights...however... this 
technique is the only one suited to my individuality... a physician quite differently 
constituted might find himself driven to adopt a different attitude to his patients and 
to the task before him” (1981, p. 431).
In the years that followed, sporadic articles appeared, mostly by other writers but by 
Freud as well, on one or another ground rule advocating that flexibility should be the 
overriding principle in the application of these rules, since otherwise the analyst 
might appear insensitive and inhuman. A discussion around “deviations from 
technique” has been prevalent in the psychoanalytic literature since. Eissler*s (1953) 
delineation of “parameters” -specific form of deviation in technique necessitated by 
ego dysfunctions within the patient—constitutes an example of the attempt to 
discuss the meaning and the consequences of ‘the strict adherence in technique’ 
and of ‘modifications and deviations in technique’. (This issue will be further 
discussed later in this paper).
The conceptualisation of the ground rules was extended and the term “frame” was 
introduced in 1952 by Milner who linked these rules to the frame of a painting. That 
is Milner stated that “’the frame [of a picture] marks off the different kind of reality 
that is within it from that which is outside it, but a temporal spatial frame also marks 
off the special kind of reality of a psychoanalytic session. And in psychoanalysis, it 
is the existence of this frame that makes possible the development of... 
transference ’” (in Livingston-Smith, 1991 p. 165). This metaphor allowed thinking 
about the ground rules as assuming a more graphic quality which, in turn, 
encouraged the elaboration and the clarification and of their nature and functions.
Winnicott’s (1956; 1965) discussion on the therapeutic setting provided another 
dimension of the therapeutic frame, which he saw as safeguarding a therapeutic 
regression rather than, or in addition to, safeguarding the analysable transference, 
as Freud had argued so far. Winnicott talked about the “holding” qualities and 
function of the analytic situation. He introduced the term “holding environment” as a 
metaphor for specific aspects of the analytic situation and process. The term was 
derived from the maternal function of holding the infant, but, taken as metaphor and 
applied in the analytic situation, it extended beyond the infantile period. Talking 
about “the holding function” Winnicott (1965) says that “...the analyst is holding the 
patient, and this often takes the form of conveying the words at the appropriate 
moment something that shows that the analyst knows and understands the deepest 
anxiety that is being experience, or that is waiting to be experienced” (p.240).
Winnicott’s assertion that the analytic situation recapitulates an early-mother relation 
has been questioned by some other analysts. Discussing this issue, Modell (1976) 
reports Anna Freud’s argument that it is foolish to insist that regression in analysis 
goes back to structurally undifferentiated states of the first or second year of life; 
however, he does point out that there are actual elements in the analyst’s technique 
that are reminiscent of an idealised maternal holding environment. These involve, 
for example, that the analyst is constant and reliable; he responds to the patient’s 
effects; he accepts the patient, and his judgement is less critical and more benign; 
he is there primarily for the patient’s needs and not for his own; he does not 
retaliate; and he does at times have a better grasp of the patient’s inner psychic 
reality than does the patient himself and therefore may clarify what is bewildering 
and confusing.
Winnicott’s position has been extended by Bleger (1967) who viewed the frame or 
setting as an “institution” and “’a non-process’ made up of constants [keeping of 
times, fees, analytic contract etc.] within whose bounds the analytic process takes 
place” (p. 459). He agreed with Winnicott’s thesis that the frame represents the 
most primitive maternal relationship which he calls “the patient’s ghost-world of the 
non-ego”. Bleger talks about the frame as “the most perfect repetition compulsion... 
since it is the most complete, the least known, and the least noticeable one...”. 
Moreover he argues that “actually there are two frames, one which is suggested and 
kept up by the analyst, and consciously accepted by the patient, and the other, that 
of the ‘ghost world’ on which the patient projects” (p 462).
According to Bleger (1967) the “ghost-world”, the patient’s frame, is associated with 
terrifying psychotic anxieties and in the context of analysis the patient’s may attempt 
to alter the frame in order to avoid these anxieties. It is only when the patient’s 
frame (psychotic anxieties found in all patients) is analysed within the analyst’s 
frame (constants of the analytic situation) that basic ego development can be seen 
to unfold in the analytic experience.
This line of thought has been extended by Langs (1978a,b;1988 in Livingston-Smith 
1991) and other analysts who conceptualise the analytic frame within a 
“communicative” context or theory. This conception views the establishment and the 
management of the ground rules and setting as part of the conscious but mostly
unconscious communicative interaction between patient and therapist. According to 
Langs “the therapist’s maintenance of the ground rules and setting creates the 
background of safety, a hold and container—a defined therapeutic space and 
communicative medium—within which the patient may grow and develop, and 
resolve his intrapsychic and interpersonal conflicts” (1978a p 430)..
Communicative psychoanalysts aim to maintain a ’’secure frame” which refers to a 
specific structure of the therapeutic situation. The primary intention is to maintain 
the ground rules not because “this is the appropriate thing to do”, but because 
clinical evidence has demonstrated that this is “the deep unconscious requirement 
of patients”. And communicate analysts follow the advice of the deep unconscious 
system rather than the conscious because “they feel that the deep unconscious 
system is more in touch with emotional reality, less caught up in defence and self- 
deception” (Livingston-Smith 1991, p. 172).
According to Langs 1988 (cited in Livingston-Smith 1991) the secure frame offers 
the patient a sense of basic trust; clear interpersonal boundaries; unconscious 
support for the patient’s contact with reality; a healthy therapeutic symbiosis; a 
mode of cure through genuine insight; a situation in which the unfolding dynamics 
and genetics will center on the patient’s madness rather than the madness of 
therapist; an unconscious image and introject of the therapist as having a sound 
identity and an inner state of healthy narcissistic balances; an image of the therapist 
as sane; a powerful sense of being held well and of appropriate containment; and a 
situation of appropriate frustration and healthy satisfaction.
Core components.
This section will involve a description of the components of the therapeutic frame 
most often referred in the relevant literature. Its aim is to illustrate that despite the 
general agreement among psychoanalytic practitioners concerning the therapeutic 
importance of the frame, each aspect of the frame has proven to be quite 
controversial and sometimes difficult to conceptualise.
I. Use of the couch.
The patient reclining on the couch with the analyst sitting behind and out of sight 
was one of the ground rules proposed by Freud. Although Freud advocated that this
setup encourages transference, it is also possible that he introduced it because he 
disliked being stared at for several hours. (Freud 1912). According to Winnicott 
(1947) the use of couch encourages regression “for the neurotic the couch and 
warmth and comfort can be symbolical of the mother’s love; for the psychotic it 
would be more true to say that these things are the analyst’s physical expression of 
love. The couch is the analyst’s lap or womb...”(p. 20) Although transference and 
regression are phenomena that may occur spontaneously in psychotherapy 
Clarkson (1995), in the analytic situation the aim is to facilitate them and thus the 
use of couch is strongly recommended. Communicative psychoanalysts have, in 
addition, argued that its use helps in avoiding superficial social interaction and 
encourages derivative communication (Livingston-Smith 1991).
II. Free-association.
This was the cornerstone in Freud’s technique. That is, he asked his patients to 
share all their thoughts as they came to mind without any regard for logic or order. 
Through the patient’s associations analysts aim to understand the patients inner 
conflicts. It seems that in free association patients “reveal a lot about themselves, 
their aspirations, fears, fantasies—often far more than would be the case if the 
therapist asked questions or structured the therapeutic session more”. In practice, 
however, it is difficult for someone to share all the contents of his/her thoughts and 
thus free association is “an ideal towards the patient strives. Nevertheless, its 
principle underprints all current psychoanalytic practice. (Lemma-Wright 1995 
p. 183).
III. Analyst’s neutrality.
Neutrality is another aspect of the frame that goes back to Freud’s papers on 
technique in which he argued that the a analyst should act like “a blank screen” to 
the patient so that the patient could freely project to the analyst any feelings or 
attitudes, in other words so that to allow transference to occur (Freud 1912). 
Although prevalent among the psychoanalytic literature, the term ’’neutrality” Jias 
brought about much controversy. Although it is appreciated that it might be of 
therapeutic importance the analyst not to reveal anything about their selves as a 
person- by not disclosing his/her personal thoughts, by not answering direct 
questions etc.—as Lemma Wright (1995) states, this is a very different stance from
the one which we are used to when we communicate with another human being, 
and can, thus, be experienced as persecutory and anxiety provoking.
Modelling of blandness to evoke transference by decorating the analytic office in ten 
shades of beige with no personal items and by remaining silent in order to attain 
Freud’s (written) ideal of neutrality and so to evoke transference is a vain attempt, 
(written since his consulting room was strikingly rich, evocative and sumptuous). 
This is so, because as much as analysts try to remain “neutral”, they cannot prevent 
the wealth of information conveyed to patients by the way they dress, their general 
manner, what they choose to focus on etc. (Lemma -Wright 1995). Moreover “the 
majority of working clinicians’ experience is that transference phenomena will 
manifest whether or not the psychotherapist has a Greek urn, a modern sculpture or 
a blank wall with the occasional certificate testifying to institutional compliance... 
transference in general is likely to occur whether or not the other party 
[psychotherapist] invites, agrees or refuses it” (Clarkson 1995 p.76).
Neutrality defined as the analyst being a “blank screen” can be thus be seen as an 
ideal which is difficult to be attained and under certain circumsianc^es as 
unnecessary. The term neutrality conveys, however, another meaning as well- 
which can be seen as going back to Freud himself and Anna Freud. This refers to 
Anna Freud’s (1936 as cited in Livingston-Smith 1995) recommendation to remain 
equidistant from the conflicting forces within the patient, in other words, to apply a 
person-centered attitude and restrain from making attempts to ’’run” the patient’s 
life. The idea that the analyst should focus on the inner truth, pain and autonomy of 
the client, even if this proves to be discomforting for the analyst can be seen as 
going back to Freud’s recommendation to resist the temptation for self-disclosure 
and to act “like a mirror”. As himself put it, “it might be expected that it would be 
quite allowable and indeed useful, with a view to overcoming the patient’s existing 
resistances, for the doctor to afford him a glimpse of his own mental... conflicts and, 
by giving him intimate information about his [analyst’s] own life, enable him [patient] 
to put himself on an equal footing”. This kind of interaction, however, although 
intimate, does not facilitates the exploration of patient’s unconscious and obstacles 
the resolution transference by ’’reversing the situation [since the patient will find] the 
analysis of the doctor more interesting than his own” (Freud 1912 p432-435).
8Analyst’s anonymity can be seen as another aspect of the neutrality. Although it is 
generally accepted that the analyst’s anonymity facilitates transference, there 
seems to be an increasing awareness of the difficulties around attaining this aspect 
of the analytic frame in our days. As Clarkson (1995) states, “It is probably 
impossible for the psychotherapists to be guaranteed blank screen exempt from the 
vicissitudes and coincidences of all the revealing tendencies of life. Any dream to 
the contrary is just that” (p322). Clarkson goes on to report instances when 
therapists have met patients in supermarket’s and the later have deduced facts and 
have make fantasies about the food in the therapist’s trolley, and similar situations 
when therapist’s have met patients in surgery waiting rooms, planes, sex shops etc. 
She also refers to publlicly marked events like publications, marriage, pregnancy 
etc.
Renouncing all mechanisms of producing change (e.g. praise, advice, intimidation, 
confrontation etc.) but the fostering of genuine insight and the sharing of hypothesis 
is another aspect of ’’neutrality”, that goes back to Freud’s papers on technique. 
Related here is the debatable issue about whether analysts should employ 
interpretations as the only verbal intervention (means to make a unconscious 
phenomenon conscious) as well as whether analysts should interpret only the 
verbalised material offered by client or proceed to interpret beyond it, that is 
interpret silences, movements and other non-verbal behaviours. Space does not 
allow to expand on this important issue which can be seen as part of the ’’neutrality” 
and of the therapeutic frame but is also related with the analytic process as well.
IV. Absence of Physical contact.
Although physical contact with patients has been ruled out by classical analytical 
theory on the basis that it will contaminate transference, the issue of “touch” is a 
fraught issue within psychoanalysis. Although all writers and therapists oppose 
sexual “acting out” with a patient, a divergence exists concerning more delimited 
forms of physical contact, such as handshake, holding a patient’s hand and giving a 
patient a hug.
There seems to be as many reported instances of the use of touch in analysis as 
there are injunctions against it. Dealing with patient’s requests for physical contact is 
a complicated issue. Descriptions of deviations from the rule of abstinence seem
inconclusive. Livingston-Smith (1991) reports an instance when the therapist picked 
up the patients sweater and illustrates how the patient’s derivative response 
indicated that the patient perceived this movement as “seductive”. On the other 
hand there are many reports of incidents in which a therapist has hugged the 
patient or has hold his/her hand and this has been described as “a step to a ‘new 
beginning’” and “overcome a basic fault” (cited in Bateman & Holmes 1995). Still, 
there are reports of instances when refusal of patients’ request for physical contact 
has enabled a “re-enactment” of a painful early experience which led in a dramatic 
improvement, in a way that could not have happened had the therapist offered the 
patient the physical contact she was demanding (Casement 1985).
It seems that therapists who have deviated from the “rule of abstinence” have done 
so in an attempt to create a “more holding” environment”. Although “deviating from 
the frame” will be dealt in the following section, it is worth being reported now that it 
is difficult to give an answer whether such a deviation will have a disastrous 
outcome. Perhaps, however, the answer lies in the words of Winnicott, who 
introduced the term of the holding environment: “Occasionally holding must take a 
physical form, but I think this is only because there is a delay in the analyst’s 
understanding which he can use for verbalizing what is afoot. There are times when 
you carry round your child who has earache. Soothing words are no use. Probably 
there are times when a psychotic patient needs physical holding, but eventually it 
will be understanding and empathy that will be necessary “(Winnicott 1965 p240).
V. Total Confidentiality.
Confidentiality is an aspect of the frame for which there seems to be an agreement 
among analysts, that is, it is generally accepted that patients have an absolute right 
to expect total confidentiality ( information about the patient will not be divulged to 
others). Nevertheless analyst have been faced with the ethical question “whether or 
not to publish, or to use for teaching and training, clinical material”. Since it is 
doubtful that analysts would have been able to help their patients if they were 
unable to learn from the work of others in the field, a set of ethical guidelines 
(patient’s anonymity, consent etc.) has been developed concerning the use of 
clinical material for training and publish purposes (Casement 1985). Nevertheless, 
there are analyst who insist in total confidentiality. Livingston-Smith (1991) argues, 
for example, that there should be no note taking or recording of sessions since this
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implies that the material could fall into someone else’s hands. Communicative 
therapists actually go so far as to insist that professionals referring patients to them 
provide no information about the patient being referred.
VI. Consistency of the setting.
The analysis should take place in a single setting. Reliability and consistency, which 
are important deep unconscious values, are believed to be values expressed 
through the therapist management of the physical setting. Livingston-Smith (1991) 
provides examples that illustrate that change of rooms are perceived as a 
“threatening” frame alteration by patients. Several writers, including Livingston, point 
out, however, pragmatic difficulties in maintaining this aspect of the frame, since 
when a patient is seen within an National Health Service, for example, it is not 
possible to count on the availability of the same room from week to week.
VII. The fee.
In case payment is fixed by insurance companies or government schemes, fees is 
part of an external reality shared by the patient and analyst. In the cases where it is 
part of a private contract however, analysts tend to analyse financial matters within 
the transference relationship rather than concentrate “on reality”. In addition 
payment arrangements are seen within the context of frame. That is, it has been 
suggested that there should be a single, fixed fee paid by the patient. Therapist 
should not, ideally, alter the fee once it is set, unless this had been part of their 
initial contract with the patient. Views on free-treatment or treatment with reduced 
fee range in the literature. Some believe that this has no deleterious effect on the 
analysis while many others disagree. (Bateman & Holmes 1995).
Patient’s derivative responses on fee deviations, like not charging a patient for a 
missed appointment, or reducing the fee, have been used by communicative 
therapists to illustrate the importance of consistency and fixed fee arrangements by 
communicative therapist (Livingston -Smith 1991). Deviations on the part of the 
patient, like forgetting to sign a cheque, money difficulties arising during the 
analysis, complaints about fee arrangements originally agreed upon, are usually 
seen by analysts as indicating a questioning by the patient of the value of their 
investment in time and money. Nevertheless there seems to be an increasing 
awareness of the complexity around financial exchange in our times. As Osson
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(cited in Clarkson 1995) has pointed out there are different dimensions operating in 
the analysis of the very wealthy client and that of the patient with financial difficulties 
and “the particular dynamics of this frequently ‘taboo subject’ needs to be dealt with 
explicitly especially in cases where the need for power, sociopathic narcissism or 
control by buying affection, people, things, influence or opportunities play a major 
role.
liX. Duration of sessions and set frequency.
This is another part of the frame assumed to convey the analyst’s consistency and 
reliability. Sessions should be at a set time and each session should have a set 
duration. Although there is a convention of fifty-minute “hour”, most analyst seem to 
place more importance in the sessions taking place at the same time each week 
and having the same length, it being fifty or sixty minutes. Although some analysts 
are ready to accept pragmatic reasons for lateness (delays in train etc.) lateness for 
a session is often associated with resistances within a session. Nevertheless, most 
writers stress that there is usually no point in trying to address the lateness straight 
away, since there will be not enough supporting evidence for interpretation and 
questions are likely to divert the session away from spontaneous material.
Deviations from the frame.
Anathema, necessity or a an opportunity for break through?
Although there are analysts who insist on a strict adherence to the classical ground 
rules, there are many others who are reluctant to condemn them before exploring 
their nature and the reasons underlying their occurrence. The very fact that Freud 
and other classical analysts took a distinctly “laissez-faire” line concerning the frame 
(examples provided by Livingston-Smith 1991 and Clarkson 1995), indicates that 
strict adherence to the frame is a naïve and utopian ideal. Increasing awareness of 
this has led to a bulk of papers concerning deviations or modifications of the 
analytic situation or frame. Discussion on this issue can be seen as comprising or 
being evolved by two broad categories of deviations. Those brought by the therapist 
and those brought or requested by the patient. Deviations brought by pragmatic 
reasons, such as NHS reality or sociocontextual reasons have been also 
considered.
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Discussion about deviations brought by the analyst seems to go back on Eissler’s 
(1953) paper in which the term “parameters” was introduced. Eissler argued that 
our theoretical understanding of the structure of the ego indicates the need to 
develop varieties of (deviant) psychoanalytic technique to enhance the ego's 
achievement of mastery. This deviation, is both quantitative and qualitative 
[different], from the basic model technique, that is to say, from a technique which 
requires interpretation as the exclusive tool” (p.440). Although, here, Eissler seems 
to include only to the interpretation rule in his definition of the technique (frame) he 
does mention other aspects as well, like for example, the use of the couch, duration 
and set frequency of sessions etc.
Through clinical examples, which he backs up with theoretical knowledge, Eissler 
demonstrates the need “the technique to be adapted to the therapeutic needs of 
the patient”. Referring to patients suffering from psychopathology, beyond 
neurosis, though not exclusively, like phobia, psychosis, schizophrenia delinquency, 
to name a few, he discuses the structure of the symptom and the ego organization 
that a particular symptom is embedded and concludes that “the trend of the 
patient’s unconscious process” is what should be the analysts’ guide concerning the 
kind of analysis they undertake. More specifically he states that a parameter must 
be introduced only when: 1) the basic model of analysis does not suffice in the 
analytic situation; 2) the alteration never transgresses the unavoidable minimum; 3) 
its use can finally lead to its self-elimination; and 4) its effect on the patient’s 
transference can be undone by interpretation.
Nevertheless, he acknowledges possible dangers in the use of parameters. He 
reports that 1) the therapeutic process might be falsified so that obedience is 
substituted for structural change and for resolution of the corresponding conflicts; 
2) resistances might be temporarily eliminated without having been properly 
analysed; 3) the concept of parameters might be used to cover an inability to use 
interpretations properly and 4) parameters might have a lasting effect on patient’s 
transference—one that may not be possible to undone by interpretation. He thus 
points out that "... after an obstacle has been removed by the use of a parameter, 
the meaning which this parameter has had for the patient and the reasons that 
necessitated the choice of the parameter must retrospectively be discussed...
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interpretation must become again the exclusive toll straighten out the ruffle which 
was caused by the use of a parameter” (p. 447).
Following Eissler’s line of thought many writer’s have explored the issue of whether 
ego-defects or other dysfunctions within the patient call for modification of the usual 
limits of the analytic frame. This has resulted in advocating deviations to enhance 
the therapeutic alliance to express the “real” relationship between patient and 
therapist, to lessen the deprivation inherent in analysis and therapy, to promote the 
therapeutic relationship, to avoid unnecessary frustration of the patient, to avoid a 
trauma that the patient will not be able to tolerate, to make the therapist seem more 
human, and to demonstrate his flexibility, (reviewed by Langs 1981).
The possibility, however, that deviations may be rationalised on the ground that they 
are for the best interest of a particular patient, although in reality stem from 
countertransference problems has also been emphasised. Langs (1975), for 
example, argues that deviations usually reflect an inability on the part of the 
therapist to manage his own intrapsychic conflicts and to handle the stirrings within 
himself evoked by the patient. He goes on to say that such unresolved 
countertransference problems are unconsciously detected by patients. According to 
Langs the therapist must be aware that “even when deviations are invoked in 
emergency situations or when a ground rule is altered for some other real reason, 
they generally provide the therapist -and the patient- with inappropriate 
gratifications and repetitions of pathogenic object relationships” (p. 483)— and this 
too will be unconsciously perceived by the patient.
The therapeutic aspects of “keeping” the analytic frame have already been 
discussed in the present essay. In addition to facilitating a “secure”, “holding” 
environment and of giving the patient an experience of a sane reliable and 
consistent therapist who is able to establish clear interpersonal boundaries, the 
analytic frame can also generate several anxieties. The study of the nature of these 
anxieties constitutes the basis of arguments for the need to maintain the analytic 
frame and the need to modify it.
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Sieger’s (1967) suggestion that the patient brings his own frame, psychotic in core, 
to the analytic situation and will attempt to have the analyst modify the frame in 
order to create a sense of magical union with him and to evoke a magical cure, is an 
example of an anxiety that calls the analyst to maintain the frame, since any break 
or deviation may result in “bringing the ‘non-ego’ to a crisis, contradicting the fusion, 
challenging the ego, and compelling ego changes and defences”. In addition to 
maintaining the frame, Bleger also points out to the need to analyse it, since the 
frame may become a kind of addiction if it is not systematically analysed, leading to 
a false ego development without internal stability.
Livingston-Smith (1991) designates another type of anxiety that the analytic frame 
may evoke within patients. That is, he refers to evidence indicating that the “secure- 
frame” might evoke a powerful form of unconscious existential dread, which has 
been termed as “secure-frame anxiety” or death anxiety”. Although this 
phenomenon is not yet fully understood, a plausible suggested explanation is that 
“the secure frame universally symbolises the limitations of human existence, the 
inexorable constraints of time and death imposed by nature which throw us back on 
an awareness of our own fragile mortality “ (pi 89). Livingston-Smith discusses the 
fact that communicative psychotherapy strives to maintain a secure frame as an 
essential and indispensable component of the psychotherapeutic situation and 
points out that this places limitations on the types of patients that may benefit from 
it. He acknowledges that certain “frame-sensitive” patients (usually patients with a 
history of severe traumatization) may not be able to tolerate the “secure” frame 
provided by the communicative setting for long.
Practitioners of the communicative analytic approach aim to work towards creating 
new and benign forms of psychotherapy appropriate for the treatment of “frame- 
sensitive” patients. Until then, the structure within which they work involves a 
devotion to the ground rules; however this devotion is not dogmatic and in principle 
it accepts the possibility of adapting the frame to individual needs. Whether the 
analyst will keep the frame or will proceed in modifying it depends on the deep 
unconscious requirements of patients. That is, when a patients proposes a deviation 
or change of the frame “ the communicative psychoanalyst says neither ‘yes’ nor 
‘no’ to the patient. He or she waits for unconscious feedback [through free- 
association] about the issue and is fully prepared to conform with the patient’s
15
unconscious recommendations. Unconsciously, patients virtually always, however, 
urge analysts to maintain a secure frame with strictly defined ground rules and clear 
interpersonal boundaries” ( Livingston-Smith 1991 p i70.)
Concluding.
The importance of the analytic frame lies in the observed, throughout the history of 
psychoanalysis, property to provide a means for creating a “secure”, “safe”, and 
“holding” environment with clear interpersonal boundaries, in the context of which 
patient’s intrapsychic pain is contained and the patient is helped to face their 
intrapsychic conflicts.
Braking the frame has never been considered as something beneficial on face- 
value. Published clinical observations indicate, however, that deviations in the 
frame may occur in many forms, on many levels, and entail a variety of meanings. 
Assuming that maintaining the ground rules or frame is the only way through which 
analysts can provide patients a therapeutic experience is like making a myth an 
imperative in which case it becomes persecutory and oppressive—lacking creativity 
and genuineness. Current analytic practitioners free from the grandiose and 
naivete of this myth seem to strive to upheld the ground rules while at the same time 
to explore the meaning and how to manage deviations. This might sound 
paradoxical, and in practice can prove to be a complex process, but who said that 
analytic work is an easy straight-forward process?
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Describe how the term countertransference has been defined. 
Providing clinical examples, illustrate how it can help us 
understand what is going on in therapy.
The following seventy five years from Freud’s seminal thoughts and work on 
transference and countertransference the empirical definitions of these concepts 
have been challenged and enlarged, while their clinical psychoanalytic meaning 
continues to be viewed as relatively open. Their conceptual and clinical study has 
actually provided a cumulative body of knowledge which, although largely 
provisional, has set the ground for the reconstructible foundations of the field of 
psychoanalytic inquiry.
The phenomenon of transference has been regarded both as the greatest danger 
and the best tool for analytic work. Exploring and interpreting transference as well 
as helping the client to work it through are among the central goals in 
psychoanalysis and psychoanalytic psychotherapy. (This does not mean that 
transference does not occur in other types of therapy, but in analytic therapy it is 
magnified, especially in terms of its overt expressions). In other words, analytic 
therapy centres around the process by which the client experiences and displays 
feelings, thoughts and fantasies onto the therapists which are not based on present 
day reality but rather on feelings and thoughts the client has experienced in 
relations with significant people in his/her past. Client’s may idealise therapists, 
become dependent on them like on parental figures, fall in love with them, develop 
sexual feelings towards them and so on (positive transference), but may also 
constantly criticise and belittle therapists or angrily reject and destroy therapists’ 
efforts to help them (negative transference). Exploring the extend to which such 
reactions are based on reality or are transferred on the therapist from significant 
figures in the client’s past, is considered of vital importance for the therapeutic 
process. (Clarkson 1995; Gelso & Carter 1994;Wolstein 1988).
The extend to which countertransference can act as a hindrance or as a valuable 
tool in understanding clients and in interpreting transference seems to constitute a 
debate in the historical development of psychoanalytic conceptions of 
countertransference. From the early days of its conception, countertransference 
referred to the therapist’s feelings towards the client. In contrast with transference
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for which most writers will agree on what it involves, countertransference has been 
given various meanings. These can be summarised by saying that for some writers 
countertransference involves any psychological response of the analyst to the 
analysand, for others it is only the therapist’s unconscious feelings and thoughts 
towards the client, whereas for some others it is only those reactions of the analyst 
to the client that are inappropriate and irrational. The therapeutic usefulness of 
countertransference can be actually seen as a theme which is closely connected to 
the various meanings that countertransference has been given. An attempt to 
discuss issues around countertransference definition and therapeutic utility will 
follow.
Freud’s concern about protecting the patient from the potentially damaging effects 
of the analyst’s inner processes and their products, was shared by other analysts for 
a long time period. This resulted in viewing countertransference as reflecting the 
analyst’s residual pathology, his/her blind spots which presented an obstacle to 
analysis. At this point it must be reported that although Freud viewed 
countertransference “as an obstruction to the freedom of the analyst’s 
understanding of the patient” and he strongly recommended that practising 
psychoanalysts should keep all countertransference out of their clinical work, he did 
write that ‘“the analyst must turn his own unconscious like a receptive organ towards 
the transmitting unconscious of the patient... [so] the doctor’s unconscious mind is 
able... to reconstruct [the patient’s unconscious]”’. Moreover at the same time that 
he called for the repression of countertransference within the actual clinical inquiry, 
he based a lot of his speculative interpretations on his own self-analysis. (Epstein & 
Feiner 1988; Wolstein 1988; Sandler 1976; Heiman 1950).
So it seems that one can say that Freud was ambivalent concerning 
countertransference’s therapeutic utility. This uncertainty can be seen as underlying 
Freud’s as well as other analyst’s experience of (primitive ) anxiety and guilt when 
faced with the powerful phenomenon of countertransference. Unresolved struggles 
to overcome such feelings most likely led analysts to reject countertransference 
(Racker 1988), which resulted at a delay of forty years before the psychoanalytic 
community sensed the possibility that the study of countertransference can help 
analysts to derive and formulate interventions that might enhance the therapeutic 
process.
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In the early fifties a gradual shift took place from regarding the analyst's emotional 
or affective reactions as errors from which the client naturally needs to be protected 
to regarding these responses as significant data with a potential for illuminating the 
therapeutic situation. The goal of seeking self analysis was also shifted from the 
one of becoming “a blank screen” and of acquiring a superior mental health, to 
trying “to overcome infantile ideals more thoroughly accepting more fully the fact 
that we [analysts] are still children and neurotics even when we are adults and 
analysts” (Racker 1988, p. 161). This brought up awareness of the significance of 
utilising this insight to help clients overcome their own neuroses or pathology, which 
in turn facilitated a movement in the direction of greater participation of the therapist 
in the analytic situation.
This movement has been accompanied by a bulk of research and papers that 
attempt to describe as well as categorise therapists reactions to clients within the 
analytic situation, that is to define countertransference. The view of some of the 
writers that have contributed to the brake of the classical view that 
countertransference is simply a hindrance in the psycho-analytic work will follow. 
Although the work of these writers has aided the elaboration of the concept and 
the appreciation of its therapeutic usefulness, the way they conceptualise 
countertransference differs in terms of whether they consider the term to comprise 
only the therapist’s responses that have been elicited by or induced in him/her by 
the client; only those that result from unresolved conflicts within the therapist; or 
both.
Heimann (1950) was among the pioneers who offered revisions of the concept. She 
conceptualised countertransference as covering all feelings which the analyst 
experiences towards his patients and described it as “an instrument of research into 
the patient’s unconscious”. She argued that countertranserence is the most 
dynamic way in which a client’s voice reaches the therapist and thus when an 
analyst tries to work “without consulting his feelings, his interpretations are poor”. 
She went on to say that “our basic assumption is that the analyst’s unconscious 
understands that of his patient... [and the analyst’s] unconscious perception of the 
patient’s unconscious is more acute and in advance of his conscious conception of 
the situation (p. 81-83)”.
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Winnicott viewed countertransference as being divided between the situation in 
which the therapist is reacting accurately or objectively to the client's projections, 
personality and behaviour (objective countertransference) and to that in which the 
therapist is introducing his her own unresolved or repressed conflicts into the 
analytic work (idiosyncratic, abnormal countertransference). Winnicott saw 
abnormal countertransference as evidence that the analyst needs more analysis 
and believed that only the objective countertransference is therapeutically useful. 
He suggested that the main task of the analyst is to ‘“maintain objectivity’”, which 
may involve analyst’s love and hate in reaction to the “‘actual personality and 
behaviour of the patient based on objective observation’”. “‘Objective and justified 
hatred’ in countertransference was actually perceived as a maturation process, a 
state that the patient ‘must be able to reach... else he cannot feel he can reach 
objective love’” (as cited in Epstein & Feiner 1988 p286-287).
Growley (1988) distinguishes between rational and appropriate reactions of analysts 
and inappropriate and irrational ones. He defines the later as countertransference 
and argues that distinguishing countertransference from the totality of an analyst’s 
reactions “has its precedent in distinguishing a patient’s transference reactions from 
the totality of his reactions to his analyst”. However, he suggests that both need to 
be explored since both can enhance therapist’s understanding of the client and thus 
facilitate therapeutic progress. As it will be soon demonstrated, Growley calls 
rational responses what other writers would have called countertransference, but he 
describes them as being equally significant in informing us about what is going on in 
therapy. This makes one think of the importance of therapist’s responses for such 
an understanding, independently of whether these reactions are called 
countertransference or not.
Among the number of rational responses that Growley (1988) illustrates are the 
following: An analyst feels sorry for a patient, and examining his feelings he realises 
that the way this patient operates with many people is to make them sorry for her as 
a helpless victim of circumstances. An analyst notices sexual phantasies about a 
patient, who, it turns out, was behaving in coyly seductive ways and having sexual 
phantasies herself without mentioning them. Another analyst wonders why he 
especially liked a certain patient and discovers this patient is the only one in his 
practice who is really moving in his analysis while all the others are sitting passively
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waiting for him to get them out. And finally an analyst feels afraid of a certain patient 
and a Rorschach shows active homicidal tendencies.
Growley (1988) argues that appropriate responses can be a valuable tool for 
understanding patients while countertransference (which comprises of the 
therapist’s transference in the therapeutic situation) can also be used as such if 
treated like rational responses. This point will be become clear by reporting a clinical 
example which illustrates partially appropriate and partially countertransference 
reaction. This involves an analyst who finds it difficult to listen to his patient, feels 
quite angry and is thinking “what stupid story”, or “how can anyone be so boring?”. 
Exploring his thoughts and feelings the analysts remembers that he often used to 
listened to his father’s endless tales feeling mounting range but being unable to
express it. He actually realises that this is what he has repeatedly done with this
patient, feeling angry while withdrawing. Growley identifies “the transference from 
the father to the patient, the character defences of submitting and becoming
enraged and blaming and belittling the other person” as irrational elements,
countertransference, in the therapist response. At the same time he argues for 
evidence of a “real provocation” in this situation, appropriate responses, since the 
patient was being “long-winded and pointless”. Going further and exploring the 
reasons why this patient engages himself in pointless story telling, is what Crowley 
suggests that will facilitate an understanding of the patient and may enhance 
therapeutic work. Countertransference (anger) must be recognised, and then be 
“used to detect what the patient did to provoke it and exactly why, as one would in a 
reaction that was entirely rational and appropriate”
Racker (1988), suggested the acceptance of countertransference as “the totality of 
the analyst’s psychological response to the patient” (p. 165) and argued that 
although it may be dominated by idiosyncratic or even pathological components, it is 
likely to yield significant information about the patient’s immediate ego state. 
According to Racker the analyst’s intention to understand creates the predisposition 
to identify oneself with the analysand (basis of comprehension). He distinguished 
between concordant and complementary identifications or countertransference. The 
former involves empathetic responses to the patient’s thoughts and feelings and 
takes place when the therapist identifies with patient’s ego or id. The 
complementary identifications involve the process in the analyst by which, because
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he/she feels treated as and partially identifies him/herself with an internal object of 
the patient, the patient becomes an internal (projected) object in the analyst. In 
other words the therapists finds him/herself in the emotional position of some 
unwanted (projected) part of the patient's self (superego).
In a brief example, Racker refers to a patient who threatens the analyst with suicide, 
which is a situation that sometimes lead to rejection of the concordant identifications 
by the analyst and an intensification of his/her identification with the threatened 
object. He asserts that the anxiety that the analyst might feel may result to various 
reactions or defence mechanisms within him/herself (i.e. annoyance with the 
patient), which (anxiety and annoyance) are contents of the “complementary 
countertransference”. The perception of his/her annoyance may, however, in turn, 
originate guilt feelings in the analyst and these are likely to lead to desires for 
reparation and to intensification of “concordant” identification, concordant 
countertransference.
Racker (1988) argues that countertransference reactions are governed by the laws 
of the general and individual unconscious. Of particular importance is the “law of 
talion” according to which “every positive transference situation is answered by a 
positive countertransference; to every negative transference there responds, in one 
part of the analyst, a negative countertransference”. Awareness of this law is 
fundamental to avoid “drowing in the countertransference” and entering into the 
vicious circle of the analysand's neurosis, which will hinder or even prevent the work 
of therapy. To illustrate this point Racker brings up a hypothetical example which 
involves a male patient whose neurosis centres around a conflict with his introjected 
father, and who projects the latter upon the analyst and treat him as his father. 
According to Racker the analysts will feel treated as such- he/she will feel treated 
badly- and will react internally, in a part of his/her personality, in accordance with 
the treatment he /she receives. If the analyst is conscious of this response 
(countertransference) and recognises it as being provoked by the projection of the 
father-imago upon him/her, he /she can more easily make the patient conscious of 
this projection and the consequent mechanisms. Interpretation of these 
mechanisms will show the patient that the present reality is not identical with his 
inner perceptions (for if it were, the analyst would not interpret and otherwise act as 
an analyst) and the patient may then introject a reality better than his inner world. In
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case the analyst is under the sway of his/her unconscious countertransference, 
however, this sort of rectification will not take place. The analyst’s behaviour will be 
affected by his/her lack of awareness of his/her countertransference reaction and 
he/she will most likely renew the situation that, to a greater or lesser degree, helped 
to establish the analysand’s neurosis.
Part of a clinical illustration provided by Casement (1990) can be seen as a real 
situation of Packer’s hypothetical example. He actually illustrates that what the 
analyst feels in the session “may convey important diagnostic clues for 
understanding elusive communications from the patient” and for avoiding entering 
patient’s neurotic vicious circle. This clinical example involves a patient of his. Miss 
A, who was thirty five and had a long history of severe agitated depression. Briefly, 
when seventeen she was knocked off her bicycle by a lorry and six months after this 
accident she begun to develop agitated movement of her arms and legs. Her 
agitation was severe and soon she became confined to a wheel-chair and within 
months she also become doubly incontinent. Although teenager, she was relegated 
to a geriatric ward from which she was discharged after ten years. By the time she 
went to see Casement, an intense course of EOT had resulted in the recovery of 
her ability to walk, but she had not lose the agitated movements of her arms.
At the time of the description that will follow Miss A had not yet committed herself to 
analysis which was taking place twice a week. Casement was seeing her for about a 
year and in the first part of his paper he talks about having observed that Miss A 
almost always talked in a lifeless and boring way about the daily details of her many 
years in hospital. He actually describes his capacity for sustaining a spontaneous 
interest in her monotonous outpouring as beginning to be sorely tried and himself as 
often switching off. Casement started wondering how he would continue on seeing 
Miss A since she was “beginning to bore [him] out [his] mind”. This was actually 
something that he perceived as an issue that required “active and thorough self- 
examination”.
Describing his self-exploration he says: “I struggled with my unruly feelings towards 
this patient in every way I knew... Did Miss A represent some other relationship for 
me, from which I might be retreating into boredom as a defence? But I could not 
recognise anything that really confirm this. Or was it simply that I did not like this
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patient? Perhaps I just couldn’t stand her! And yet I felt a real concern for her- and 
basically I liked her.”. Casement describes himself as unable to understand his 
response until the time that he noticed a striking similarity between how he was 
feeling and how Miss A had described her being with her father. That is, when the 
father visited her in the hospital (twice a week) he had merely listened to her 
complaints, but never did anything to have this changed, as if he either did not care 
or perhaps could not cope with seeing his daughter in a geriatric ward. Casement 
wondered whether the father was just switching off from the appalling facts of her 
life and whether Miss A had related to him by retreating into a hopeless non­
relating, telling the details of day-to-day life in the hospital, just like the way she was 
relating events to Casement. In other words he realised that she was not expecting 
the therapist to be emotionally engaged by her, or interested in her and so in effect, 
he had virtually become an embodiment of the switched-off father.
Thinking about how to use this insight interpretively. Casement monitored each 
possible interpretation, through trial-identifying with her and discounted the idea of 
making any direct reference to his feelings of bored. He finally decided to 
empathetically explore with her the way in which she was relating to himby saying: “I 
am feeling puzzled... you speak to me as if you are not expecting me to be 
interested in what you are saying”. Moreover, he made a link with the way she used 
to relate with her father and the way she was relating to him (therapist): "... you 
became used to him not doing anything about what was happening to you... 
expecting me not to do anything with what you are telling me”. Miss A’s response 
was a short silence followed by her mentioning of other similarities between the two 
situations (e.g. seeing father & therapist twice a week). Casement reports that an 
emotional relationship begun to develop as Miss A started to relate to him “more as 
a person” after this confrontation. Moreover she committed herself to analytic 
treatment.
This clinical example demonstrates how a therapist can explore his/her feelings 
towards his/her client and use information that he/she knows about the client to 
explain these feelings (interpret countertransference) and to increase understanding 
of the client. Whether the therapist should communicate his/her feelings or just 
provide the client with an interpretation seems to constitute an issue of debate 
among writers. Some argue that the therapist must feel free do so, since patients
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need to experience the therapist as a human being with whom it is possible to have 
genuine contact (i.e. Little, in Epstein & Feiner 1988). Others rule out direct 
communication of countertransference. They view such honesty more in the nature 
of confession and a burden to the patient and suggest that it should be used only as 
a source of insight into the patient's conflicts and defences (i.e. Heiman 1950). 
Selective communication of countertransference (as in the case of the clinical 
example provided by Casement) is what others have recommended (i.e. Racker 
1988).
Important to be noted at this point, is that since therapy is a process that, at least 
initially, develops in a relative unpredictable context and largely depends upon the 
development of a therapeutic engagement in the relationship between the therapist 
and the patient, one can cannot provide readily made prescriptions about any kind 
of intervention including communication of countertransference. If we assume that 
most of the dynamics in the therapeutic situation are lead by the patient, it follows 
that therapists should develop interventions by consulting the most reach (and 
“safe”) source of reference, the client.
The importance of countertransference in understanding what is going on in therapy 
is tremendous. No matter how skilled or experienced a therapist is, there may be 
times that he/she will not understand what is going on in therapy. Such instances 
often call one to consider the involvement of countertransference issues. 
Thorough self-exploration in a (self) supervision context will most likely provide an 
explanation of what is going on. This may, however, still not happen, that is, one 
might not reach an understanding through (self) supervision, or he/she might think 
that has gained one but soon (probably in the next session) he/ she might realise 
that that was not the case. Although one can provide an endless list of explanations 
for this, for the purposes of the present discussion it is worth to consider the 
possibility that countertransference issues are involved, but the therapist has failed 
to grasp them.
An endless list might again be provided here concerning the effect that this might 
have on the therapeutic process. This list will most likely involve scenaria 
demonstrating a “negative” development in therapy like “poor interpretations”, 
“patient leaving therapy”, therapist or patient feeling stuck” etc. This scenaria can be
26
true as it has already been demonstrated in previous sections of this paper. A case 
example provided by Gelso & Carter (1994) illustrates, however, that when a 
therapist lacks insight into his/her countertransference with a client with who he/she 
has a strong working alliance, it (defined as all feelings therapists experiences in his 
work with patient) can come into open by the client him/herself and thus be worked 
through.
This clinical illustration involves a male therapist and a 35 years old female client 
with who he had worked for 2 years ( twice a week, in analytically oriented therapy) 
and had a very sound working alliance. There was a point, however, that the client 
became increasingly frustrated and hurt because each time she brought up her 
difficulties with her children, the therapist seemed to respond non-empathetically 
and at times even critically. During one session she expressed these observations 
and feelings to the therapist who became aware that, in fact, his conflicts with his 
parenting of his own children were interfering with the empathetic process with this 
client. Having grasped his countertransference reaction, the therapist was able to 
regain his empathetic stance during exploration of the client’s parenting. This 
example illustrates that the solidity of the working alliance can allow or encourage 
the client to realistically confront the therapist which is something that can be 
“insight for the therapist and [can] facilitate the treatment process” (Gelso & Carter 
1994 p. 299-300).
In conclusion, despite the plethora of definitions of countertransference and the 
lack of agreement on how it should be dealt in the therapeutic situation, most of the 
current writers and therapist appear to agree on the crucial importance of 
countertransference in analytic therapy. Clinical illustrations provided in this paper 
show that the countertransference can help us understand what is going on both 
within the client and the therapist. It can also be informative of what is going on in 
therapy. As Racker (1988) has argued, ”to clarify better of countertransference, one 
might start from the question of what happens... in the analyst in his relationship 
with the patient”. As he says, however, this is a very difficult question to be 
answered since “everything happens that can happen in one personality faced with 
another”.
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What role does an effective therapeutic alliance play in the use of 
cognitive approaches in therapy?
Maintaining relatedness to others has survival value not only in the long period of 
dependency during infancy, but also in later life. Relationship or the 
interconnectedness between two people has been significant in all healing since the 
time of Hippocrates and Galen. It appears to be one of the significant features in any 
major change or development in peoples lives, whether this happens as a result of 
falling in love, being in crisis, educational development, religious conversion or effective 
psychological therapy.
The concept of therapeutic or working alliance is part of the client-therapist relationship 
and involves co-operation between client and therapist which underpins all effective 
helping. Even though the therapeutic or working alliance seems to be first 
encountered as a concept in psychoanalytic theory (Greenson 1967; Sterba 1934), its 
nature, use, and significance has been addressed in almost all therapeutic models 
and respective approaches. Working alliance constitutes one of the five different kinds 
of psychotherapeutic relationships discussed by Clarkson (1995), who defines it as “the 
part of client-psychotherapist relationship that enables the client and therapist to work 
together even when the patient or client experiences some desire to the contrary” 
(p31).
As Wills and Sanders (1997) report, traditionally, and in contrast to other therapeutic 
approaches, the task of cognitive therapy was seen to be to resolve the client’s 
problems, as far as possible, using the tools of cognitive therapy rather than using the 
therapeutic relationship per se. That is, although a good relationship had to be in place 
in order to do the work, this was seen as necessary but not sufficient for therapeutic 
change (Beck et al., 1979). The ‘necessary but not sufficient’ view of the therapeutic 
relationship has been central to cognitive therapy and is perhaps the reason for the 
existence of a common misconception about cognitive therapy, namely that the 
‘relationship between client and therapist is considered unimportant’ (Trower et al., 
1988). Somehow, many writings on cognitive therapy give the impression that the
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therapeutic relationship is a mere container in which to do the real work, viewing 
difficulties and issues in the therapeutic relationship as problems to be solved before 
getting on with therapy (Wills & Sanders 1997).
The argument that the therapeutic relationship, itself, was not an active ingredient in 
cognitive therapy- like, for example, it has been for psychodynamic or Rogerian 
therapists, for who its quality is central for therapeutic progress—constitutes one of the 
major criticism of cognitive therapy. Current writings assume, however, this argument, 
if not incorrect, at least anachronistic. Writers like Beck et al (1990), Safran and Segal 
(1990), Layden et al. (1993), and Wills and Sanders (1997) among many others, have 
consider the development of our understanding of the therapeutic process and have 
integrated into cognitive therapy humanistic concepts of warmth, acceptance, and “here 
and now” situation as well as psychodynamic concepts of transference and 
countertransference,- once considered to be a taboo for cognitive therapists.
In this essay, an effective working alliance will be viewed as the part of client-therapist 
relationship that allows them to work together within a trustful and safe context and 
which develops and changes throughout therapy.
This essay will attempt to answer the question about the role of an effective 
therapeutic alliance in the use of cognitive approaches in therapy, by considering the 
growing cognitive model that has resulted by writers like the aforementioned. This will 
involve discussion on how an effective therapeutic alliance can facilitate cognitive 
therapy’s focus on changing belief systems, reinforcing and refining reality testing, and 
developing coping strategies. The core conditions that have to be in place before any 
cognitive work can proceed will be addressed and then emphasis will be given on the 
role of the concepts of collaborative relationship and collaborative empiricism. 
Difficulties in establishing a collaborative relationship and the effect that such 
difficulties may have upon the therapeutic alliance and progress will be then discussed. 
Finally the way that the consideration of concepts such as transference, 
countertransference and the “here and now” situation, can strengthen the therapeutic 
alliance and result in therapeutic breakthrough will be discussed.
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Therapy Structure.
Providing a clear treatment structure constitutes a major way in which cognitive 
therapists work towards building a healthy and effective therapeutic alliance, which in 
turn facilitates therapeutic progress. That is, cognitive therapists provide a structure for 
therapy as a whole and for individual sessions within therapy. These involve the 
therapist and client discussing and agreeing on therapeutic goals which are specific 
and achievable in the time available; negotiating and trying to keep an open agenda in 
each and every session; and the therapist being clear and consistent in regard to 
therapeutic boundaries -such as the time each session lasts, amount of fee paid, if 
applicable, and confidentiality and cancellation policies (Fennell 1990; Wills & Sanders 
1997).
When the therapist is being clear, consistent and open to negotiation, when 
appropriate, on structural matters, the client is likely to experience the therapist as 
reliable and trustworthy. A secure and safe atmosphere is created that allows 
development of rapport between client and therapist.
Therapy structure is crucial and central to cognitive therapy. It provides the cognitive 
therapist with effective tools to use in the therapeutic process. Mastering the 
techniques required to provide a good therapy structure is not, however, sufficient for 
therapeutic progress and change. As Wills and Sanders (1997) reports, becoming a 
cognitive therapist involves “the process... of both mastering techniques and integrating 
these into the context of the relationship” (p57). It is actually the combination of 
applying the techniques that cognitive models offer, while at the same time paying 
attention and being sensitive to the development of the therapist-client relationship, 
that leads to an effective and strong therapeutic alliance. The following sections will 
explore the relationship context within which cognitive therapists apply their 
therapeutic tools.
The Core Conditions
Cognitive therapy, similarly to any other psychological therapy, recognises the 
significance of the core conditions of empathy, understanding, genuineness, respect.
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congruence and unconditional non-possessive positive regard. The client has to feel 
understood and respected before she shares her inner world with the therapist. If the 
core conditions are in place, it is likely that the client will feel safe to identify and 
challenge her strange and illogical thoughts (Wills & Sanders 1997).
Keeping the core conditions is likely to result in the development of a healthy and 
strong therapeutic alliance and give the client the impression that This is someone 
[therapist] that I can trust’, as Beck (1976) says. Having a gentle, caring style which 
respects the client’s perspective, being adept at reflecting not only the overt content of 
what the client says, but also the feelings and confusions expressed or implied, and 
being careful not to impinge or impose will most likely result the therapist to come over 
as friendly, warm and accepting, with confident sincerity and professionalism. This will, 
in turn, facilitate a rapport building between client and therapist which will enable them 
to work together, to challenge thoughts and beliefs which appear problematic to the 
client, to enable such challenging work to take place (Fennell 1996; Wills & Sanders 
1997). Client and therapist working together constitutes a major principle in cognitive 
therapy. The way that this ‘working together" takes place, the way it strengthens the 
therapeutic alliance and its therapeutic effect are discussed in the following section.
Collaborative relationship and collaborative empiricism.
In cognitive therapy , client and therapist are engaged together as a team, first in 
exploring immediate thinking and underlying assumptions, and then in actively working 
to change the ones that have been identified as problematic to the client. Describing 
the nature of the collaborative relationship and its therapeutic effect Beck et al. (1985) 
say: ’’The cognitive therapist implies that there is a team approach to the solution of 
patient’s problems: that is, a therapeutic alliance where the patient supplies raw data 
(reports on thoughts and behaviour...) while the therapist provides structure and 
expertise on how to solve problems. The emphasis is on working on problems rather 
than on correcting defects or changing personality. The therapists fosters the attitude 
‘two heads are better than one’ in approaching personal difficulties... As therapy 
progresses, the patient is encouraged to take a more active stance” (pi 75).
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Cognitive therapy can be viewed as an experiment which therapist and client are 
conducting together. This is the 'empiricism' of collaborative empiricism’. First a 
hypothesis is developed about the factors accounting for the development and 
maintenance of current problems (the conceptualisation). Then the hypothesis is tested 
through a series of organised interventions manipulating key variables (working to 
change negative automatic thoughts and assumptions). Outcome of what is done at 
each stage is carefully assessed, measuring changes in thinking, mood and behaviour. 
Similarly the client is taught to see his/her thoughts and assumptions not as facts, but 
as hypotheses which are open to question and whose validity may be tested through 
behavioural experiments. So, clients learn ways of testing out their theories about 
themselves, other people and the world and to examine how far these theories fit the 
facts and how helpful they are. The aim is to use experience to come up with new 
theories which will be more realistic and more helpful (Fennel 1996).
Maintaining the core conditions and applying the collaborative spirit previously 
described can be seen as being in a dynamic relationship with the therapeutic alliance 
between client and therapist. That is, they result in the development of a trusting and 
secure atmosphere in which both client and therapist will feel safe to explore client’s 
difficulties, underlying cognitive schemata and assumptions, and will eventually 
proceed in conducting cognitive and behavioural experimentation of alternative ways of 
being.
Difficulties in establishing a collaborative relationship.
Collaboration is the cornerstone of cognitive therapy; however, it is not always easy to 
achieve. One of the of the common relationship difficulties is problems with 
collaboration (Wills & Sanders 1997). Although it might be tempting to view such 
difficulties as obstacles to be solved before getting on with the ‘real work’ of therapy, 
such difficulties can actually reveal important information about the effectiveness of the 
therapist’s therapeutic stance or style and can also be used to understand the client, 
her mode of relating to others, and to promote therapeutic change.
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Collaboration difficulties may highlight a situation in which rather than both client and 
therapist working together, in an open manner, to resolve the client’s difficulties, the 
therapist may become the ‘expert’ and start to offer directive advice; tasks may be set, 
not negotiated; the client may become ‘over-compliant’ or non-compliant’, for example 
‘agreeing’ with the therapist on homework tasks and then not carrying them out. The 
therapist may get the feeling of being ‘bully’, teacher’ or ‘political campaigner’ in the 
sessions. When collaboration difficulties are observed by the therapist, she can see 
this as an opportunity for self reflection and development. This will involve exploration 
of the possibility the therapist to lack empathy, or not be able to understand the client, 
causing difficulties in remaining on objective collaborator (Wills & Sanders 1997).
Work around difficulties in the therapeutic alliance can also be one of the ways that 
therapeutic breakthrough can be brought about in cognitive therapy. Safran and Segal 
(1990) take the view, for example, that alliance ruptures often occur when the 
therapeutic relationship activates an important interpersonal schema. The process of 
identifying such difficulties and work with them is, in itself, a major therapeutic 
intervention. It can actively used in therapy particularly where clients have not had the 
experience of resolving difficulties with others, or where people in the client’s life do not 
have the time, patience or knowledge to work things through.
Constructive resolution of alliance ruptures provides an ideal opportunity to 
conceptualise, explore, challenge and modify interpersonal schema. Beck et al. (1990) 
identify several kinds of schema underlying problems in collaboration. These include 
themes of distrust of the therapist, personal shame, grievances against others, 
deprecation of self or others, or fear of rejection. In addition the client may simply not 
know how to collaborate, or may fear change.
Exploring alliance ruptures often involves exploration of the client’s interpersonal style 
and patterns of relating to others. In practice, clients will bring their interpersonal style, 
and difficulties, into therapy. The client’s reactions to the therapist, and the therapy, 
whilst not forming the cornerstone of therapy, nor being deliberately provoked in 
cognitive therapy, provide unique opportunities to assess, understand and work on
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dysfunctional interpersonal schemata, assumptions and beliefs (Beck et al. 1990; 
Safran & Segal 1990). Recent writers’ suggestions on how a cognitive therapist may go 
about to explore what is going on in his/her relationship with a client, involve the use of 
the psychodynamic concepts of transference and countertransference and of the 
humanistic “here and now” situation, which are seen are valuable aids to 
conceptualisation and to therapeutic progress. (Sefran & Segal 1990; Wills & Sanders 
1997).
Wavs of exploring what is going on in the therapeutic relationship.
Wills and Sanders (1997) quote Layden et al.’s 1993 argument that ‘“in order for the 
therapist to deal effectively with his or her own role in the interaction, it is imperative 
that he or she have an intellectual empathetic understanding of the cognitive and 
emotional baggage that the patient brings to sessions’” (p.61).
What happens in the therapeutic relationship is very likely to mirror the client’s 
psychological world. In Wills and Sanders words, “the core beliefs and assumptions 
and mechanisms by which the client confirms these assumptions are illustrated in vivo” 
(61). Observing and then reflecting the client’s way of relating to the therapist and 
therapy- in an appropriate manner and at an appropriate time- the therapist might 
appear challenging initially; however, if such a reflection is accompanied by an 
empathetic and sensitive invitation to explore the underlying mechanisms 
(assumptions, schemata), this process is likely to result in strengthening the therapeutic 
alliance and in turn the therapeutic progress. In other words, working on what is going 
on in the therapeutic relationship, the therapist will come across as someone who is 
interested and sensitive to client’s difficulties. At the same time, a situation is created 
where therapist and client can work on revealed difficulties and experiment on 
alternative ways of being and relating.
Assuming that the client’s behaviour with and reaction to the therapist may be driven by 
her underlying problems, and therefore is similar to behaviours with others. Persons 
(1989) discusses a number of behaviours that clients often exhibit and suggests 
possible schemata that these behaviours might be driven by. For example, being late
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for sessions or not doing homework may be driven by a number of different schemata; 
schemata relating to extremely high standards, which can result in problems with being 
disorganised and chaotic outside and an inability to get anything done on time; or to 
core beliefs of ‘worthlessness’, which can result in the client not feeling it is worth 
making the effort for herself to try anything that might help. Alternatively, the client may 
not be willing to come to sessions on time, or work on tasks between sessions, which 
may indicate fear of dependency on the therapist or therapy.
Since it takes two for a relationship to exist, exploring what is going on in the 
therapeutic relationship involves looking at the effect of the therapist’s responses to the 
client. Recent writings on cognitive therapy acknowledge the existence of 
countertransference, which is defined as the totality of the therapists responses to the 
client, including thoughts, schemata, emotions, actions and intentions (Safran & Segal 
1990; Wills and Sanders 1997). That is, it is assumed that the therapist feels in a 
certain way about a client both because this can be an effect of the client’s schema, but 
also as a result of the therapist’s own schemata. Therapists are encouraged to 
acknowledge and explore their feelings and reactions, which are used “in the service of 
therapy rather than allowing them to become obstacles in therapy” (Safran & Segal 
1990, p.41).
As human beings therapist hold their own schemata, beliefs and assumptions about 
themselves, the therapeutic situation, and the world in general. Some of these might, 
however, be unhelpful within the therapeutic context and if not recognised might result 
in hindering the therapist from providing the maximum of his or her therapeutic 
potential. In contrast identifying, acknowledging and if necessary modifying them, is 
likely to result in the therapist gaining greater insight about both him/herself and the 
client and in being congruent, honest and respectful, qualities that are essential for the 
development as well as maintenance of a healthy therapeutic alliance.
Among the common unhelpful therapist assumptions is, for example, “It is wrong to 
dislike/disagree with/feel attracted to/ be angry with my clients. Such assumptions are 
likely to interfere with the therapeutic relationship. For instance the therapist who felt
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annoyed with a client, and also believed she must never show or share this annoyance, 
is likely to think ‘the client is being irritating ( it is his fault, I won't let it affect me), rather 
than stopping and thinking what exactly is going on to arouse these feelings of 
annoyance in her.
Conclusion.
The way therapeutic alliance is conceptualised, developed and maintained in cognitive 
therapy does not differ a lot from the way this happens in other models of therapy. 
Therapeutic alliance is central to cognitive approaches in therapy. The difference 
between cognitive models of therapy and other therapeutic models, appears to be that 
in the first the therapeutic relationship is used in a more explicit and collaborative way 
and whilst not necessarily being the focus in therapy, it can actively be used to 
enhance therapeutic progress. Difficulties or ruptures in the therapeutic alliance are 
not viewed as problems to get over with, in order to start the real work of therapy, but 
as sources of information about both the therapist's style and the client’s psychological 
way of being.
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Racism and Psychoanalysis.
The main argument of this paper will be that psychoanalysis provides theoretical tools 
for understanding the phenomenon of racism and offers practitioners, especially those 
who assume the therapeutic relationship—both the real & the transferential one -  as a 
basic therapeutic tool, with a framework that accounts for clients’ both external world 
and real life experiences as well as for their inner world and internalised experiences. 
An attempt will be made to present the dominant form in which racism and 
discrimination is understood within the psychoanalytic model. This can be seen as a 
framework which is based on Kleinian 1946 relations theory and has also major 
influences from Bion’s 1962 thinking and relating theory.
Before presenting this framework, some of the many political issues and clinical 
challenges or considerations in working with racial issues will be briefly addressed. 
Since this framework draws from the Kleinian theory, the reader will be reminded of 
some concepts involved in this theory, particularly the ones that are involved in the 
framework that will be then presented and discussed. Finally, the importance of being 
aware of this framework, with particular emphasis on its clinical usefulness, will be 
addressed.
Political / Clinical issues:
Racism, and prejudice -similarly to sexism, poverty and social disadvantage- are 
events that affect whoever are its victims as well as its perpetrators, in that, all of 
them cause profound pain and are part of the person who lives in the society that they 
take place. Arising in the external world, however, seems to be the reason why a 
number of analytic psychotherapists resist to deal with them. These practitioners view 
such issues as events that take place in the real (outer world), and maintain that racism 
and minority discrimination is not an issue for them, simply because it is a political (and 
thus ‘external’) issue (Bateman & Holmes 1995; Thomas 1992; Holmes 1992).
Kareem (1992), a psychoanalytic practitioner, has argued that the defence of such 
practitioners, appears to be that they treat all human being the same, even if society 
may not yet do so. Kareem and others (e.g. Marsella & Pedersen 1981 as cited in
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Grant 1994; Sue & Sue 1990) go on to say that the ‘colour-blind’, which is similar to 
culture, or gender blind approach, is underlined be an unconscious wish that we are all 
the same, and reflects the difficulty that all of the humankind have in dealing with and 
accepting difference and diversity.
The question of whether it is appropriate or not to maintain a colour-blind approach is 
complex and multidimensional. Some argue that diversity and differences must be 
taken into consideration and others maintain that taking these issues into consideration 
may itself appear discriminatory, however, ‘positively’.
Dealing with racial & cultural issues within the therapeutic arena (independently of 
whether this involves similarities or differences between the therapist and the client) is 
a complex and sensitive issue. The answer to the question about the appropriateness 
of a colour-blind approach is not an easy task. This is not going to be further explored 
in this paper; however, worth to be reported is that it might be that the position that 
different psychoanalytic psychotherapists adopt is a function of a number of issues 
including countertransference (Curry 1964;Thomas 1992; Clarkson1995).
Before proceeding to the presentation of the framework, the reader is urged not to 
perceive this as a recipe. This framework does not provide a standardised way to 
work and conceptualise difficulties related to racial, cultural, or discriminatory issues. It 
can rather provide practitioners that are interested to explore the complex issues 
involved in the phenomenon of racism and cultural discrimination, with some ideas that 
can perhaps facilitate the process of understanding these experiences.
The framework.
Timimi (1997) has summarised the two basic assumptions that underlie this framework 
as following;
1. Racism is lodged in universal developmental psychic mechanisms that are located 
within the paranoid-schizoid position.
2. Introjection of the centuries-old relation between whites as colonizers and blacks as 
colonized, organizes these paranoid-schizoid splits. Projective identification into
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objects coloured white, of superior desirable aspects of the self, and into objects 
coloured black, of inferior undesirable aspects of the self exists in internal as well as 
external object relations or, more precisely, internal and external part object 
relations.
Understanding those two assumptions presupposes good grasp of some concepts 
involved in the Kleinian object relations theory, which, as previously said, will be now 
briefly reviewed.
The major concepts in Kleinian object relations theory, are these of paranoid-schizoid 
and depressive mechanisms. According to Klein people constantly move from one to 
the other and back again. Throughout life paranoid-schizoid mechanisms and 
phantasies are available and are likely to be used when under any kind of distress 
(Segal 1992).
In the paranoid-schizoid position good and bad need to be kept apart and it is actually 
this splitting that later helps the baby-adult to distinguish love and cruelty and to feel 
trustingly. Although Klein assumed being able to distinguish between good & bad (good 
mother/father or bad mother/father) as an important and ‘natural’ process, she argued 
that deeply splitting a mother or father into a fairy-godmother and wicked step-mother is 
a distortion of reality.
Splitting is an action undertaken in phantasy which can be used to separate things 
which belong together. Splitting thus creates larger-than-life people and larger-than-life 
emotions, unmodified by their opposites. Perception is distorted so that, for example, if 
someone or something is defined as bad, any goodness in them is simply not seen.
The process of sorting out good and bad objects involves projection of parts of the self. 
This actually brings us to the concept of projective identification, which is underlined by 
the assumption that one of the ways the baby (and later the child and the adult) tries to 
deal with its own destructivenes is by disowning it. Klein described projective 
identification used in the paranoid position as involving “getting rid of something
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belonging to the self into someone else. It involves evoking in someone else aspects of 
the self which one cannot bear”.
Projective identification involves a very deep split, where the aspects of the self 
projected into others are very deeply denied in self. Projective identification is basic & 
crucial to Kleinian’s work, with transference and countertransference. That is Klein 
believed that therapists as well as other people can be provoked into some kind of re­
enactment of a past traumatic experience. The issue of re-enactment will be further 
discussed later.
A final concept involved in the paranoid-scihzoid position that is relevant to the current 
paper, is that of part object. Klein thought that the baby’s original love-object was the 
mother’s breast. To begin with, baby’s do not know that the mother’s breast is 
irrevocably attached to her and could not survive without her: To see other aspects of 
the mother as separate from the breast at first is unreasonable, given the knowledge 
available to a new baby. As the baby grows, if conditions are good, it begins to 
recognise that the breast belongs to the mother and is part of her and not of the baby 
self. This takes place under the influence of the depressive position.
Although in the depressive position the baby will ultimately begin to integrate 
experience rather than to split it and an awareness of objects as more whole, with both 
loved and hated characteristics will begin, the anxieties that accompany this position 
make it uncomfortable. These are guilt, which arises as the baby realises that the 
object it loves (breast/mother) is the same as the one it attacks and a sense of loss 
which arises as the baby realises that the loved object can care for someone else. The 
sense of the self as the centre of the loved object’s world is challenged and it changes, 
which raises up separation anxieties. So at times of stress the child or adult may 
attempt to get rid of the new awareness that the depressive position brings. Klein 
argued to have found that children had phantasies of cutting up and cutting off parts of 
the parents’ bodies, which creates part-objects out of more whole ones. In other words 
one goes back to schizoid-paranoid position and tries to solve the experienced conflict
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and anxiety by splitting the perception of the person involved. This way conflicts are, 
however, avoided rather than worked through.
Kleinian object relations theory has been used to develop a conceptualisation of racism 
as a phenomenon full of paranoid effects born out of schizoid splitting based on racial 
appearance, a method of categorising which has little biological or cultural explanatory 
power. Mechanisms of projection and projective identification are repeatedly used to 
maintain artificial racial distinctions (Timimi 1997). The inability to accept and 
acknowledge difference without attempting to control and dominate the object that is 
felt to be different and separate (characteristics of the paranoid-schizoid position) 
operates upon racial divisions and as part of the universal human tendency to hate 
difference. (Rustin 1991;Tan 1993).
In this respect, differences are fertile areas for projections. We saw before the process 
in which an infant uses phantasies of controlling an object at the same time as 
projectively identifying with it, in order to ward off painful feelings of separateness and 
difference. The hypothesis that follows from this, is that if a group of people, in this 
case blacks, is viewed as inferior, they may become containers for those hated aspects 
of the self and are then, through projective identification, experienced as fused with 
these parts. Persecutory anxiety can result as the person tries to control these bad 
aspects of the self in an object whose potential difference and separateness feels so 
threatening.
The story does not, however, end here. Socio-cultural history has opened up particular 
pathways within which these mechanisms can operate. In other words where there is a 
minority group that has experienced discrimination, there is usually a history which 
consists of real-life events, but also other material like fairy tales, images, myths and 
jokes, which do not necessarily reflect real life events, but they are equally significant 
since they both contain direct or indirect messages, beliefs and ideas about “the inferior 
nature of the specific group” and they both pass from one generation to another, and 
influence they way we perceive & interpret the world. Such influences are crucial when
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thinking about the pre-transference -  a concept introduced by Curry (1964)- which is 
likely to be experienced by both a client and a therapist.
Continuing on the socio-historical issues, it is worthwhile to consider Timimi’s (1997) 
argument that, at its most basic, the history of development of group relations provides 
events that can be summarised as the competition of a small number of white nations 
to dominate the rest of the world. The reverse, that is the ruling of a large number of 
white people by a small number of blacks, has never been the case. Thus, the part 
object relation of white as civilised, master, owner, occupier etc. And black as 
uncivilised, slave, owned, occupied etc. was established through time. Whilst such a 
relationship can be maintained in social reality, an accompanying paranoid-schizoid 
phantasy can be organised in such a fashion. Put another way, the person who wishes 
to feel masterful, civilised, superior and in control of his/her object world, and despises 
feeling inferior, uncivilised and invaded, has a readily available projection route to get 
rid of such feelings: if he/she is able to identify with being white.
As Timimi (1997) explains, for whites (meaning those who identified with being white, 
as well as those parts of the self identified with being white), despised aspects of the 
self can be projectively identified in blacks. Blacks (meaning those who identified with 
being black, as well as those parts of the self identified with being black), as recipients 
of these projections, are, in effect, being asked to act as containers for these hated 
parts of the self. Here a whole range of experiences from language and culture through 
to a belief in one's ability can be undermined if it is experienced as being black. In this 
scheme, reciprocal projective identifications locate the desirable aspects of the self in 
whites.
Before proceeding to the importance of being aware of this framework, it is important to 
say that the dynamics that have been described are not static. Although the white/black 
dichotomy is has proved extraordinary difficult to change, black resistance movements 
have brought the conflict into the surface. This is something that as Dhruev 1992 has 
argued, offers the opportunity for creating change by forcing open space where 
negotiated settlements may take place. In other words such movements open up the
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possibility of reaching the depressive position in this conflict, a position which, as 
previously explained, allows space for a harmonious existence of differences. The 
depressive position stirs, however, strong feelings, like envy for example, which have to 
be worked through before having allowing space for the harmonious existence of 
differences.
Reading the aforementioned framework one might wonder whether it implies that 
racism (tendency to engage in schizoid splitting and use of projection / projective 
identification mechanisms, when encountered by differences) is an inherent 
mechanism. In other words is racism inside us (as human beings)? Discussing this 
rather complex question would require far more space than the one available in this 
paper; however it is worth to consider two points.
Since the concepts of projective and splitting mechanisms originate from the Kleinian 
theory one would obviously want to evaluate the universality of its validity. A relevant 
question here, is whether Klein’s theory is applicable to people who have, for example , 
grown up within cultures where babies are cared by more than one person (that is 
cultures where a baby encounters multiple breasts or no breast). Although answering 
this question requires scientific evidence not available to the writer, the reader is 
reminded that when Klein talked about the baby moving from a paranoid schizoid 
position to a depressive one and back again, as a result of its experience and active 
contact with the mother’s breast (baby’s original love object), she considered the breast 
to endow a wide range of meanings which go beyond that of a mammary gland 
producing milk. That is, Klein found that phantasies of the breast included the breast 
as a source of life, love and hope, of babies and good things, of comfort, peace and 
serenity.
In considering the question whether racism is inside us, one might feel the urge to say 
“no”. Perhaps this is the result of a strong sense of guilt that seems to accompany the 
thought that “if this is true, then I have been or I am a racist”. The word racism might 
bring a Nazi image to mind; however in the context of the present discussion racism is 
seen a process that the mind might engage. In other words, the present paper
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examines the conflict that a “healthy” person’s ego might encounter when faced with 
differences and the mental mechanisms that the ego might engage in its attempt to 
deal with them, rather than the possible resulting behaviour that the person might 
display.
Importance of being aware of this view.
Three of the many reasons why it is important to be aware of this view, or framework 
are:
1. It can be applied in the process of understanding the experience of people who 
have been either victims or perpetrators of racism, but also of a lot of other 
discriminatory behaviours or attitudes that are threatening for one’s identity.
2. It facilitates exploration and understanding for such phenomena with a 
consideration of related historical, social and political reality, something that is 
missing from many of the other existing frameworks.
3. Last but not least, it is clinically useful.
Crucial to be clarified, is that its clinical usefulness lies upon using it as a 
supplementary source or support system. That is, when a problem or difficulty has been 
related to a racial aspect (or other discriminatory experience) it might be useful to 
consider this framework. Depending on whether the client can be perceived as the 
victim or the perpetrator in the specific situation, one might consider the possibility and 
consequences of the client having internalised prevalent social attitudes about his/her 
group. To exclusively rely on sociological terms about racism in therapy, especially the 
analytic one, is of little use, however, since the primary concern here is indeed, the 
internal state of a person involved and the aim is to help them move from any from a 
negative split to a more positive one.
Not exclusively relying on the racial aspect of the presented problem, both in the 
process of formulating and working with a client is also crucial. This is well 
demonstrated in the case study presented by Andreou (1992) which refers to a black 
girl who seemed to live in a fantasy world where things and people were very good 
and perfect (this she associated with the white middle-class) or else very bad and “low
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life’ (this is where she placed black people and her own family with whom she did not 
want any contact). Andreou conceptualises this in terms of splitting external reality 
into good and bad & considers social influences.
However not stopping there, that is perceiving this girl as a person whose race was one 
aspect of her identity and continuing to explore her internal world, by using 
transferential interpretations, it came up that the girl had been sexually abused. This 
girl’s feeling of disgust and mess was projected onto the outside. Since society often 
degrades black people and their way of life, she had learned to do so as well. She 
feared that her white therapist would touch on the feelings which were so hidden 
underneath. When the therapist actually did she would not listen. Her feelings of 
disgust about her skin were due to sexual abuse and she preferred to keep them at bay 
by keeping them skin deep, as she often wanted therapy to be at that level as well.
The objective of acknowledging and working on the individual client’s internal and 
external world can be seen as being similar to the objectives of healing and curing 
addressed by Kagawa-Singer and Chi-Ying Chung (1994). As they say “to cure is to 
eliminate the pathology according to the biochemical and Western psychotherapeutic 
models. To heal is to address the existential and spiritual distress that may exist with 
the disease” (p205).
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Counselling and Clinical Psychology. Towards a Differentiation or 
Homogenisation?
This paper was conceived as a result of a small scale pilot study that concerned 
clinical psychologists’ perception of charted counselling psychologists and was carried 
out by two counselling and four clinical psychologist in training. Six clinical 
psychologists were interviewed-two males and four females. Three of them were head 
of clinical departments in NSH Trusts while the rest had at least five years of practical 
experience in the field. Although the number and the nature of the methodological 
problems encountered in carrying out this study, do not allow the drawing of any 
conclusions, data collected form the interviews and the reading of related literature 
made me think about the nature of counselling psychology and about the boundaries of 
what distinguishes it from other applied psychological disciplines- specifically clinical 
psychology.
A variety of important issues were raised by this study. The one I perceive as critical, 
however, and which I chose to discuss in this paper is that around professional 
differentiation and homogenisation between counselling and clinical psychology. I will 
not attempt to argue for or against professional differentiation or integration. My aim is 
to address this issue, to present aspects of what seem to be the factors surrounding it 
and to invite the reader to consider and weigh the information provided.
Almost all of the clinical psychologists that participated in our study raised issues 
around counselling psychologists’ breath and nature of training, which was an issue 
that seemed to be related to their perceptions of what kind of therapy or treatment 
counselling psychologists are trained to provide and what kind of population they are 
qualified to work with. The fact that counselling psychologist can achieve chartered 
status, and thus be employed by NHS Trusts in clinical departments, was seen as an 
issue that might bring confusion or even conflicts about the roles and autonomy of the 
two professions. Interviewed clinical psychologists reported uncertainty and sometimes 
ignorance about the above issues. However, the way they presented their thoughts and 
concerns around them, seemed to indicate a predominant intention to differentiate the 
two professions.
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It seems like counselling psychologists are differentiated from clinical psychologists in 
terms of status because they are, or should be cheaper, and because they might have 
a doctorate status, but, still, there is the question about its value once it is compared 
with clinical psychologists expertise. The actual words of the clinical psychologists 
interviewed, will actually make this point clear:
“as qualified psychotherapists they [counselling psychologists] can perhaps command 
quite a high salary., but they are called counselling psychologists so that doesn’t have 
that kind of status about it.”
“ I suppose they should get paid somewhere, more than counsellors but less than 
perhaps the higher grades of clinical psychologists... maybe that’s a compromise.. I 
don’t know, it sounds terribly., competitive.”
“ if they were as expensive as every one else, it would make them less attractive., in 
terms of the existing market I think there is a problem about being as expensive, in 
which case why have a counselling psychologist when you could have a clinical who 
would have broader experience and expertise”.
“if they are doctors then that has certain status, and yet in another way I’m sure they 
would be regarded as counsellors, and counsellors are., you know which is quite a 
different role and a different expectation and status and autonomy and., so on.”
“I don’t understand how our roles would complement each other rather than conflict, 
because of the title, because of the fact that, I guess, a counselling psychologist comes 
out with a doctorate-am I right? So Dr. somebody? I guess for the professions that 
could be quite a lot of conflict in terms of status and autonomy in a team,, because I 
guess I’d see that the counselling psychologist might be not so efficient in some areas, 
but whether I’d be in a position to say that I don’t know.”
“I see conflict... maybe with a doctor of counselling psychologist and clinical 
psychologists who aren’t doctors but might considered themselves to be much more 
comprehensively trained in mental health”
Now, how do clinical and counselling psychologists differ in terms of the therapy that 
they provide and in terms of the population they are qualified to work with?
In the words of the clinical psychologists interviewed, counselling psychologists differ 
from clinical psychologists in that
“they are trained to provide counselling rather than structured treatment... [and so] to 
specify mental health issues as opposed to mental illness”.
“they are best suited to work with the ‘worried well’ and people that just require 
counselling, rather than structured psychological treatment for serious mental health 
problems”.
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“they are best suited to work with specific client groups or problems where there has 
already been an assessment... offering treatment, rather than doing general mental 
health work".
Clinical psychologists interviewed appreciated the “counselling” training that counselling
psychologists receive; however they seemed to focus on it, ignoring, this way, the
significance of the psychological background that counselling psychologists have.
As one of them said "... I think that it would be an enormous advantage to have some 
counselling skills in the team. Whether that came from a counselling psychologist or a 
counsellor... I’m unclear about whether that would be a specific advantage that they 
would be a counselling psychologist as opposed to a BAG accredited counsellor”.
The particular perceptions that clinical psychologists had about counselling 
psychologists training and their views of counselling psychologists clinical competence 
resembles the ones held by clinical psychologists in Collins and Murray study. (1995). 
Having such an erroneous knowledge or understanding about the training of 
counselling psychologists, fudging the difference between counselling and counselling 
psychology as well as overlooking counselling psychologists’ theoretical psychological 
background can be seen as a fair justification for the prevalent lack of trust in 
counselling psychologists clinical competence among the clinical psychologists 
interviewed.
Obviously, this picture narrows and underestimates the nature and the expectations of 
the training that counselling psychology trainees obtain. Moreover the way that the area 
of counselling psychologists’ clinical competence was interpreted by clinical 
psychologists in our and in Collins and Murray (1995) study is far away from the one 
other clinical psychologists have reported in the literature and from the one 
documented by counselling psychologists themselves.
In recent literature counselling psychology has been presented as having a marginal 
status in relation to almost all the branches of applied psychology. Barkham (1990) who 
is a clinical psychologists active in the psychotherapy research, talks about “a possible 
future integration” of counselling and clinical psychology and reports that the two 
professions are often confused or identified, a phenomenon which he attributes to the 
“equivalence paradox”. This paradox arises from the reported literature on comparative
51
outcome studies, and indicates that “two therapies, considered different in their content 
lead to broadly equivalent results.
Some of the factors underlying the energy that gave rise to the professionalisation of 
counselling psychology constitute the basis of counselling psychologists’ arguments 
about their differentiation from clinical psychologists. These involve viewing the helping 
relation as a therapeutic variable, emphasising well being rather than sickness, 
employing interventions brought by the humanistic value system which have a 
therapeutic and psychoeducational nature, focusing on developmental aspects of 
human problems, being trained to provide services in organisational development and 
stress management. Clinical psychologists, on the other hand, however, argue that an 
increasing concern on all these factors can be found among themselves currently as 
well. Difference on the focus that counselling psychologists place to these factors and 
on the degree of adopting and emphasising a more holistic view of the client constitute 
the counter-arguments of counselling psychologists (Clarkson 1995; Elton 1995; 
Woolfe 1990).
While the type and nature of approaches that counselling psychologists are trained in 
and the population that they are suited to work with constitute the themes through 
which professional differentiation is sought in the UK, in US, where counselling 
psychology has a divisional status since 1947, they seem to be the basis for discussion 
about clinical and counselling psychology’s homogenisation or integration
This is evident in arguments pointing out that current trends in clinical and counselling 
psychology, at least in the States, share the converging themes of adopting an eclectic 
theoretical orientation and moving toward a health-psychology orientation. In terms of 
speciality differences, clinical psychology is seen as reflecting a unique and significant 
trend toward a community psychology involvement. Counselling psychology, on the 
other hand, is seen as reflecting 2 unique trends, that of maintaining but decreasing its 
interest in its vocational, educational and preventive roles while increasing its interest in 
the remedial, rehabilitative role (Barkham 1990; CPQ: Editorial 1988, 1, 4; Watkins 
1985; Levy 1984).
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Levy (1984) has talked about a “human service psychology” and Watkins (1985) has 
argued that the trends and future directions of clinical and counselling psychology 
“suggest similar paths”. Watkins has actually taken his argument so far as to suggest 
that the time may well be near when separate training curriculum for the 2 specialities 
will be unnecessary, if not irrelevant and that a more unified approach to training may 
prove more economical and more advantageous for all.
Issues around the differentiation and the homogenisation or integration of counselling 
and clinical psychology can be seen as resembling the differences and the similarities 
in the way that psychological knowledge and theory is applied by individual psychology 
practitioners, which is something, that in turn, can be seen as depending on the 
particular individual’s idiosyncrasy, theoretical orientation, and on which of the 450 
existing psychological approaches they find meaningful.
The issue of differentiation or homogenisation of the two disciplines provides 
challenging material for academic papers and constructive discussions. The fact that 
the ones written before 1994, which is time that the Special group in Counselling 
Psychology voted to become a division, focused on distinguishing counselling 
psychology form other applied psychological disciplines might reflect part of the 
process that counselling psychologists engaged in their attempt to attain the goal of 
Divisional status. In 1990 Woolfe characterised counselling psychology as an “infant 
growing up”. This might indicate that we needed and most likely still need to perceive 
counselling psychology as a subsystem in order to allow space for it to grow.
I do not intend to argue that counselling psychology is not truly distinctive in terms of its 
philosophy, training, knowledge base and application of psychological theory; but to 
simply stress what almost all writers, prior and after 1994, have argued about, namely 
that because of the large spectrum of approaches adopted by counselling psychology, 
it will always overlap with other areas of applied psychology and particularly with clinical 
psychology.
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It seems like counselling and clinical psychology are two applied disciplines the 
practitioners of which will increasingly find themselves to be colleagues in the same 
departments but to possibly share different assumptions about each other’s role and 
clinical competence. This brings up issues around the responsibility of trainees and 
qualified counselling psychologists, to let clinical psychologists, as well as other 
practitioners involved in the structure of mental health services, know who counselling 
psychologists are, their professional activities, their usefulness.
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THERAPEUTIC PRACTICE SECTION
INTRODLCTION
The therapeutic Practice section includes work carried out during the three one year 
clinical placements. It contains a short description of the placements and a discussion 
about the integration of theory and practice in these placements. There are also 
summaries of four client studies which give an overview of individual pieces of work 
with clients and a discussion of process issues related to therapeutic work conducted.
The original detailed client studies that the summaries are based upon and the process 
reports to which the discussion of process issues draws upon, have been included in a 
separate appendix which is not available for public access, due to the confidential 
nature of these documents. This appendix is kept at the Psychology Department of 
Surrey University and contains other confidential documents as well, such as my log­
books of therapeutic and other work conducted in the three one year clinical 
placements.
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FIRST YEAR PLACEMENT
Psychology Department in a Community Mental Health NHS Trust.
My first year clinical placement was within a Psychology Department of a Community 
Mental Health NHS Trust, which was part of a General Hospital. This department 
consisted of a team which included five clinical psychologists, two counselling 
psychologists and two assistant psychologists. The department had close links with the 
Psychiatric and Psychotherapy Department which were also part of the General 
Hospital, but belonged to different NHS trusts.
Clients were within the 18 -65 year age rage and were mainly referred by General 
Practitioners and Psychologists and Psychiatrists working at other departments of the 
hospital. Referrals were also received from other health and social care professionals, 
like Psychiatric Nurses and Social Workers. Clients' difficulties ranged from mild to 
severe and chronic mental health problems.
My responsibilities included conducting individual therapeutic sessions with clients and 
participating in weekly staff meetings, which involved managerial meetings and clinical 
peer review meetings. The placement experience also involved observing assessment 
and therapeutic sessions conducted by psychologists and being introduced to the way 
other departments of the hospital were operating by visiting them and attending or 
observing therapeutic and rehabilitation programs that were taking place. Attending 
academic meetings during which staff members from various departments were 
presenting research and clinical papers was another aspect of this placement 
experience.
Supervision was provided on a ratio of one hour supervision to five hours' client 
contact, by a Charted Counselling Psychologist. The theoretical emphasis of 
supervision and of the conducted therapeutic work was initially largely humanistic, but 
later moved to incorporate cognitive behavioural conceptualisations and techniques. 
The placement was for two days per week between 18.10.95 and 31.7.96
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SECOND YEAR PLACEMENT
Primary Care in association with an NSH Trust Mental Health Services of a 
Psychology Department.
My second year clinical placement involved individual therapeutic work with primary 
care clients within the “Counselling Service” of a medical Center (GP Surgery). This 
was in association with a Psychology Department of an NHS Trust at a General 
Hospital, which meant that mental health care provided by other services of the Trust, 
like (e.g. CMHT team / Psychotherapy / Psychiatric Department) was available if the 
need to refer a client for a specialised assessment or further treatment arose.
The “Counselling Service” was offered by a Psychotherapist (my supervisor) and the 
candidate. This service was part of a research project on short-term psychotherapy in 
primary care and involved offering clients twelve sessions of psychological therapy plus 
one or two assessment sessions. This was the case with all therapeutic contracts with 
clients, but one client who, for training purposes, I saw throughout the placement year. 
Clients were within the 18 -85 year age rage and were referred for short term 
individual psychotherapy by their GP or by the Practitioner Nurse working at the 
surgery. There was a rich mix of ethnic and cultural groups among the clients.
The placement experience also involved attending a number of therapeutic workshops 
and lectures conducted by specialised professionals working for the Trust.
Supervision was provided on a ratio of one and a half hour supervision to five hours’ 
client contact, by a Charted Psychotherapist. My therapeutic work was also monitored 
by a manager supervisor who was a Consultant Clinical Psychologist and 
Psychotherapist, with who I often discussed client cases. The theoretical emphasis of 
supervision and of the conducted therapeutic work was psychoanalytic. In specific and 
special circumstances, related with individual clients, which suggested that the 
psychoanalytic approach was not going to be beneficial for the client, a humanistic or 
supportive approach was adopted. The placement was for two days per week 
between 19.09.96 and 07.8.97.
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THIRD YEAR PLACEMENT
Primary Care in association with an NSH Trust Mental Health Services of a 
Psychology Department.
My third year clinical placement involved individual therapeutic work with primary care 
clients within the “Psychology Service” of a medical Center (GP Surgery). This was in 
association with a Psychology Department of an NHS Trust at a General Hospital, 
which meant that mental health care provided by other services of the Trust (e.g. a 
CMHT team. Psychotherapy / Psychiatric Department) was available if the need to 
refer a client for a specialised assessment or further treatment arose.
The “Psychology Service” was offered by a Clinical Psychologist (my supervisor) and 
the candidate. Clients came from various ethnic and cultural groups and were within 
the 18 -85 year age rage. They were referred for short term individual psychological 
therapy mainly by their GP, but sometimes also by the Practitioner Nurses or the 
Health Visitors working at the surgery. The placement experience also involved 
attending a number of therapeutic workshops and lectures conducted by specialised 
professionals working for the Trust.
Supervision was provided on a ratio of one hour supervision to five hours’ client 
contact, by a Charted Clinical Psychologist. The theoretical emphasis of supervision 
and of the conducted therapeutic work was initially Cognitive Behavioural and was 
mainly informed by Schema-Focused Cognitive approaches. Later an eclectic approach 
was adopted, that is, depending on the individual needs of clients, their presenting 
problem and length of therapy, techniques from other therapeutic models were 
integrated in the therapeutic work. The placement was initially for two but later for 
three days per week between 01.10.07 and 31.8.98.
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An Overview of the Three One Year Placement Experiences with a 
Focus on Integration of Theory and Practice.
As already discussed, my three placements involved individual therapeutic work at a 
psychology department within an NHS Trust and at two primary care settings in 
association with the psychology department of another NHS Trust. My clinical work 
involved individual therapy and encompassed three different therapeutic models: the 
humanistic/existential model, the psychodynamic model and the cognitive behavioural 
model. In this overview, I will discuss my placement experiences in terms of how the 
therapeutic model under which I was working was influencing the way I conceptualised 
the client’s difficulties and the way I tried to understand and use the therapeutic 
relationship with them.
I view the three placement experiences as the starting point of a building up 
experience, that is, as a continuing process of developing therapeutic skills and 
understanding the role of a therapist. The discussion that follows mainly focused on 
theoretical issues and the development of therapeutic skills and ways of formulating. 
This does not mean, however, that this is all I learned or remember from this 
experience.
There is a number of other aspects of my placements experience, which I consider as 
equally valuable for my professional development, but which I will not discusse here. It 
might, however, be worthwhile to mention a few. Evaluating the suitability of a specific 
client for ‘short-term psychotherapy’, offered in the specific placements I was in, 
assessing whether specific individual clients would benefit from the particular approach 
I was using (for training purposes) and whether, as well as how, I could adjust this to 
the needs of the client, exposed me to “real-life” situations in which a therapist is called 
to be flexible and “creative” in the sense of deriving and integrating techniques and 
approaches. Learning to effectively manage situations that could or did influence my 
therapeutic work with clients, independently of the theoretical model I was using, is 
another example. These involved: lack of room availability; practical and political 
issues involved in who will be my clients, when I am going to see them and for how 
long, break of boundaries by clients or staff in the particular setting etc.
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The first Year.
My first placement year focused around developing and applying basic therapeutic 
skills and, or thus, forming a therapeutic working relationship with clients, which can be 
seen as resembling the l-Thou or l-You ordinary healing relationship described by 
Buber (1970) or the person to person or real relationship referred to in the 
humanistic/existential literature.
Rogerian techniques (such as empathetic listening, unconditional positive regard, and 
genuineness) were used to help myself understand the worldview of each client and 
then to facilitate the client finding his or her own direction and frame of thinking. Clients 
were invited to an non-directive exploration of their relationship with themselves, 
others, and the world. Most of the times this exploration was bringing an insight that 
was, in turn, resulting in a feeling of empowerment, which was leading clients to feel 
able or “free” to make decisions and choices. Such a stance evokes, however, 
anxiety, since by making choices one must accept the fact that by choosing they deny 
other alternatives, possibilities or life-long familiar patterns. Dealing with this circle of 
choice and anxiety was a major theme in my work with clients during that year.
The difference in the way individual clients perceived their right of choice appeared to 
resemble the difference in the way existentialists have regarded the issue of choice. 
That is, in existential literature, the issue of choice has been regarded both as 
opportunity (Buber 1970; Tillich 1961) and problematic (Sartre 1956). Attempting to 
understand and respect the client’s own construction and meaning of the world was, 
perhaps at times still is, one of the most challenging tasks in my therapeutic work.
This challenge centred around the situation when my own worldview was in direct 
contradiction with that of the client. That is, respecting, for example, the client’s choice 
to perceive pain, confusion and disorder in the world as the absurdity and cruelty of life 
(similarly to Sartre), rather than, or at least as well as, “as opportunities for growth” 
(similarly to Buber) and to my worldview was quite a difficult task. The process of 
overcoming this difficulty involved understanding the meaning of my need for others to
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share my-own worldview and realising the meaning and limitations of my role as a 
therapist.
Although sometimes differences between my own and the client's world-view were 
resulting in the aforementioned struggle, at the same or, other times such differences 
were resulting in a ‘scientific curiosity’ that was, in turn, leading to a humanistic 
exploration and admiration of the variations in the meanings that different people can 
generate. Exploring the influence of the client’s perception of their cultural, religion, 
gender and family (to name a few) values upon this meaning, was perhaps one of the 
ways I was communicating respect to clients and of helping both client and myself to 
gain insight into the client’s world view.
Adopting a humanistic/existential approach involved exploration of clients’ “l-Thou" 
relations with other people—that is, relationships in which others are seen as people 
rather as objects (Buber 1970). This exploration spoke directly to multicultural and other 
concerns around differences, since it highlights the question of how we can learn to 
stand in relationship to those different from ourselves.
It also involved the l-Thou relationship between the client and myself. Although, during 
my first placement year, the direct exploration of the therapeutic relationship was 
taking place mostly with the supervisor, rather than with the client, it did constitute one, 
if not the most important aids in the process of understanding the client’s difficulties 
and concerns. Exploring my experience as “I” and “Thou” in my therapeutic encounter 
with clients, helped in “meeting them”, since my experience often resembled the client’s 
description of “I” and/or “Thou”. Moreover, the few times, towards the end of the 
placement, that I risked to share this understanding with the client, in other words to 
employ the “here & now” situation in my interaction with them, it resulted in raising 
client’s awareness of their way of relating to others and in empowering them to 
perceive themselves as individuals who can actively chose their style and way of 
interacting with others.
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The second Year.
My second year placement experience focused around learning to apply brief 
psychodynamic psychotherapy. This experience was very powerful because it 
highlighted the need to be aware of the nature and origin of my own feelings and 
reactions in the therapeutic encounter (‘countertransference’). Moreover it illustrated “in 
vivo” Kahn’s (1991) and other’s argument that it is meaningless to assert that some of 
the client’s responses to the therapists are reality based and some reflect the 
‘transference’. All start with the actual stimulus complex, the therapist, and all reflect 
‘transference’ in as much as all perceptions are filtered through the client’s organising 
principles, which were developed through previous experiences of relationships.
Applying the psychodynamic model involved acknowledging that for each client there 
are always two realities, an external and an internal one. I viewed my therapeutic role to 
be helping clients to became aware of the way their internal reality (shaped by past 
experiences and the human tendency to experience the present in terms of that past) 
influences the way they experience their external reality.
Although the main aim was to explore clients’ internal state and to work on their 
internal conflicts, acknowledging that internalised parental, cultural, religious, gender 
and so on values, often reflect realities of the individual’s external (real) world was a 
major part of the therapeutic work, since as Andreou (1992) argues, it can help to 
understand rather than pathologise individual client’s psychological state, (e.g. looking 
at or acknowledging the interrelated themes of race and powerless as problems of 
reality, while exploring and hypothesising about how that might be represented in the 
client’s internal world).
Treating the therapeutic hour as a real situation, the client was invited to an exploration 
of the his/her way “of being” and “relating”. Such an exploration aimed in the client 
gaining insight that often empowered them to act with more conscious control and 
awareness.
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Avoiding to engage in further exploring client’s references to the dynamics of their 
relationships outside the sessions, but rather learning to utilise this information so to 
understand and focus on their interaction with me was the most challenging therapeutic 
task during that year. Learning to explore client’s narratives for possible “unconscious 
narratives” about the way they were experiencing our interaction and felt about my 
interventions, in other words looking for what Smith (1991) calls “derivative 
communications” was a difficult process.
Thinking about a client’s narrative on her mother always having been judgmental 
about her decision to divorce and disregardful of the client’s feelings, as a response to 
my question regarding her husband’s well-being, is an example of an instance when it 
was possible that the client was informing me (unconsciously communicating) that she 
had perceived me as being judgmental and disregardful of her feelings. One could, 
however, also speculate that the client’s experience of a judgmental mother was 
leading her to attribute similar attributes to me, the therapist (transference).
As Casement (1985) and Hahn (1991) illustrate, the sense of similarity, between past 
and present, can be initiated by either the client or therapist. Being open to and 
exploring both possibilities within supervision, but also with the client, when seen as 
appropriate, and accepting the fact that sometimes it is difficult, if not impossible to give 
an answer to such a question, helped me to appreciate the importance of exploring the 
therapist-client interaction.
Being encouraged, by my supervisor, to bear the strain of not-knowing, helped me to 
appreciate Casement’s (1985) argument that “ their [therapists’] competence as 
therapists includes a capacity to tolerate feeling ignorant and incompetent, and a 
willingness to wait (and carry on waiting) until something genuinely relevant and 
meaningful begins to emerge” (p4). Casement continues by saying that “only in this 
way it is possible to avoid the risk of imposing upon the client the self-deception of 
premature understanding, which achieves nothing except to defend the therapist from 
the discomfort of knowing that he does not know” (p 4).
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Although I am in agreement with Casement argument and I share his view that a 
therapist should wait until he or she feels that he or she can recognise a thread of 
meaning that can be identified or interpreted, I am wondering whether in this work of 
interpreting a therapist can avoid imposing their own cultural, religious, gender, 
theoretical (to again name a few) values.
Approaching each session without desire, memory or understanding as Bion (1967) 
suggested, is perhaps a way to deal with this situation, but seems to be an 
unattainable aspiration. A more realistic way of trying to avoid such influences is 
perhaps being aware and constantly trying to monitor our desires to cure or to 
influence, our active remembering of previous sessions and our illusion of 
understanding in terms of what is familiar (culturally, theoretically etc.) (Bateman & 
Holmes 1995).
The third vear.
My third placement experience, mainly focused around applying cognitive models of 
therapy, specifically the schema-oriented cognitive model, but later moved into 
evaluating the appropriateness of employing or integrating the models practised in 
previous years.
Adopting a more active and directive therapeutic stance in exploring clients’ thoughts, 
cognitive assumptions and associated feelings and bringing an educational component 
within therapy, was a different therapeutic process from the one involved in the 
psychodynamic work I was carrying through the previous year. Although extending my 
intervention repertoire was initially a challenge, the space that the schema-oriented 
cognitive model leaves for work on the therapeutic relationship, resulted to a smooth 
integration of the new skills with the ones acquired in my previous years.
Viewing the client and myself engaged together as a team, first in exploring immediate 
thinking and underlying assumptions, and then in actively working to change the ones 
that had been identified as problematic to the client, the therapeutic work with clients 
took the form of an experiment which myself, the therapist, and client were conducting
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together Beck et al. (1985). Maintaining the core therapeutic (Rogerian) conditions and 
applying a collaborative spirit was resulting in the development of a trusting and 
secure atmosphere in which both client and myself were feeling safe to explore client's 
difficulties, underlying cognitive schemata and assumptions, and eventually proceed in 
conducting cognitive and behavioural experimentation of alternative ways of being.
Since clients bring their interpersonal style and difficulties, into therapy independently 
of the which model the therapist applies, their reactions to me-the therapist, and the 
therapy once again provided unique opportunities to assess, understand and work on 
dysfunctional interpersonal schemata, assumptions and beliefs. Recent writings, like 
Safran and Segal (1990), Wills and Sanders (1997) on how cognitive therapists may go 
about to explore what is going on the therapeutic ‘working-collaborative’ alliance with 
the client (which involve the use of concepts of “here and now” situation, transference 
and countertransference) were valuable aids in conceptualising client’s difficulties and 
therapeutic progress.
Although I consider integrating my knowledge of the three models as one of the most 
valuable developments in my training years, I find it difficult to describe “what I am 
doing or the way I am” in my ‘integrative’ work when this is out of context. My attempt 
to integrate the three models is evolving in my struggle to find a balance between 
chaos and form, between theoretical firmness and flexibility. Integrating theories and 
models of therapy into a coherent system rather than pulling out techniques to use, 
involves integrating what I have learned from theory, what I have found meaningful in 
the process of applying each model, my values and biases and my awareness that 
there is still things to be found, into who I am and then being this “I” when practising.
Concluding.
Studying different theories and applying different models, all of which I found inspiring 
and meaningful, made me to appreciate the increasing empirical evidence which 
acknowledges theoretical models and approaches as less important than the 
therapeutic relationship itself (Clarkson 1995). I learned to talk about what at times 
seemed to be the same thing in different ways or languages (e.g. transference /
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reactivated dysfunctional interpersonal schema) but it was almost always the attempt to 
establish, explore, or end a therapeutic relationship with a client that was bringing, or 
at least, was setting the ground for, a therapeutic breakthrough.
Sometimes I felt like being cynical about the existence of different 'psycholanguages', 
but at other times I found each of them meaningful and helpful. I wondered and still 
am, whether the different psychological languages reflect the diversity and variance in 
the clinical, or non, population, or whether these languages have constructed this 
diversity and variance. This is a complex question, that gets even more complex if one 
considers that there is evidence that there are many different realities and different 
ways of experiencing them.
As Anderson (1990) states, however, “people seem to want to keep exploring them 
[realities]...[despite any society’s effort] to ensure that its official reality is installed in the 
minds of most of its citizens (members).."(p. 152). Different psychotherapeutic 
languages perhaps reflect different theorists’ attempts to explore “reality” and can thus 
be helpful for a clinician when he or she engages into their own theoretical or 
philosophical exploration of “reality” or when they communicate, talk or argue with 
colleagues. It can also perhaps be helpful when working with clients who might find it 
relieving to give a name to “what is happening to them” (since that means that others 
have experienced this as well).
Since therapy is, however, about the client’s own-exploration and own awareness, it 
follows that the choice of language should be theirs and that therapists should try to 
learn the language of each client. As Casement (1985) states, “patients benefit from a 
therapist’s willingness to find out, even that which is already ‘known’, through working 
clinically with them. This feels better by far than using short-cuts to understanding, 
based on what is borrowed from others—and which patients also borrow. Fresh insight 
emerges more convincingly when a therapist is prepared to struggle to express himself 
within a patient’s language, rather than falling back upon old thinking” (p. 26).
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SUMMARIES OF FOUR CLIENT STUDIES.
INTRODUCTION
The client study summaries which follow are summaries of in depth studies which were 
carried out as part of my therapeutic training. Due to the confidential nature of these 
documents the full client studies are not available for public access. Moreover, all 
names, places and other personal/situational identifiers have been disguised or 
removed. Space limitations required a selection of details of the current situation and 
personal histories of the clients and the inclusion of only the necessary information in 
order to present the way that the client’s difficulties were conceptualised and the 
rational behind the therapeutic work.
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SLMMARY OF CLIENT STUDY ONE (Year 1)
Mrs C., a thirty five years old mother of twin toddlers, received an assessment and ten 
sessions of psychological therapy in the Psychology Department of an NHS Trust 
where I conducted my first year clinical placement. She was referred by her General 
Practitioner because she was experiencing stress and depression related symptoms 
for about a year-- a time period during which she had been making an effort to deal 
with her drinking problem. A broadly person centered approach was adopted with this 
client, but cognitive behavioural techniques were also frequently employed.
On assessment Mrs C. described occasional sleeping difficulties, lack of energy, 
irritability, outbursts of anger and difficulty in making decisions. She presented herself 
as an “alcoholic” and described herself occasionally experiencing cravings for alcohol, 
and often eating compulsively. Mrs C. had a history of alcohol abuse of nine years. At 
the time of the initial assessment, she was attending AA meetings twice a week and 
had managed to remain abstinent for about seven months. During the course of 
therapy she joined a slimming club. She was able to control her food consumption, but 
experienced a relapse in drinking.
Mrs C. outlined interpersonal difficulties from a very young age and described a 
progressive preoccupation with daily drinking since early adulthood. She disclosed 
memories of her trying “to fix” her parents’ intense relationship problems, but outlined 
a shift from her caretaker role in the family to a rebellious one during adolescence, 
stating that she enjoyed and sometimes still did, saying and doing things that she knew 
would upset her parents. Mrs C. described herself “suppressing feelings of anger” 
especially towards her parents and reported that she believed this to be the reason for 
her addiction to alcohol.
During the time that I was seeing Mrs C., she was making an active effort to stop using 
alcohol, which appeared to result in her experiencing a considerable amount of 
distress. It is possible that Mrs C’s unsuccessful effort to “fix up” her family had resulted 
in a low self esteem and produced high levels of anxiety and anger which seemed to 
manifest themselves in her prolonged rebelliousness. For quite a long time, drinking
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seemed to have constituted a major coping mechanism for Mrs C. -  a way to deny or 
suppress the pain resulting from her low self esteem and her interpersonal difficulties. 
Another factor that seemed to have contributed in Mrs C.’s distress and to have made 
the process of developing new coping mechanisms difficult, was her difficulty to ask 
and accept support. There seemed to be a pattern where Mrs C. (from a very young 
age) was isolating herself when facing difficulties, while at the same time presenting 
herself as well functioning and then experiencing anxiety for not being offered support. 
This pattern seemed to evoke anger and distancing for those who could offer support.
Therapy largely focused on an non-directive exploration of Mrs C. feelings of anger 
towards her parents and of strategies of managing anger and dealing with situations 
that evoked anger within her. Therapeutic work also involved identifying stressors in her 
every day life (e.g. adjustment to motherhood) and exploring ways of dealing with them. 
Mrs C. appeared motivated to engage in therapy, but mostly on a cognitive, often 
superficial, level. This was reflected in her fast rate of speech and in smiling or 
sometimes laughing while describing experiences that she was calling “difficult” or 
“painful”.
A short time period before as well as following Mrs C disclosure of relapse, she started 
contradicting herself about the amount of alcohol she was using. Moreover, she had 
not disclosed her relapse at her AA meetings, which she was now attending irregularly. 
Sessions then focused on issues around her relapse with the aim to perceive it as a 
learning experience. Her relapse experience appeared to be a result of trying to deal 
with both alcohol and food consumption at the same time. It transpired that the 
relapse had evoked feelings of guilt and seemed to have led Mrs C. to withdraw into 
herself, fearing both failure and discovery.
Mr C. reported that she had found therapy very helpful in that she had gained an 
understanding around her feelings of anger. This seemed to have helped her to take 
some action towards setting emotional and behavioural boundaries in her relationship 
with her parents. She appeared more self confident, her sleeping difficulties decreased 
considerably and although she continued to experience exhaustion in taking care of her
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children, she was also experiencing fulfilment and pride. Mrs C. also reported to have 
benefit from our discussions concerning her pattern to present herself as well 
functioning. The fact that no change was observed in the way she was using the 
sessions (e.g. continued reporting copying well before and after her relapse 
experience), however, most likely indicates that Mrs. C. was processing our sessions 
mostly at a cognitive level.
Although the fact that, towards the end of therapy, Mrs C. was often admitting not 
having told me the truth about the alcohol she was using was seen as a positive step 
towards being honest with herself, it was also perceived as indicating the possibility that 
the therapeutic process had been blocked by her alcohol use. Discussing this in 
supervision, it was evaluated that she would probably benefit from the specialised help 
provided by the drug and alcohol team of the hospital. This was presented as an option 
to Mrs C. who agreed to be referred and to my knowledge, she started one-to-one 
therapy with a counselling psychologist working for this team.
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SUMMARY OF CLIENT STUDY TWO (Year 2)
Mrs B., a forty years old woman, was referred for depression by her General 
Practitioner to the counselling service at the medical surgery where my second year 
clinical placement took place. Although this service was providing primary care clients 
short term psychological therapy, it was agreed that for training purposes I was going 
to see one client, Mrs B, for longer-term therapy. Towards the end of our initial short­
term contract (12 sessions), we agreed to continue therapy and upon the completion of 
the first contract we conducted another twenty eight sessions. The psychodynamic 
approach was employed throughout the therapeutic course with this client.
Mrs B had been married for twelve years. At the time of the assessment she described 
herself often “feeling low”, lacking energy and interest, experiencing sleep difficulties 
and low appetite. She reported having gone through “major physical changes”, mainly 
weight loss, during the last year due to a medical condition—which was under control 
through medication. She stated that she feels “a failure” because of her physical 
condition and because she had not managed to have a successful marriage and 
career. She described communication difficulties with her husband and expressed 
bitterness and anger towards him because he had not been emotionally supportive 
during the stressful time period when her medical condition was diagnosed. She 
described a successful career; however she had left her job “on the spur of the 
moment”.
Mrs B. described a good and close relationship with her family of origin. She reported a 
history of high achievements, both at an academic and professional level and stressed 
that her parents were proud for her. She outlined a history of assuming a care-taker 
role in her relationships with people close to her, in her own words she had “always 
been the shoulders” of family members, her husband, and friends. Feeling “strong” 
helped her to maintain and be happy in this role up until the year before when she felt 
that she was not able to cope any more.
Mrs B’s depressive symptoms appeared to be related with the fact that she was 
experiencing her thyrotoxic condition as well as her marital and professional difficulties
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as personal failures and was interpreting them as evidence that challenged her self- 
worth. It seemed that Mrs. B. has grown up in an environment where high 
achievements were strongly valued. Although being a high achiever, brought Mrs. B. 
parental praise as a child and probably made her feel “accepted”, it seemed to have 
resulted in a tendency to evaluate feelings and behaviours in terms of whether they are 
“good enough”, in other words, in experiencing life within a competitive context, living 
little room for understanding the nature and meaning of her experiences. This world 
view encouraged the development of a “false” self - “compliant” but “strong”—which 
enabled her to function without fearing others’ disapproval. Her need for care and love 
were denied and classed as a weakness and her self-esteem was built upon “pleasing 
and taking-care” of others, while ignoring her own feelings and needs.
Mrs B. therapeutic aim was to understand “what is happening in her life and to feel 
happy again”. She attended sessions regularly. Therapy largely focused on an 
exploration of the way Mrs B. was perceiving herself and of the way she was relating to 
others. Therapeutic work initially focused on Mrs B. difficulty to acknowledge that she 
faces difficulties and to accept help, which was manifesting itself in the sessions by her 
frequently interrupting my reflections and interpretations and making comments that 
seemed to aim in belittling them. It transpired that Mrs B. had transferred her 
competitive tendency in the therapeutic situation, which was conceptualised as being 
underlined by a fear of being criticised by the therapist. Addressing and exploring this 
fear encouraged Mrs B. to start reflecting upon her internal world.
Therapy also involved an exploration of the dynamics of Mrs B’s relationship with her 
parents and her husband, with the aim Mrs B. to understand her role in these. It 
transpired that Mrs B. was using a “right -wrong” pattern of thinking to prevent herself 
from experiencing her difficulties at an emotional level. Mrs B. was able to acknowledge 
and work on this pattern, which resulted in her to proceed in acknowledging and 
exploring a wide range feelings towards her parents and husband as well as her 
career, which in turn liberated her from the belief that she is “a failure”.
Throughout Mrs B. was motivated to use therapy to understand the nature of her 
difficulties. Although there were times that she seemed to use therapy as a place to just
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outpour her every day concerns, she was able to move in using therapy to link her 
past experiences with her self concept and current difficulties, which, in turn, resulted 
in her gaining an insight that gave her an empowering sense. Towards the end of 
therapy, she was no longer experiencing depressive symptoms and reported that she 
had gained back her strength and self-confidence. Although she was still uncertain 
about the future of her marriage, she said that she felt able to cope whatever way 
things would turn out to be. Sometime in the middle of therapy she went back to work 
part time, but towards the end of therapy she was happily increasing her shifts almost 
to a full time level.
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SUMMARY OF CLIENT STUDY THREE (Year 2)
Mrs S. a forty six years old single woman from a non-Western culture, was referred for 
depression by her General Practitioner to the ‘counselling service’ at the medical 
surgery where I conducted my second year clinical placement. She was offered a 
twelve session contract of psychological therapy. Although Mrs S’s difficulties were 
conceptualised within a psychodynamic theoretical frame, the therapeutic work involved 
mainly humanistic and supportive strategies and techniques. On assessment Mrs S’s 
reaction to transferential interpretations appeared to be characterised by high levels of 
confusion and anxiety which suggested that it would be safer for her ego integrity to 
step back from such interpretations, due to the limited time that I was going to be able 
to see her.
On assessment Mrs. S. described depressive symptoms which included often “feeling 
low”, lacking energy and interest, experiencing sleep difficulties and having low 
appetite. She also reported feeling “unsuccessful” both in her professional and 
personal life, since she had not managed to have a stable job or an intimate 
relationship. She appeared preoccupied by a belief that “there must be something that 
she is doing wrong”. During the assessment Mrs S. appeared to be quite self-critical 
and had considerable difficult to concentrate on a specific topic for more than few 
moments.
Mrs S. had left her country of origin fourteen years ago “to better herself”. She had 
travelled and stayed in a number of European countries, where she had held different 
jobs. She had been in England for about six years and during the course of therapy she 
was holding a job with which she was unhappy. She was an active member of a 
religious group to which she was very dedicated. Her circle of friends were members 
of this group and most of them were males, since Mrs S. believed that women are 
“horrible”, which was, according to her, the reason why she had never managed to 
have a good long lasting friendship with a woman. Mrs S. outlined a pattern in past and 
present friendships of her trying to please others and doing things “their way”, which 
was resulting in them abusing this and in Mrs S. deciding to distant herself from them. 
Although she was initially reluctant to disclose detailed information about her intimate
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relationships she later disclosed a history of relationships that involved emotional and 
at times physical abuse.
Mrs S. characterised her childhood as “very confusing”. Her family history involved 
parental separation which had resulted in Mrs S. spending a lot of her childhood with 
her mother who had been re-married. She outlined a tense relationship with her 
mother who was described as critical and as always putting Mrs S. down. Mrs S’s 
stepfather had tried to sexually molest her on several occasions. This was disclosed to 
the mother who, however, accused Mrs S. as if “she had done something”.
Mrs S. seems a dynamic and intelligent woman who had been able to adjust to 
different countries, hold different jobs and learn foreign languages. Her travelling could 
be seen as a journey through which she tried to find herself and meet her unfulfilled 
need for love and intimacy. Mrs S. sense of “doing something wrong” was 
conceptualised as most likely stemming from her mother’s disbelieve that Mrs S’s 
step-father had attempted to assault her. It was possible, that this situation had left 
Mrs S. confused as to the extent to which she was responsible about what went on 
with her step-father. This unresolved issue and the feeling of confusion seemed to 
have stayed within her and to have resulted in a tendency to try and make sense of her 
life experiences in terms of what she had done wrong, living little room for 
understanding their nature and meaning.
Therapeutic work largely focused on Mrs S’s difficulty to trust people. Mrs S. was 
able to acknowledge her initial reluctance to trust me, which she, however, attributed 
to the fact that she did not know me rather than to the fact that I was a woman. This 
difficulty was also discussed in terms of differences in racial-cultural and religion group 
membership between client and myself. These discussions helped Mrs S. to 
increasingly engage in therapy. That is, she became willing to disclose and discuss 
issues around her self-image and concept and her intimate relationships.
Mrs S. pattern of moving to extremes in her interpersonal relationships, either blindly 
trusting people and trying to please them by “going their own way” or not trusting them
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at all was addressed throughout therapy. Addressing ways in which Mrs S appeared 
to try to please people in her present relationships, and exploring the reasons why she 
was doing so, helped Mrs S. to start separating her own from other’s needs. She was 
able to move from her preoccupation about “what she has done wrong” to a position of 
exploring, for example, small and manageable for her behavioural steps towards 
renegotiating the boundaries in her relationships with her friends.
Mrs S. appeared to process our discussions mostly at a cognitive level, in that she 
often ignored or responded with thoughts to explorative questions about her feelings. 
Although she was later able to move in acknowledging a wide range of feelings, she 
had difficulty to further explore these feelings, especially ones around anger and envy, 
saying that she preferred to pray for the people towards whom she held such emotions. 
Although praying appeared to be used as a defence against further exploring her 
feelings, it was a defence that appeared to work for Mrs S. (“made her feel better with 
herself”) and most importantly a defence that she seemed to need (would often report 
that she feels that she would “have gone into pieces” if she did not pray).
Although it was somewhat difficult for Mrs S. to experience her personal difficulties at 
an emotional level, the fact that during the therapeutic process she was able to develop 
trust towards the therapist (who was a woman) and to use the therapeutic hour in an 
increasingly focused manner appeared to have resulted in improvement of her 
psychological well-being. She reported not feeling depressed and said that our 
discussions had helped in that she was finding herself to “be more assertive” and “more 
aware of her difficulties”. She was actually interested in continuing the “work with 
herself”, which we arranged for her to do through referring her to a local counselling 
service where she would be able to attend either group or individual therapy.
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SUMMARY OF CLIENT STUDY FOUR (Year 3)
Mrs D., a forty two years old single woman who was seen within the psychology 
service, based at the medical surgery where I conducted my third year of therapeutic 
training. She was referred by her General Practitioner for anxiety and depression 
symptoms. A Schema-Focused Cognitive therapeutic approach was employed and 
therapy involved eight sessions, including an assessment and a follow up session.
On assessment Mrs D. described severe sleeping difficulties, loss of energy and 
interest and outlined a long-standing problem with headaches which had been 
aggravated. Four months before the assessment Mrs D. had moved to a new job. 
Although she was aware that she had to give time to herself to adjust in this new job, 
which she said to enjoy, she seemed to be preoccupied by self-devaluing thoughts 
about her job performance. This appeared to make her feel that she could not cope 
and had led her to ask for sick leave on which she was on when I first saw her. Four 
months before the assessment Mrs D. had also experienced an unwanted, for her, 
ending of a long-term relationship with a married man.
Mrs D. account of her past history included relationship difficulties with partners as well 
as with members of her family. These mainly involved Mrs D. feeling “bullied, judged 
and at times exploited”. Her parents had separated in Mrs D’s early adulthood. She 
described her father as supportive and friendly, but her mother as highly critical and 
antagonistic towards her. In general she appeared to be a resourceful individual with 
significant achievements, (e.g. had finished college, managed to change and keep 
different jobs in the past, had learned foreign languages etc. ).
It transpired that Mrs D’s early experiences with significant others, who she had 
perceived as critical (e.g. mother, teachers) had most likely led to the development of 
absolute assumptions (schemata) such as “I am incompetent”, I am not good enough”, 
“I am not important”. Situations (critical incidents) where she perceived herself or her 
performance as being evaluated appeared to trigger automatic thoughts such as “I 
can not cope” or “I won’t be loved”. This was bringing up anxiety which manifested 
itself through: a) body sensations of feeling uptight and often panicky (difficulty breath.
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fast hurt beating), b) behaviours of avoiding close or intimate relationships, withdrawal 
from social situations or situations that she perceives herself as being evaluated (e.g. 
job situation) and c) emotions of sadness which alternate with anxiety and feelings of 
loneliness. Lack of family and social support appear to be something that was adding 
to client's distress.
Mrs D’s therapeutic aim was to understand the reasons she feels anxious and to learn 
to cope with stress. She attended sessions regularly. Mrs D. was able to overcome her 
initial difficulty to engage herself in therapy, which was reflected in her reluctance to 
disclose intimate information and to complete a weekly dairy etc. Her initial reluctance 
to engage was conceptualised in the context of her having transferred her relating 
schemata within the therapeutic situation. That is, Mrs D. appeared to interpret the fact 
that she was seeing a psychologist as evidence supporting her cognitive schema of “I 
am not good enough”. Her initial difficulty to engage seemed to be also associated with 
a fear that she was going to be evaluated by the therapist. Addressing and exploring 
thoughts and feelings around her fear of being criticised by the therapist encouraged 
Mrs D. to start reflecting upon her internal world and helped her to move to an intense 
engagement.
Exploration of her fear of being criticised and evaluated by the therapist offered Mrs D 
insight on her way of relating and interacting in social situations. Mrs D. was also given 
information on communication and assertive skills. Practising such skills was attempted 
through homework assignments and through role modelling during sessions.
Although Mrs D was initially reluctant to explore the brake up of her relationship, she 
later moved to acknowledge feelings of disappointment and rejection. A pattern of 
thoughts, feelings and behaviours that seemed to be underlined by a fear of 
commitment was identified and was explored. The way that her fear of ‘getting close to 
others’ was manifesting itself in social and work context was also discussed. Finally, 
Mrs D. was presented with information about the nature, causes and effects of stress 
and anxiety and was encouraged to explore ways of managing and coping with them.
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Reviewing therapy Mrs D. reported feeling “optimistic” and said that the exploration of 
painful experiences had resulted in her viewing them as learning experiences. At the 
time of our last session, her sleeping difficulties had decreased, her headaches had 
improved and she was thinking about getting back to work. I saw Mrs D. for a follow up 
a month after that session. She had been back at work and appeared to be coping well 
with her workload. She reported enjoying her job and talked about feeling more 
confident and happy with herself. She also appeared to have a more happy and active
social life, within the context of which she was making a conscious effort to apply the
communication and the assertive skills we had worked on.
During the follow up we agreed on her discharge.
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A Discussion of Process issues illustrated by Reference to Two 
Process Reports which are included in a Confidential Appendix.
The two process reports included in a confidential appendix are from the second and 
third year of training. They involve transcripts of two audio-taped individual sessions 
with clients at different settings and highlight a number of therapeutic issues. Although 
confidentiality restricts the extend to which these issues can be discussed, an attempt 
will be made to address some of these without compromising the clients’ anonymity.
One of the issues involves the difference and progress in the way I consider and use 
the therapeutic relationship. In both years, I considered the value of analysing the 
interaction between the therapist and the client in order to understand and 
conceptualise the client’s difficulties and to evaluate the effect of the therapeutic 
interventions. In the second year this awareness appears, however, to be mainly 
retrospective in the sense that I was able to make sense of what had gone on in 
therapy after the sessions, either through supervision or self-reflection. In the third year, 
processing issues around the therapeutic relationship takes place during the session 
and appears to be an integrative part of my attempt to engage and work with the client.
Another issue highlighted by reviewing the process reports, is the difference and once 
again the progress in my therapeutic stance and style. That is, in the second year I 
appear to rely too much in the thinking of “others" and to try hard “to get it right”. My 
strong adherence to a specific school of thought (psychoanalytic) and position on 
technique, combined with my limited experience in practising within this approach, 
results in what seems to be a ‘borrowed’ process that is, a therapeutic hour in which I 
sometimes try to “form the client” in my image of the way the session should proceed. 
Although this is accompanied by a genuine interest and attempt to understand and 
engage with the client, my fear of the unknown in both the client and the therapeutic 
process, restricts the joint discovery of fresh, rather than pre-conceived, insight. In the 
third year of training, I appear to be more able to contain the anxiety of the unknown, 
which, in turn, gives me confidence and allows space for fresh insight.
81
Using the therapeutic relationship in a constructive way involves both a cognitive and 
an emotional engagement with the material and the behaviour of the client. My initial 
reluctance (conscious or unconscious) to fully engage in this process is apparent in the 
first process report. This was with a client, Mrs J., who suffered from depression. She 
was a resourceful middle aged woman with a history of a successful career, who had 
recently gone through medical as well as marital and professional difficulties, which she 
was experiencing as personal failures.
Failing to address and invite the client to explore the fact that she was frequently 
interrupting my interventions during that session, is an example of my difficulty to use 
the dynamics of our interaction, during the session, in order to help her to gain insight 
about her internal world. Our discussion about her concern in regard to her parent’s 
reaction when they would find out about her decision to separate, for instance, started 
by her acknowledging that she worries about their reaction, but ended up in her 
belittling her fear and in what seemed to be a debate, between us, on whether she 
fears that they will be critical. As I was able to hypothesise, after the session, it is 
possible that the client feared that I, the therapist, will be critical and judgmental about 
her decision to separate. Her behaviour of frequently interrupting can be seen as a 
unconscious attempt to “prevent” me from doing so. Having had come up with this 
hypothesis during our session, I could have reflected it in an empathetic and tentative 
way and I could have, thus, possibly helped the client to work on or through this issue.
If I had addressed her interrupting behaviour, this would have helped in focusing the 
therapeutic process on the “here & now transferential” relationship, instead of the 
client’s relationships “out there” which are important to be explored, but are “tricky” in 
the sense that issues around them cannot or is difficult to be worked through during the 
session.
Another instance when I was not able to make use of the therapeutic relationship is 
when, sometime in the middle of the session, I make an intervention (a closed 
statement) that appears to be irrelevant to both surface and latent content of the 
client’s narrative. That is, the client wonders about what the future holds for her and
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talks about having expected herself to be happily married while she reports that she is 
feeling numb and unable to express feelings and I state that I notice that she was 
talking about her marriage being unsuccessful and that she assumes total responsibility 
for this. Although in my comments about this intervention I cannot make sense of its 
content, I report that I had no recollection of the client's account of feeling numb prior to 
listening to the tape. I also report that I was feeling helpless and stuck at this point and 
irritated after the session.
As I speculate in my process report comments, my irritation most likely was evoked by 
the fact that the client was frequently interrupting me. Personal issues with irritation and 
anger appear, however, to interfere with my therapeutic work here, resulting in my 
switching off or denying my irritation and all of my consequent feelings. This, in turn, 
prevented the emotional engagement with the client, required in the use of the 
therapeutic relationship. My intervention appears to have led the client to talk about 
her care-taker role, which she went on to associate with childhood experiences, a 
much more comfortable topic for myself—a process that can be seen as underlined by 
“proactive countertransference” Clarkson (1995), which interferes with the therapist’s 
affective attunement.
Being reluctant to process my irritation also resulted in missing the opportunity to utilise 
my experience of feeling helpless and stuck which could resemble the client’s 
emotional state. That is, the client appeared to be preoccupied with questions (whether 
she has done the right thing; what the future holds) that perhaps were making her feel 
helpless and stuck, since it is difficult if not impossible one to answer them. Moreover 
this helplessness was perhaps bringing about the numbness that she reported and I 
failed to attend to and thus to facilitate a process of exploring issues around it.
Although my hesitation or resistance to process my feelings was stemming from issues 
that needed to be worked through in supervision and personal therapy, where there 
were indeed taken, this reluctance can also be seen as the result of the therapist 
lacking confidence in the therapeutic / analytic process that enables them to be able to 
tolerate ‘the vicissitudes of being used by their patients’ (Casement 1985). That is, I
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prefer to fall back upon old thinking (issues about client's childhood discussed in 
supervision), rather than to risk to be open to the unknown, to engage with the client’s 
momentary material, which would have directed the therapeutic process towards a joint 
discovery and fresh insight.
This rather firm and restricted therapeutic style was perhaps the result of “going by the 
book” rather than “by the client”. That is, my inexperience in employing the 
psychodynamic approach, together with my strong belief that there is “_a right way” do 
to so, left myself little, sometimes no, room in the technique I was using-a technique 
that now feels borrowed rather than mine. This becomes evident in my process report 
comments about an intervention in which I reflected Mrs J. narrative about her having 
been used to be the “shoulders” of other people and then I go on to share my wonder 
about how it was for her when she felt like needing someone else’s shoulders to lean 
on. I define this intervention as “reflection of content embodied in an open question” 
and I go on to say that this intervention can be seen as an explorative question that 
would have been appropriate if I were working in another model (e.g. client-centered). 
Moreover, I comment that it would have been better to offer the client an interpretation 
(the hypothesised statement behind the question), like for example that perhaps it is 
difficult for her to lean on other people’s shoulders.
Although I have no intention of debating the classical psychoanalytic principle of the 
importance in limiting intervention to interpretations, I think that my reaction to the 
specific incident is an example of theoretical bias and of its distorting effect. That is, the 
particular question does not seem to be either intruding nor disrespectful of the client’s 
individuality and I appear to put forward an intervention that, although a question, led 
client to reflect upon her care-taker role and thus, in a way, to come up with her own 
interpretation about her difficulty to lean on others. I, thus, see my comments about this 
intervention being inappropriate within a psychodynamic therapeutic context, as a rigid 
and selective adherence to a principle which can seriously restrict the therapeutic 
process and in the name of a chosen orthodoxy can destroy vital therapeutic attributes 
(required in any approach) such as authenticity, genuiness, and tuning therapy to the 
client’s needs and idiosyncrasies.
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Although I was not confident enough to address the therapeutic relationship directly 
with this client and I sometimes appeared to impose a firm theoretical framework in my 
work with her, my awareness of these issues contributed in the gradual development 
of a therapeutic stance which allows space to be more receptively open to what 
different clients communicate and to risk being less tenacious in my adherence to 
particular theoretical positions.
My developing ability to process and address issues around the therapeutic relationship 
during a session with a client is evident in the other process report on a session that 
took place at the beginning of my third year of training. This was with a young woman. 
Miss A, who was experiencing depression that appeared to be related with a number 
of traumatic-loss experiences that she had gone through in the last seven months. 
These involved the death of her brother, a termination of an unplanned pregnancy and 
being robbed.
This session took place at the beginning of my third year of training, which was the time 
that I had started using cognitive therapeutic approaches in my work with clients. The 
first five minutes of the session, I make summarising interventions and ask explorative 
questions about what is/was going on through her mind, which do not appear to be 
inappropriate but are attempts to be “safe” and “right”. It reminds me the way I was in 
the session with Mrs J. when I was, at times, trying to borrow the process described in 
psychoanalytic books, the difference, this time, being that it was the process described 
in textbooks describing cognitive approaches. Another difference from the session with 
Mrs J. is that I was able to use the therapeutic relationship during the session, which 
resulted in a significant shift in the therapeutic process.
At a point the client was talking, for example, about finding it difficult to be present 
when others talk about babies or abortion and that it finds it “uncomfortable” to share 
her abortion experience with friends. In my process report comments, I report that I felt 
“distant” at this point and I decided to go “closer” by encouraging the client to talk 
about how she feels about us talking about the abortion(“now”). This led to a 
discussion on how Miss A. feels about showing that she is unhappy. Then Miss A
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talked on an abstract level about some things that are more difficult than others to 
share and I went on to say that perhaps the abortion is one of these things, which was 
acknowledged by the client. My following intervention was to say that it is very 
courageous of her to chose to share this experience with me and I went on to 
acknowledge how difficult this must have been. This “praising” intervention aimed in 
empowering the client to continue her exploration of her abortion experience.
Verbalising this intervention felt risky and I was eager to see her reaction in order to 
appraise its effectiveness. The client's reaction was a long silence, after which she 
started talking about her brother’s death. Although I still cannot be sure about the effect 
that my intervention had upon the client, I perceive it as a genuine attempt to “be with 
her in the session”. Observing that the client chose to talk about her brother’s death at 
the time that she had been directly encouraged to talk about the abortion experience, 
initially made me wonder whether we are attuned; however I was determined to give 
her space to experience her bereavement which consisted of multiple losses and to 
respect her choice of the loss she wanted to talk about. The client cried for the rest of 
the session, kept long silences, and talked about the time before and after her brother’s 
death.
This has been one of the few session in my training experience that both the client and 
myself have remained silent for so long. I view silences in this session as one of the 
most effective therapeutic interventions, since I think that Miss A was able to process, 
possibly work through, a number of things during them. The fact that she did not always 
disclosed what was going on for her during silence was perhaps part of the way she 
needed to experience her grieving process. A difficult process that is hard to know 
where you are at, probably like I did with her during the session. Moreover, a painful 
process that can become somewhat easier and less frightening if you are not alone, 
which is what I hope to have been the effect of my presence and genuine care.
Being able to contain my anxiety for the unknown in the therapeutic process was 
perhaps what helped me to conceptualise Miss A. grieving neither in the context of a 
step or phase theory of bereavement nor in terms of whether she has achieved some
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prescribed steps or tasks (e.g.WordenI982/1991), as I often have done with other 
clients. Such theories have provided me significant information about client’s 
experience of bereavement and have helped me to assess normal against potential 
pathological developments (Weitz 1991); however in the specific session with Miss A. it 
felt that if I were to conceptualise her bereavement in such a context I would undermine 
her individual experience of loss (Stroebe & Schut 1996).
In conclusion, facing my mistakes, failures (sometimes foolishness) and theoretical 
gaps has been a challenging process; however it has reinforced my scientific curiosity, 
has encouraged my devotion to supervision and personal therapy and my respect for 
clients. This is not other than the process of analysing what is going on in the 
therapeutic relationship with clients, which has been the most challenging but also the 
most valuable and influential part of my ongoing development as a therapist.
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RESEARCH SECTION
INTRODUCTION
This section contains three separate pieces of research. The first is a literature review 
which looks into some theoretical, empirical and clinical work related to child sexual 
abuse. The other two are qualitative empirical studies which explore issues around a) 
the construction of an non-singular ethnic identity and b) the role of personal values on 
the psychotherapeutic encounter.
This section also contains a reference of a conference presentation.
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CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE. 
A discussion of theoretical, empirical, and clinical work.
ABSTRACT
Child sexual abuse is not a new phenomenon. Children have been sexually 
molested and exploited throughout history. What is different in the present time, 
however, is a change to the degree of sensitivity to recognise such activities as 
abusive and to discover their impact upon the psychological development of a child. 
In this paper some of the main theories which attempt to explain the origins of child 
sexual abused are briefly reviewed and their influence on therapeutic work is 
highlighted. Empirical evidence on the short-term effects of child sexual abuse are 
reported and critically evaluated. The traumatic impact of sexual abuse during 
childhood and a set of possible factors that may influence the extent of trauma are 
also discussed. The complexity arising from the prevalent diversity on the reported 
effects of child sexual abuse, their similarities with evidence from studies on clinical 
groups and their mismatch with evidence from studies on adult-victims of child 
sexual abuse is addressed. The resulting complications in terms of resulted 
interpretative constraints and complexities in the diagnostic and therapeutic work 
are also pointed out.
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DEFINITION & \
PREVALENCE OF CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE.
The recently publicised case of the sexual abuse, exploitation and murder of young 
girls in Belgium brought up universal shock and condemn. Child sexual abuse has 
actually exploded into public awareness during the last decade. Talking about this 
explosion in the mass media. Summit (1983) argues that it underlines the message 
that sexual abuse of children is much more common and more damaging to 
individuals and to society than has even been acknowledged by clinicians or social 
scientists. Worth being noted at this point, is that, publicised cases of sexual abuse 
usually infer that child sexual abuse frequently results in the death of the victim, and 
that it is committed predominately by strangers or criminals. Child sexual abusers 
are frequently, however, respected members of the community and often family 
members (Finkelhor 1984).
The current definition of child sexual abuse recommended as a criterion for 
registration throughout England and Wales by the Departments of Health Social 
Security (1986) is “the involvement of dependent, developmentally immature 
children and adolescents in sexual activities they do not truly comprehend, to which 
they are unable to give informed consent, or which violate social taboos concerning 
family roles”. Kempe and Kempe (1984) employ this definition and state that 
although it does not address the possibility of consensual sexual activity among 
children, it is clear in suggesting that activities are abusive when they do not 
consider the developmental needs of the child. They list the following acts as 
categories of sexual abuse: incest; paedophilia; exhibitionism; molestation 
(touching, masturbation fondling, kissing); sexual intercourse; rape; sexual sadism; 
child prostitution and child pornography.
A reliable rate of child sexual abuse incidence is not available, since as with other 
forms of child maltreatment, reported sexual maltreatment probably makes up only a 
part of actual incidence. Most writers suggest that sexual abuse of children, 
particularly incest, may be grossly underreported. Mayhall and Eastlack Norgard 
(1983) present a list of possible explanations for this underreporting. Some of them 
include: 1) sexual abuse is not easily identifiable or diagnosed since it rarely results 
in physical injury. 2) it can be detected only by secondary indicators (pregnancy or 
venereal disease), unless the child tells someone. 3) both children and adults may
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have more difficulty expressing themselves in matters of sexual abuse than in other 
types of maltreatment because of guilt and other feelings associated with the 
experience. 4) young children may regard the experience of sexual abuse as normal 
part of growing up and may follow abuser’s saying to keep it a secret etc.
Acknowledging the difficulties around a reliable account of sexual abuse incidence 
Finkelhor (1986) estimates that 19 per cent of all females and 9 per cent of all 
males have been sexually abused at some time in their lives. Actual reports have, 
however, ranged from 6 per cent to 62 per cent for females, and 3 per cent to 31 
per cent for males. Although these figures suggest that victims are more often 
female, many writers argue that female victims are simply more available for study, 
since involvement of boys is under-reported. Moreover they stress that young males 
are at least as frequent, just as helpless and even more secretive than females 
(Hunter 1991; Summit 1983; Finkelhor 1979). There is no significant difference in 
social class with regard to prevalence rates; no ethnic differences appear to be 
significant; and although physical force is evident in only a minority of cases, threats 
and coercion are almost universal (Herbert 1993).
THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE AND MODELS OF 
THERAPY.
Increasing awareness of the prevalence of child sexual abuse has given rise to a 
number of theoretical approaches which attempt to explain its occurrence. The 
following section will attempt to briefly review some of the major theoretical 
approaches to child sexual abuse. The specific approaches were selected because 
they propose specific contributory factors and have generated as well as influence 
clinical and therapeutic approaches.
Classical psychoanalytic and meta-psychoanalytic approach.
Freud’s observation of female patients, as victims of child sexual abuse, and his 
formulation of the Oedipus Complex led him to propose the earliest theories of 
sexual abuse. In 1896 he developed the “seduction theory” which asserted a causal 
relationship between childhood sexual trauma (resulted from the stimulation of the 
genitals) and latter psychic damage, specifically hysteria and neurosis. Few years 
later he announced, however, that his patients disclosures of sexual abuse were 
untrue and that “hysterical symptoms are derived from fantasies and not from real
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occurrences... this fantasy of being seduced by the father [is] the expression of the 
typical Oedipus Complex in women” (Freud 1933). In other words Freud assumed 
that it is the daughter’s strong projection of “penis-envy” and love for the father that 
creates the fantasy of sexual activity between father and daughter. Although some 
psychiatrist have since questioned the validity of assigning child sexual abuse to the 
child’s fantasy and have acknowledged that child sexual abuse is indeed lodged in 
reality, others came to accept female child’s fantasies about father as a fact.
Freud’s Oedipal theory influenced much of the early psychiatric literature in which 
the concept of the child-as-seductress is prevalent (e.g.Bender & Blau 1937; 
Revitcha and Weiss 1950). Sexually abused children are seen as often playing an 
active and even initiating role, while the father is seen as weak and powerless in the 
face of his daughter’s incestuous desires. Associated with the concept of the 
seductive child is the tendency to view the mother as being responsible for the 
occurrence of incest, that is to perceive the mother as acting out her own incestuous 
wishes (unresolved Oedipus Complex) by using their daughters as surrogates and 
by abandoning their husband.
The validity of the psychoanalytic approach has been criticised and challenged by 
several writers who have pointed out a number of limitations. The claim that child 
sexual abuse is a rare phenomenon has been challenged by recent research which 
has shown that it is a quite prevalent phenomenon (see previous section). A second 
criticism involves the fact that the psychoanalytic model provides an explanation 
only for the father/daughter incest, which actually accounts for less than a third of all 
child sexual abuse (Finkelhor 1984), failing this way to explain other types of intra- 
and extra-familial child sexual abuse. Focusing on the intra-psychic functioning of 
individuals this model also ignores wider social and cultural factors, such as that 
sexual abuse is primarily committed by men. Last but not least, the psychoanalytic 
model exonerates the abuser, placing responsibility for the abuse on the 
unconscious desires of the “seductive” child or the collusive mother. (Sanderson 
1995; Bagley & King 1990; Finkelhor 1984).
A number of modern psychoanalytic writers (e.g. Herman 1992; Miller 1984; 
Chodorow 1978;) have attempted to reinterpret Freud’s psychoanalytic formulation. 
They acknowledge the active participation of the father, allowing this way a shift in
92
responsibility from the child to the adult. The re-analysis of the Oedipal Complex 
does not deny children's sexual feelings. It, does, however, recognise that children 
are not able to consent to a sexual relationship and argues that men, especially 
those who are not involved in nurturing and caring roles, often interpret a child’s 
need for physical and emotional affection as a need for sexual attention, or even 
invitation.
Recent publications, like Seligson’s (1993), indicate, however, that these 
reformulations are to a large extent still ignored by many writers and therapists who 
insist in denying the reality of the experience of incest by attributing it to fantasy and 
sexual desires on the part of the victim. Obviously this attitude has serious 
implications for treatment, since it implies the aim to treat incest and child sexual 
abuse as a “disturbance” within the victim, and not the abuser. As Kirchner (1993) 
has argued if clinicians take the stance that the client’s most important task in 
treatment is examining his/her own incestuous wishes, they run the risk of 
revictimising the client. And he goes on to say that “a survivor needs a corrective 
transactional experience with us [clinicians], not one in which he/she is once again 
blamed or hurt” (142).
Although Freud’s approach, and its naive adoption by some in the “helping 
professions” has led to an unjust blaming of both mothers and victims and has 
impaired the proper recognition and treatment of sexual abuse victims, there are 
two ideas in his theory that are of clear importance in both understanding and 
treating these victims. The first is his formulation that emotions of love and hate 
towards the abuser can exist simultaneously, which is of particular importance in 
therapeutic intervention in allowing the survivor to express both these apparently 
conflicting emotions, without judging her in any way (McLeod & Saraga 1988). The 
second involves Freud’s insights concerning the unconscious aspects of the mind, 
which is of vital importance in understanding why some sexual abuse victims are 
able to repress memories of abuse and push them into an “unconscious” part of 
mind, which nevertheless disturb and torment the victim with nightmares, sudden 
flashbacks, anxiety and panic attacks, chronic fears and obsessions, and 
unexpected bouts of depression (Bagley & King 1990).
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The Family Dysfunction Approach.
The notion of the dysfunctional family was first proposed in 1940 as a concept 
within family systems theory and from then on it developed to a widely held 
theoretical approach about the manifestation of incest. Instead of arguing that the 
disturbance lies within the individual psyche of the victim, like the psychoanalytic 
model, this theory asserts that that the family as a unit is pathological and that 
abnormal behaviour such as incest is ‘a symptom’ of overall family maladjustment. 
All members are aetiologically involved in the sexual abuse and everybody is seen 
as contributing to conditions under which incest or sexual misuse occurs. A rational 
for maintaining the family’s pathology and for ensuring that the abuse is kept a 
secret is prevalent in these families, “dysfunctional families”, which have been 
described by researchers as inward looking, socially isolated families and 
dominated by pathological fears. Incest is believed to be utilised and maintained in 
order to reduce tension and to maintain homeostasis and balance within the family 
(Justice & Justice 1979;. Lusting et al 1966; Jorne 1979; Hartman & Laird 1983).
Other dynamics commonly described in families that incest occurs involve the 
relationship between the mother and the children or the husband. That is the mother 
has been described as not fulfilling her nurturing and protective role by absenting 
herself both emotionally and physically and as failing to comply with her husband’s 
sexual demands. The mother is seen to collude with the incest, and it is this 
collusion which has been considered to be the cornerstone of the family pathology. 
Many family dysfunction theorists have argued that the mother knows, consciously 
or unconsciously, that incest is taking place, but chooses to deny it, even when 
confronting by the daughter, by not taking preventive action to protect her daughter, 
or by blaming the daughter for the incest. For these reason the mother has been 
often described as “the real abuser in an incestuous family”. Finally both the mother 
and the father are seen as dysfunctional adults and parents, who allow or even 
reinforce role reversal with the children who often assume adult roles, such as 
housework, child care duties and in the case of the daughter-victim “wifely duties”. 
(Justice & Justice 1979; Rist 1979; Dietz & Craft 1980; Hartman & Laird 1983).
Regarding incest primarily as a symptom of pathological family relationships which 
serve to keep the family together, therapeutic interventions focus in family dynamics 
with the aim to restore interpersonal relationships. Therapy assumes participation of
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all members of the family in child sexual abuse and so looks for motivation and 
sometimes responsibility in each. Although the modality of family therapy, team 
interventions have been documented as useful in changing the balance of power in 
a so called “abusive family” it has also been argued that such a therapeutic model 
detracts from the painful and devastating effects incest has, not only upon family, 
but more specifically and importantly on the child. Viewing sexual activity and abuse 
as secondary and much less important the abused child’s experience runs the risk 
to be minimised or even denied. Emphasis on maintaining the family as a 
functioning unit might also place children at risk of further abuse (Bender, Fein and 
Bishop 1982; Gough 1993)
The aforementioned criticisms come from gender-power theorists who have 
challenged the assumptions of much family work arguing that through the 
therapeutic interventions employed by family therapists, responsibility is displaced 
from the abuser and is at best bestowed on the whole family, or at worst, and 
probably more frequently, is dumped on the mother (Sanderson 1995; Bagley & 
King 1990). Employing evidence from a number of studies, gender power theorists 
have challenged the notion of the collusive mother who chooses to ignore, or deny 
the incest. A significant number of mothers have been found, for example, to act 
when incest is disclosed and to take immediate preventive action (e.g. Mrazek 1982; 
Conte & Berliner 1981).
Examination of the dynamics and the circumstances that may prevent the mother 
from reporting the abuse also provides evidence that questions the validity of the 
notion of the collusive mother. A number of researchers report a significant number 
of mothers in their samples who had realistic fears for their safety and well being, as 
well as that of the family, if they were to disclose the incestuous relationship. That 
is, these mothers were known to social workers, were also victims of domestic 
violence and were facing various other constraints such as financial and emotional 
dependence on the husbands. These evidence have led gender/ power theorists to 
suggest that ‘maternal collusion in incest, when it occurs, is a measure of maternal 
powerlessness. (Dietz & Craft 1980; Trusesdell, McNeil and Deschner 1986;)..
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The feminist (Gender/Power) Approach.
Feminist approach developed out of a reinterpretation of the existing approaches, a 
re-interpretation that places responsibility for the abuse on the abuser, while 
focusing on the experiential effects on the victim and the mother. The focus of this 
approach is based on two aspects that had not previously been extensively 
addressed or had sometimes been ignored, namely the role that unequal power 
relationships play in child sexual abuse, and the abuser’s responsibility in initiating 
and maintaining the abuse.
Patriarchy and male socialisation are analysed in the context of gender relationships 
and are seen as the primary cause of child sexual abuse. Conclusions drawn from 
this analysis is that the sexual assault of daughters and children is inherent in family 
system which allows and actively socialises males to assume and wield the power 
and females to be submissive, passive and compliant providers of male needs. 
Female socialisation explains victims helplessness and once combined with 
financial dependence, oppression and threat of physical and sexual violence is seen 
as evidence that both the mother and the daughter are victims, equally powerless 
against the husband/father. (MacLeod & Saraga 1988; Herman 1981
The feminist approach has greatly added our understanding of child sexual abuse 
and has inspired particularly successful therapeutic interventions; however there are 
several theoretical and therapeutic issues which are minimised or insufficiently 
addressed. Interpreting child sexual abuse as a sexual power relationship, rooted in 
deferential gender socialisation and male power in a patriarchal society, the feminist 
approach provides an explanation that includes the dynamics of extra-familial child 
sexual abuse as well as intra-familial and incestuous abuse. Being primarily 
sociological in its approach this model can be seen, however, as minimising 
psychological factors and motivations. That is, the bulk of research in male sexual 
abusers has provided a quite complicated set of information on the range and type 
of abusers that indicates a number of factors, in addition to socialisation patterns, 
that account for sexually abusive behaviour (Becker 1991). Another major challenge 
for the feminist analysis involves the fact that it offers little or no information for the 
sexual exploitation of male children and fails to clarify at what point the victimised 
male child becomes the adult male offender (Bagley & King 1990).
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Interventions of this model aim in individual as well as public treatment with the goal 
to increase awareness so that women’s and children’s rights of safety and freedom 
from assault are seen as the responsibility of the entire community. Placing the 
responsibility for sexual abuse with the abuser, the feminist approach has removed 
the blame from mother and daughter. Although this shift has been generally 
welcomed, criticisms focus on the danger that those survivors who do feel 
abandoned and betrayed by their mothers may be prevented from exploring these 
feelings in therapy for the fear of indulging in ‘mother blaming behaviour’. Finally 
although feminists assumption that females are vulnerable, socialised to be 
compliant, and paralysed to offer any resistance is true for many women, some do 
resist. Failing to recognise this underlines the risk to replace the stereotypes of 
‘seductive child’ and ‘powerless mother’ with that of the powerless child and mother, 
denying female strength.
Finkelhor’s four preconditions Model.
Reviewing all the causal factors that researchers and clinicians have identified as 
contributing to child sexual abuse, Finkelhor (1984) developed a hierarchical model 
which includes individual factors related to the victim, abuser and the family, as well 
as social cultural factors. He grouped these factors into four preconditions and 
argued that they need to be met prior to the instigation of child sexual abuse. These 
preconditions can actually be seen as playing in a logical sequence. That is, the 
potential abuser must firstly have strong motivation to abuse, he will need to find 
children erotically and sexually attractive (1st precondition). To act upon this 
motivation he will need to overcome any internal inhibitions that may act against his 
motivation to sexually abuse (2nd precondition). When these have been overcome, 
the potential abuser will need to overcome external inhibitions, such as opportunity 
and lack of supervision before he can act (3rd precondition). Finally the potential 
abuser needs to overcome the child’s possible resistance to being sexually abused 
(4th precondition).
Finkelhor’s model accounts for both intra and extra- familial child sexual abuse since 
it does not distinguish between the two. This has important implications for 
treatment as it should ideally avoid distinctions between types of abuse to prevent 
a value laden hierarchy of severity of abuse to become operational influencing 
treatment. Finkelhor includes the child’s and the mother’s behaviour in his analysis.
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but makes it clear that these are not relevant in response to the abuser’s manifest 
sexual interest. So the model places responsibility with the abuser, while it 
incorporates both psychological (motivation of abuser, internal inhibitions etc.) and 
sociological (male socialisation, social tolerance of eroticising children etc.) factors. 
Finally the model allows evaluation as well as intervention on all four levels. 
Nevertheless, it is essentially a descriptive framework, which incorporates a range 
of dissonant theories and observed clinical data, and as such, in its present form, it 
cannot be viewed as a theory until it is tested empirically, in particular in its 
application to treatment and interventions (Finkelhor 1984; Sanderson 1995).
EFFECTS OF CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE
A diversity of findings is prevalent in research on the effects of child sexual abuse 
and on the factors related with the degree of harm to the child. The documented 
broad range of outcome among sexual abuse victims, the mediating factors related 
to this outcome and a number of methodological problems in relevant studies seem 
to account for this diversity. This diversity can also be seen as indicating the 
complexity around the nature and consequently the study of the phenomenon of 
child sexual abuse.
All recent reviews of studies on child sexual abuse conclude that it has harmful 
effects; however all point out serious methodological weaknesses which result in 
interpretative constraints. Some of them involve 1) the difficulty around separating 
effects that can directly be attributable to sexual abuse from effects possibly 
resulted by co-or pre-existing psychopathology in the child or in the family, or by 
stress associated with disclosure; 2) the relatively small number of studies that have 
actually examined children and 3) the existing lack of appropriate control or 
comparison groups. Such problems obviously limit the degree to which firm 
conclusions can be drawn and result in viewing findings as generating hypothesis to 
be further studied. In other words findings are seen as pointing out variables that 
may eventually be of importance in understanding the sexual abuse phenomenon 
(Briere & Runtz 1993; Beitchman et al 1991; Browne & Finkelhor 1986).
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Child sexual abuse in the context of development.
Child sexual abuse occurs within the context of human growth and development 
and as such it interferes and sometimes may interrupt child’s development 
emotionally, socially and/or physically. Research findings concerning possible 
effects of sexual abuse during preschool, school and adolescence years will be 
discussed in this section. These involve reactions occurring within 2 years of the 
termination of abuse and are often called “short-term effects” in the literature. There 
will be some reference to findings concerning the “long term effects” of child sexual 
abuse, which come from retrospective studies that is, studies on adults that have 
been sexually abused as children, but these will not be extensively discussed in the 
present paper.
Pre-school Age:
Sexual abuse per-se at this stage has been found to interfere with the development 
of children’s sexual identification. Sexually abused children are ahead of their years 
in the development since sexual experiences are not expected or overtly permitted 
at this age. Displaying some form of sexual behaviour judged to be abnormal (age- 
inappropriate or precocious sexual knowledge, requesting sexual stimulation and 
exposure of genitals) is an effect of sexual abuse that has been consistently 
reported by researchers employing a variety of assessment tools, including parental 
report instruments, observation of free play with anatomically correct dolls ratings of 
children’s human figure drawings etc. Important to be noted, however, is that the 
reported occurrence of such behaviour in individual children varies widely, ranging 
from 10% to 90% (Beitchman et al 1991; Browne & Finkelhor 1986).
Although such a wide range calls for considerable caution in inferring the 
occurrence or non occurrence of sexual abuse based on the presence of sexualised 
behaviour, knowledge about its existence (intensity, duration etc.) provides valuable 
clinical information and may give a clinician sufficient ground to further investigate 
the case-history of the specific child. Related to the difficulty in diagnosing sexual 
abuse during preschool years is the issue around the extent to which preschoolers 
discriminate fact from fiction. It is not uncommon allegations of mistreatment by 
adults made by children of preschool age to be dismissed as fictitious with the 
suggestion that children of this age are prone to fantasy. Sivan (1991), however, 
examines the research on children’s thought and language, memory and learning.
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fears, fantasy, and play, as well as the research on the influence of television on 
children of this age and concludes that “preschoolers base their play on the reality 
of their experience, and the detail which they reflect is probably directly related to 
the amount of experience to which the child has been exposed” (p. 492).
Although preschooler’s fantasy does not seem to influence them in terms of leading 
them to make up stories concerning sexual assaults, it does influence them in terms 
of the meaning they construct from their experiences, which in turn plays a 
significant role in the impact that the experience of sexual abuse will have upon the 
child. That is, preschoolers may be influenced by what they thought or imagined to 
have occurred than by actual facts. For instance “...if a child imagines that the 
offending adult wanted to urinate on him, the incident may be remembered as 
unpleasant, but it may have no sexual connotations (Leaman, 1980 p.22)
Distinguishing the effects of sexual abuse from other environmental disadvantages 
that a preschooler-victim might be exposed to is difficult. This difficulty is illustrated 
in studies where sexually abused preschoolers have been found to display less or 
similar disturbance with physically abused preschoolers (Fagot et al. 1989). 
Controversial, nevertheless existing data supporting the argument that age is 
unrelated to degree of measured psychopathology (e.g. comparison of preschool 
and school age children’s internalising vs externalising psychopathology in Friedrich 
et al 1986) makes the situation even more complicated. Relevant and maybe 
explanatory for this complication is the question whether preschoolers actually 
manifest specific types of psychopathology. This question has been raised by a 
number of writers who actually point out the need to better distinguish between 
behaviours that are related to age, such as enuresis, suicide attempt, from those 
that are not (e. g. Goldston et al 1989).
School age children:
Similarly with the preschoolers, sexually abused children at this age appear to 
manifest inappropriate sexual behaviours. Evidence from studies using both normal 
and clinical controls have suggested that sexualised behaviour is a symptom that 
seems to be a relatively constant marker of sexual abuse during the years prior to 
puberty (Beitchman et al 1991).
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The possible cost in the area of industry to a child who is sexually abused during 
this life period is an issue that has been extensively examined and discussed. 
Behavioural and academic problems at school are commonly reported symptoms for 
sexually abused school age children. They range from 32% to 85% and involve 
significant lower school performance as rated by the teacher (Tong et al 1987); 
being at least one grade behind at school (Adams-Tucker 1981) and more 
behavioural and emotional problems as assessed by both parent and teacher report 
on standardised questionnaires (Tong et al 1987; Friedrich et al 1986; Gomes- 
Schwartz et al. 1985).
Since sexually abused school age children in the aforementioned studies were 
compared with a non-clinical control and in same cases these children had a pre­
abuse history of psychiatric and/or developmental difficulties, it is difficult to 
determine whether school and behavioural problems are attributable to sexual 
abuse per-se. The question whether developmental immaturity and cognitive deficits 
is likely to predate sexual abuse provides an additional complication in the process 
of drawing conclusions. That is, as Gomes-Schwartz et al. (1985) point out, children 
who are developmentally delayed may be at greater risk for sexual abuse, and that 
expense may contribute to further deterioration of their school performance.
Adolescence:
Although adolescents are usually seen as being able to defend themselves 
physically and in terms of asking for help, reported percentages of cases of 
adolescent sexual abuse suggest that a significant number do not. A possible 
explanation for this involves the fact that adolescents are still dependent upon the 
parents to a large extent. Because of this dependency and since they are not ready 
to be self-sufficieiit, they might believe that there no other alternatives apart from 
the abuse. Moreover they may not have other place to live and they might be too 
embarrassed to discuss the experiences with other adults or peers (Bagley & King 
1990;Mayhall & Eastlack- Norgard 1983).
Fisher et al. (1980) describe three types of sexual abuse that may occur during 
adolescent period. In the first the adolescents have been sexually abused for at 
least several years, often since preschool. Early sexual contact may have been 
limited to fondling or masturbation with intercourse first occurring in the adolescent
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period. The second type of adolescent sexual abuse begins in adolescence and 
emerges from long-standing personal and marital dysfunction and role reversal 
within the family. The third type refers to sexual abuse which begins in adolescence 
and is related to developmental issues of adolescence and developmental issues of 
parents who are at mid-life. That is, it is normal for adolescents to experiment with 
their emerging sexuality within the family and functional families provide a safe and 
non-incestuous atmosphere in which such an experimentation can take place. If the 
parents in the family are, however, struggling with their own developmental issues 
of ageing at the same time, greater vulnerability to sexual abuse may exist.
Since adolescents are establishing their identities, particularly their sexual identities, 
the experience of sexual abuse by an adult may be more traumatic than for other 
developmental periods. The fact that “being provocative” is for many adolescents a 
normal part of growing up, might result the adolescent to be assumed responsible 
for the incident(s) of sexual abuse. Such a burden of blame can compound the 
difficulties of the adolescent, especially if the sexual abuse occurred within the 
context of the family and resulted in physical and emotional disruption for the entire 
family (Mayhall & Eastlack-Norgard 1983).
When adolescents are experiencing abuse or neglect, their reactions are usually 
more drastic than when younger children experience similar live events. In the case 
of sexual abuse “acting out” behaviours, such as running away, truanting, 
alcohol/drug abuse, and promiscuity, are commonly reported as being displayed by 
adolescent victims (Gomes-Schwartz et al. 1985; Runtz & Briere 1986; Sansonet- 
Hayden et al. 1987). Studying adolescents who had been involved in sex rings, 
Burgess, Hartman and McCormack (1987) report a significant higher occurrence of 
illicit drugs use, compulsive masturbation, prostitution, physical fights with friends 
and parents, and delinquent/criminal behaviours among the sexually abused boys 
compared to a normal control group matched for age, sex, race and family structure. 
In Goldston et al. (1989) study, however, running away was a more common among 
the clinical control girls, than the sexually abused group of girls and four other 
incidences of acting out did not differentiate the two groups. Although the 
discrepancy between these two studies can be attributable to differences in the 
nature of sexual act involved or to the gender of the sample, the fact that the later
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study included a clinical control group, raises the question whether acting out 
behaviours can be attributable to sexual abuse per-se.
Evidence for the presence of depression, low self esteem, and suicidal ideation or 
behaviour also appear to be common among adolescent- victims of sexual abuse. 
Reviewing a number of studies Beitchman et al (1991) and Browne and Finkelhor 
(1986) report that sexually abused adolescents have often been rated as depressed 
and as having a low self esteem in studies or have received a major depression 
diagnosis from psychiatric facilities. Suicidal ideation and behaviour, including self- 
injurious behaviour, also seem to be common, especially in incest victims. Lack of 
inter-rater reliability and evidence that depression and low self-esteem are also 
common in non-sexually abused clinical groups, once again brings up, however, the 
issues around methodological problems and around the environmental 
disadvantages that sexually abused children are exposed to.
Another area that has received attention in the literature concerns the effects of 
child sexual abuse on victims’ sexual identity. Although impairment in sexual 
function among victims of child sexual abuse has been well documented by 
retrospective studies (Browne & David 1986), evidence on links between sexual 
abuse and later sexual orientation seems to be inconclusive. There is some 
evidence suggesting that sexual abuse may predispose victims to later 
homosexuality, or gender identity disturbance. Johnson and Shier (1985), for 
example, found a significantly higher prevalence of homosexuality (48% vs. 8%) 
and bisexuality (10% vs. 3%) among young adult males who had a history of child 
sexual abuse compared to non-abused controls. In Runtz and Briere’s (1986) 
retrospective study of females undergraduates, sexual abuse victims reported they 
were more likely to have homosexual contact during their teenage years compared 
to normal controls. As Beitchman et al. (1991) argues, however, such studies need 
to be interpreted cautiously, since most people with a homosexual erotic orientation 
have not been sexually abused as children and moreover it is not clear whether a 
nascent homosexual orientation itself predisposes to homosexual contact which 
might be abusive. In addition a number of studies from the sexual abuse literature 
have found little connection (Finkelhor 1984; Bell & Weinberg 1981)
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Evidence about symptomatic behaviour of children (or adults) that have been 
sexually abused, has provided, a valuable set of information from which we have 
identified short (or long) term effects of child sexual abuse. This knowledge is 
extremely useful for clinicians, in a therapeutic context, especially during the 
assessment process. Considering Loewestein's (1979) description of a symptom as 
an unconscious compromise between communicating and not communicating 
certain thoughts, however, that is, viewing behaviour as interactional and situation 
bound, the clinician is called upon to enlarge his./her diagnostic framework in order 
to increase the possibilities of successfully deciphering what is being 
communicated. One way to do this is to view symptomatic behaviour as the 
expression of unresolved trauma, which has its origins in having grown up in an 
abusive family environment, in case of intra-familial abuse, or in a family 
environment with inadequate adult supervision in case of extra-familial abuse. .
OTHER ASPECTS OF TRAUMA IN CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE.
Describing the formidable developmental and adaptation tasks faced by a child 
trapped in a sexually abusive household Herman (1992) says: 
she [victim] must find a way to form primary attachments to caretakers who are either 
dangerous or, from her perspective, negligent. She must find a way to develop a sense of 
basic trust and safety with caretakers who are untrustworthy and unsafe. She must develop a 
sense of self in relation to others who are helpless, uncaring, or cruel. She must develop a 
capacity for bodily self-regulation in an environment in which her body is at disposal of 
other’s needs, as well as a capacity for self-soothing in an environment without solace. She 
must develop the capacity for initiative in an environment which demands that she bring her 
will into complete conformity with that of her abuser. And ultimately, she must develop a 
capacity of intimacy out of an environment where all intimate relationships are corrupt, and 
an identity out of an environment which defines her as a whore and a slave (101).
The abused child’s existential task is described as equally formidable, since she
must find a way to preserve hope and meaning even though she perceives herself
abandoned to a power without mercy. The alternative is utter despair, something no
child can bear.
The pathological environment of childhood abuse forces the development of 
extraordinary capacities, which are, creative yet, destructive. Victims develop coping 
mechanism which although essential for their survival as children they prevent them 
from experiencing a healthy adult life (Richardson & Bacon 1991; Bagley & King 
1990; Mayhall & Eastlack Norgard 1983). It is vital in the interests of accurate 
research, effective treatment, objective legal advocacy and for the sake of primary, 
secondary and tertiary prevention or intervention that professionals dealing with
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cases of sexual abuse be aware of the links between the experience of sexual 
abuse and the resulted observed or masked sequelae.
Summit’s (1983) developed a model “the child sexual abuse accommodation 
syndrome” to help improve understanding and acceptance of the child’s position in 
the complex and controversial dynamics following sexual assault. According to this 
model the child’s survival depends on, or is typically characterised, by secrecy, 
helplessness, entrapment, delayed disclosure, and retraction. The first two reactions 
are seen as preconditions to the occurrence of the sexual abuse and the remaining 
three as sequential contingencies which take on increasing variability and 
complexity.
Each category or reaction included in the sexual abuse accommodation syndrome 
reflects a compelling reality for the victim. For this reason awareness of the 
syndrome provides ‘a counterprejudicial’ explanation to the otherwise self- 
camouflaging and self-stigmatising behaviour of the victim. Most importantly, 
however, each category represents a contradiction to the most common 
assumptions of adults. The first two categories, “secrecy” and “helplessness” reflect, 
for example, the child’s normal tendency to keep the abuse a secret and to submit 
quietly. It explains that contrary to the general expectation that the victim would 
normally seek help, children will typically cope silently since they are expected to 
show obedience and affection to adults, especially those in position of authority. 
Adults, who often judge a victim as a willing accomplice unless compliance was 
achieved through force or threat of violence, are reminded by the second category 
of the syndrome that wordless action or gesture of a parent is an absolutely 
compelling force for a dependent child and that the threat of loss of love or loss of 
family security is more frightening to the child than any threat of violence.
The third category of the syndrome “entrapment and accommodation”, explains the 
development of a compulsive and addictive abusive pattern and sensitise us to the 
fact that much of what is eventually labelled as adolescent or adult psychopathology 
(dependency, self-destructive behaviour, selective restructuring of reality, multiple 
personality and so on) represents habitual vestiges of painfully learned childhood 
survival skills. Understanding the development of the accommodation mechanism of 
the child or the vestigial scars of the adult survivor is of particular importance for
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those working therapeutically with a victim since such an understanding can prevent 
them from condemning or stigmatising the symptoms and thus reinforcing a sense 
of badness, inadequacy or craziness in the victim.
The last two categories “Delayed, Conflicted and Unconvinced Disclosure” and 
“Retraction” deal with issues around the child’s disclosure which, according to 
Summit (1983), in the majority of cases, is a result of an overwhelming family 
conflict, incidental discovery by a third party, or sensitive outreach and community 
education by child protective agencies. This category reflects the common reality 
that “whether the child is delinquent, hypersexual, countersexual, suicidal, 
hysterical, psychotic, or perfectly well-adjusted, and whether the child is angry, 
evasive or serene, the immediate affect and the adjustment pattern of the child will 
be interpreted by adults to invalidate the child’s complaint” (187).
The adolescent girl, for example, who, after an especially punishing family fight and 
a belittling showdown of authority by the father, is finally driven by anger to give up 
the secret “seeks understanding and intervention at the very time she is least likely 
to get it” (Summit 1983, p i 86). Authorities will most likely identify with problems of 
parents trying to cope with a rebellious teenager and will observe that the girl is 
more angry about the immediate punishment than about the sexual atrocities she is 
alleging. So they will assume there is no truth to such a fantastic complaint, 
especially since the girl did not complain years ago when she claims she was 
forcibly molested. Adolescents who have followed an alternative accommodation 
pattern in which they succeed in hiding any indications of anger or conflict and who 
are usually achieving, popular and eager to please both teachers and peers face 
more incredulous reactions by adults when they try to describe a history of ongoing 
sexual abuse. Adults tend to think that “No one so talented and well-adjusted could 
have been involved in something so sordid” so, it didn’t happen or, if it did, it 
certainly did not harm the child.
Retraction of complaint is finally seen as a normal and expected reaction “unless 
there is a special support for the child and immediate intervention to force 
responsibility on the father [abuser]”. Describing the chaotic aftermath of disclosure 
Summit (1983) illustrates that the child, once again, bears the responsibility of either
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preserving or destroying the family. It is the burden of such a responsibility that will 
lead the child to “admit” that he/she made up the story.
Awareness of the accommodation syndrome by mental health professionals is 
essential since it provides understanding which can enable them to articulate the 
position of the child in the prevailing adult imbalance credibility and might prevent 
them from reflecting the traditional mythology about sexual abuse which 
stigmatises and re-victimise the child. This is especially true in the crisis of 
disclosure when care-takers tend to turn to experts for clarification-when a 
specialist is needed to help mobilise sceptical acre-takers into a position of belief, 
acceptance, support and protection of the child (Richardson & Bacon 1991; Bagley 
& King 1990; Summit 1983).
Taking into consideration the subjective reactions of the child-victim of sexual 
abuse, Finkelhor and Browne (1985) proposed a model of four “traumagenic 
dynamics” or factors affecting trauma. These are traumatic sexualization, betrayal, 
powerlessness, and stigmatization. Apart from providing a systematic understanding 
of the effects of child sexual abuse, this model can also be used to make 
assessments of victimised children and to predict problems to which these children 
may be vulnerable subsequently.
Traumatic sexualization refers to the “process in which a child’s sexuality (including 
both sexual feelings and attitudes) is shaped in a developmentally inappropriate and 
interpersonally dysfunctional fashion as a result of sexual abuse” (Finkelhor & 
Browne 1985 p 532). One of the several ways described that traumatic 
sexualization can occur is when a child is repeatedly rewarded (through the 
exchange of affection, attention or gifts) by an offender for sexual behaviour that is 
inappropriate for the child’s level of development. The child may thus learn to use 
sexual behaviour as a strategy for manipulating others to satisfy a variety of 
developmentally appropriate needs. Children so traumatised may cope by becoming 
promiscuous or developing an aversion to sex, both of which are reactions that 
represent a failure to develop normal sexual relationships.
Betrayal is the dynamic by which “ children discover that someone on whom they 
were vitally dependent has caused them harm” (Finkelhor & Browne 1985 p 531).
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An example of a way that it may occur in the course of abuse or its aftermath is 
when children come to the realisation that a trusted person has manipulated them 
through lies or misrepresentations of moral standards. Obviously the degree of 
betrayal depends on the child's relationship with the offender. It is also related to a 
family’s response to disclosure, since children who are disbelieved or blamed 
undoubtedly experience a greater sense of betrayal than those who are supported. 
Betrayal has a sequel in an impaired ability to trust other people in many 
subsequent situations, especially those involving interpersonal relationships.
Powerlessness or disempowerment refers to “the process in which the child’s will, 
desires, and sense of efficacy are continually contravened” (Finkelhor & Browne 
1985 p 532). The basic kind of powerless occur in sexual abuse when a child’s 
territory and body space are repeatedly invaded against the child’s will. This is 
exacerbated by whatever coercion and manipulation the offender may impose as 
part of the abuse process. Force is not necessary for the development of 
powerlessness, since any kind of situation which a child feels trapped (i.e. 
consequences of disclosure) can create a sense of powerlessness, which reinforces 
the child’s self-perception as a victim. Prolonged assaults may lead to a permanent 
sense of powerlessness in the victim, and an inability to avoid further victimisation, 
be it sexual, social, or economical.
Stigmatization refers to the process by which negative connotations, such as 
badness, shame, and guilt “are communicated to the child around the experience 
and then become incorporated into the child’s self-image” (Finkelhor & Browne 1985 
p532). These can be directly communicated by the abuser but can also be 
reinforced by attitudes that the child infers or hears from other persons in the family 
or community. Stigmatisation reinforces a sense of isolation in children who might 
eventually gravitate to various stigmatised levels of society. They might get involved 
in drug or alcohol abuse, criminal activity, or in prostitution. The effects of 
stigmatisation may also reach extremes in forms of self-destructive behaviour and 
suicide attempts.
Summit’s (1983) and Finkelhor and Browne’s (1985) work on the trauma 
experienced by victims of child sexual abuse has significant implications for both 
intervention and research. During assessment, for example, trauma can be
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understood by investigating the child’s experience prior to and subsequent to 
abuse. The categories of the “accommodation syndrome” and the “traumagenic 
dynamics” are ongoing processes that have a history prior to and a future 
subsequent to the abuse. As such, if assessed both in the pre-and post-abuse 
phase they can provide an integrated understanding of the child’s family life and 
personality characteristics in both phases. As Finkelhor and Browne report, for 
example, a child who was a previous victim of physical or emotional abuse may 
have already been suffering from a disempowering dynamic before the sexual 
abuse occurred. In contrast an eldest child with important responsibilities, living in a 
fairly healthy family environment, may have acquired a well developed sense of 
personal efficacy and powerfulness, in which case, the disempowering aspects of a 
sexual abuse experience may have only a minor or transient effect.
Concerning research implications, the “accommodation syndrome” and the 
“traumagenic dynamics” point out the need for the development of instruments 
specifically designed to assess the impact of sexual abuse. That is, much of the 
research on child sexual abuse has been conducted using broad psychological 
inventories (e.g. MMPI), which have subscales like neuroticism or self-acceptance 
that can assess a variety of pathological conditions, but not necessarily the 
pathologies closely to sexual abuse. Moreover, even though ad hoc investigator- 
invented measures which are more sensitive to the specific pathology that may 
result from sexual abuse have also been used, they are not based on any theory, 
and often suffer from lack of methodological rigor (Finkelhor & Browne 1985; 
Summit 1983).
Worth being reported at this point is that there is a continuing view of some in the 
literature that sexual abuse is not traumatic or that its traumatic impact has been 
greatly overstated (e.g. Henderson 1983). Proponents of this view argue that the 
evidence for trauma is meager and based on inadequate samples and unwarranted 
inferences. One cannot deny that there is a point in their argument, since it is only 
recently that clinicians have been able to substantiate their impressions that sexual 
abuse is traumatic with evidence from strong scientific studies (Sanderson 1995; 
Browne & Finkelhor 1986).
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As evidence now accumulates, however, it communicates a clear suggestion that 
sexual abuse is a serious mental health problem, consistently associated with very 
disturbing subsequent problems in some important part of the victims. Support for 
this argument is provided by Browne and Finkelhor (1986) who report that eight 
non-clinical studies of adults, including three random sample community surveys, 
found that child sexual abuse victims in the “normal” population had identifiable 
degrees of impairment when compared with non-victims. Findings from these 
studies are particularly worthy of notice, since they were identifying differences 
associated with an event that occurred from 5 to 25 years previously and they used 
fairly broad definitions of sexual abuse. In addition in the four studies that used 
multivariate analyses, differences in the victimised group remained after a variety of 
background and other factors had been controlled.
Although such studies indicate that a history of childhood sexual abuse is 
associated with higher risk for mental health and adjustment problems in adulthood, 
they provide limited information about the actual extent of impairment. This is 
justifiable, in a way, since, as it is increasingly accepted, the impact of sexual abuse 
is a function of many variables, some of which will remain uncontrolled in any study 
(Beitchman et al 1991; Basta & Peterson 1990). Nevertheless a number of studies 
have examined the relation of various abuse-specific variables to the impact of 
childhood abuse and have came up with a cluster of factors that seem to mediate.
Mediating Factors:
Studies on the factors influencing the extent of trauma of childhood sexual abuse 
suffer from a number of methodological weakness. In a number of these studies the 
sample typically includes a group of children who has experienced intrafamilial 
abuse and another who has experienced extra-familial abuse. Moreover, sometimes 
parameters of sexual abuse (e.g. age of onset, frequency, type of sexual activity) 
vary widely across subjects. Nevertheless such studies have raised our awareness 
of factors that may place victims at a greater risk for disturbance. Their findings, 
although frequently assumed as heuristic, have also provided a useful framework 
that has facilitated both the assessment and the therapeutic process.
The variables identified by these studies can be organised have been organised 
into four separate categories:
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Perpetrator Characteristics:
This category includes the relationship of the offender to the child. Research on the 
intrafamilial versus extra-familial abuse has provided mixed results. Some 
investigators report more trauma (measured by degree of symptomatology) when 
family members sexually abuse a child while others find few differences (Browne & 
Finkelhor 1986). The close relationship between the child and the extra-familial 
abuser as well as an often mismatch between the number of perpetrators in the 
family and non-family abuse situation may account for such differences (Basta & 
Peterson 1990). Despite this relative inconsistency in research results most of the 
sources suggest that the psychological trauma is greater for the child when the 
offender is a family member or someone with who the child has a close relationship 
(friend, teacher), in which case the likelihood for the abuse to be repeated is also 
greater.
Some of the factors that seem to distinguish the effect on the child in the situation of 
stranger-initiated sexual abuse from the abuse that takes place within the family are: 
1) degree of blame placed on the child as the provoke of the abuse; 2) amount of 
family support and availability of protection; 3) personal consequence for the family 
(disruption of child’s family membership when offender is prosecuted); 4) degree of 
child’s family dysfunction which is related with 5) child’s emotional stability prior to 
the abuse (Mayhall & Eastlack Norgard 1983).
Style and Type of Sexual Abuse
Factors grouped in this category are mostly behavioural, such as frequency or 
duration of abuse, the type of sexual activities endured (fondling, intercourse etc.) 
and the degree of force, coercion or co-operation. Although there is a limited 
number of studies that have examined these issues, the use of multiple regression 
has provided data which suggests that greater frequency and duration of the abuse 
is related to relatively prolonged symptomatic behaviour (Friedrich et al. 1986; Sides 
et al. 1989; Burgress et al 1984). Concerning the type of sexual act and the use of 
force, there is evidence from some short-term studies that force or a high degree of 
physical violation (vaginal, anal or oral penetration) contribute to greater trauma in 
victim (Elwell & Ephross 1987).
I l l
Victim’s characteristics.
This category involves age, maturity of the child, and gender.
Age of onset
Reviewing a number of studies on the relation between age of onset and severity of 
outcome, Beitchman et al (1991) points out that findings are inconclusive. Studies of 
children and adolescents have reported greater disturbance in children abused 
during the pre-teen and teenage years compared to children abused at a younger 
age. Such disturbances involve more severe diagnoses (using the DSM-III), a 
greater likelihood to be referred for inpatient treatment and more changes in 
behaviour for children who were first sexually molested between the ages of 10 and 
15. Studies, however, that have examined outcome of childhood sexual abuse in a 
retrospective manner report an opposite trend. That is adults abused at younger 
ages are more likely to report extreme or considerable trauma and to show a higher 
frequency of serious disturbance (psychosis, borderline personality, suicide 
attempts) in comparison with those abused as teenagers.
Speculating about this discrepancy Beitchman et al (1991) report that the full extent 
of the effects of abuse may not be evident when victims are assessed as children 
and that possibly new symptoms associated with their abuse will emerge. Moreover 
since studies of short-term effects were based on samples of children where the 
abuse had recently been disclosed, younger children in these samples would 
usually not have been subject to the abuse for as long as older children.
Gender
Because of the extreme reluctance of males to admit to sexual victimisation 
experiences less is known about possible variations in coping mechanisms of male 
victims (Summit 1983). A study by Friedrich, Urquiza and Beilke (1986) of sexually 
abused boys found that they had a tendency to act out aggressively and to have 
more sexualised behaviours than a comparison group of conduct disordered boys. 
Another study by Friedrich, Urquiza and Beike (1986) found girls to be more 
internalising in their post-abuse behaviours and boys to be more externalising. In 
general it seems like that the sequelae for females tends to be more self-destructive 
than other-destructive. An explanation for this involves the hypothesis that women 
are more prone to internalise their distress and become depressed or suicidal
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whereas men are more likely to externalise their conflicts and become abusive and 
aggressive (Marvasti 1986).
Disclosure.
This category involves whether the child keeps the abuse a secret or is willing to 
discuss it; parental response and support after the disclosure; professionals' 
reactions to sexual abuse work and effects of investigation and litigation 
procedures.
Whether child keeps abuse secret or is willing to discuss it.
According to Miller (1985) “An unacknowledged trauma is like a wound that never 
heals over and can start to bleed again at any time. In a supportive environment the 
wound can become visible and finally heal completely” (p. 184). Although Miller’s 
and other’s work (e.g. Richardson & Bacon 1991) argues convincingly that “Not 
being able to talk about or even know about these wounds is what later leads to 
pathological developments (Miller p i26), the effects of disclosure versus secrecy 
have received little empirical systematic investigation. The strong clinical 
assumption that children who feel compelled to keep the abuse a secret suffer a 
great psychic distress has not been always confirmed by studies of children 
(Browne & Finkelhor 1986), . In contrast, empirical evidence from studies on adults 
who have suffered traumatic sexual experiences indicates that they are more prone 
to health problems several years later if they have not discussed the experiences 
with others than if they have discusses them (Pennebaker & Susman 1988).
The observed mismatch between clinical assumptions and empirical evidence and 
the discrepancies in the later can be explained if one takes into consideration that 
the decision to disclose is related to many factors about the experience, which 
makes the assessment of its effects alone extremely difficult. Looking the 
contributory factors that may lead a child to disclose sexual abuse and the crisis it 
involves for the child, the family and helpers (Richarson & Bacon 1991) it becomes 
clear that it is actually naive to draw conclusions on the effects that disclosure 
(telling) per-se has. This is not to say that studying the effects of disclosure is not 
important. On the contrary it means that we need to empirically examine in what 
instances disclosure, and subsequent intervention on the part of medical, legal, or
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social agencies, can be expected to have an adverse or helpful effect on the sexual 
abuse victim.
Parents' response to disclosure.
Evidence indicating that parents’ reactions to stressful procedures for the child (i.e. 
hospitalisation) are a major determinant of children’s reactions, and that including 
parents in the interventions is helpful (Roskies et al 1978; Peterson et al 1985) 
support the prevailing hypothesis that failure of parents to react in a supportive 
manner following disclosure of sexual abuse is adversely related with the degree of 
trauma experienced by the child. Although there are few studies that have 
systematically looked at this effect, the resulted evidence supports this hypothesis.
Friederich et al (1988) reported that duration of abuse and lack of family support 
explained 24% of the variance in sexual abuse problems as measured by the 
CBCL. Adams-Tucker (1982) found that children who were not supported by their 
parents following disclosure of the abuse (65% of her sample) had more severe 
symptoms and were more likely to be hospitalised compared to children whose 
families were supportive; however, duration of abuse was longer among the 
unsupported children, and the number of incest victims in the two groups was not 
reported. Finally Browne and Finkelhor (1986) review two studies that indicate that 
negative reactions aggravate trauma in sexually abused children..
Professional reactions to sexual abuse work.
Although there is an increasing body of research on the effects of the style (e.g. 
type/number of questions asked) of the professionals interviewing parents or 
children when a suspected case of sexual abuse comes into light (Flin & Spencer 
1995) and on the bias (e.g. gender of the professional/ victim) in their perception 
and behavioural reaction (Kean and Dukes 1991), the emotional reactions of these 
professionals and the possible link between these reactions and trauma has hardly 
received any attention.
Harber and Pennebaker’s (1992) suggestion that “victims’ urge to talk about 
traumas and listener’s disinclination to hear about the experiences... suspend 
victims between countervailing tendencies to reveal their private thoughts and 
feelings, and to inhibit emotional expression that may lead to personally disturbing.
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and socially costly disclosures” (p.361) provides sufficient theoretical ground upon 
which one can speculate that interviewer’s feelings may get in the way and prevent 
him/her from handling such an interview with the required mixture of delicacy and 
assurance.
Jones and McQuiston (1987) provides a list of common reactions that can beset all 
professionals during an interview on a suspected case of sexual abuse. These 
involve denial; anger; guilt; fear; despair; horror; jealousy; resentment, and 
omnipotence. Authors stress and explain the importance of keeping a “neutral 
approach” during the interview. That is an attitude that conveys empathy and 
understanding of behaviour (even if it is unacceptable or illegal) but never implies 
acceptance of ill-treatment of children, nor condone such behaviour.
Feelings brought up in the interviewer and the possibility the interviewee 
(child/parent) to pick up on them calls for empirical investigation that such a situation 
might have upon the process of the interview and consequently on the meaning that 
the child constructed from it. .
Effects of the investigation & legal proceedings.
Increasing awareness of incidents of child sexual abuse and the resulting call for 
new laws that attempt to protect children’s rights have led law makers to consult 
mental health professionals in order to understand the effects of the legal system on 
sexually abused children and how the negative impact of the system can be 
ameliorated. Proposals currently being under consideration include modified 
courtrooms, videotaped depositions, preparation of children prior to testifying, 
specially trained court workers, quicker disposition of child sexual abuse cases, 
closed courtrooms, and the extension of the statute of limitations (Flin &Spencer 
1995; Tedesco & Schnell 1987).
Despite the limited research on the issue it is often assumed that investigation and 
litigation procedures have a harmful effect on the child-victim. Assumptions and 
evidence about the effects of such procedures are, however, controversial and 
inconclusive. That is, some argue that such procedures have a negative impact on 
children and hence further victimise them, while others argue that the same 
procedures may be beneficial. Weiss and Berg (1982) point out that children do not
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have the same rights as other parties in the litigation process and that legal 
proceedings often prolong or intensify the child's emotional reactions. They actually 
illustrate this effect by presenting a case on how court procedures interfere with the 
resolution of emotional reactions associated with sexual abuse in children. Berliner 
and Barbieri (1984) discuss children's difficulty during cross examination, noting that 
the attorney’s job is to impeach the child’s testimony which often result the child to 
be intimidated, embarrassed, or otherwise humiliated.
Contrary to the aforementioned arguments, Pynoss and Eth (1984) talk about the 
beneficial effect of open discussion and exploration of trauma for the child and 
argue that testifying can be seen as increasing a child’s sense of self-efficacy and 
can serve as a coping strategy. Melton (1984) in his testimony before the United 
State Senate subcommittee suggested that it is plausible a child’s court experience 
to be cathartic, provide a feeling of control, provide vindication, and symbolically put 
an end to an unpleasant experience. Finally in Tedesco and Schnell (1987) study 
approximately 21% of the children-victims who had been involved in testifying in a 
criminal trial (N=48) perceived that the questioning and investigation was harmful, 
while 53% saw it as helpful.
On the basis of existing evidence most writers seem to state the need for 
modification of procedures and effectiveness of such procedures in reducing 
courtroom trauma, while at the same time they all stress the need to further explore 
the effects of legal proceedings on children. Recommendations involve the focus on 
specific characteristics of the child (e.g. age, sex, nature of sexual abuse 
experience) and of the legal procedures (e.g. videotaped interviews, number of 
interviewers, testifying at court) that lead to the child being damaged or benefited by 
the legal proceedings (Flin & Spencer 1995; Tedesco & Schnell 1987; Melton 1985).
CONCLUSION.
Child sexual abuse is a complex and multifarious phenomenon. This paper presents 
a set of information based on theorists’, mental health practitioners’ and 
researchers’ attempts to explain its origin, conceptualise and describe its traumatic 
impact upon children’s psychological development, and confirm this impact 
empirically. The prevailing mismatch between clinical observations and assumptions
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and research evidence as well as the diversity in the later, makes the study of the 
sexual abuse of children a challenge.
Such a mismatch most likely indicates the need for methodological improvement in 
future research efforts, such as, for example, the development of special 
instruments that are going to be sensitive to the specific and diverse sequelae of 
sexual abuse and the use of control groups that will help to identify the distinctive 
effects of sexual abuse. This mismatch also conveys the suggestion that until we 
overcome the existing methodological problems and their interpretative constraints, 
we are called to compare, both quantitatively and qualitatively, and make use of the 
available data from theoretical, clinical, and empirical work simultaneously.
Attempts to integrate such information encourages team work between agencies 
involved in child sexual abuse and the development of a common conceptual 
framework that might increase our understanding of sexual abuse and advance the 
investigative and intervention processes.
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ETHNIC IDENTITY: UNDERSTANDING NON-SINGULAR ETHNIC SELF- 
IDENTIFICATION 
Abstract,
Awareness of the possibility that for some individuals self identification with an ethnic 
group will not be a straightforward process, is crucial for both clinical practice and 
research purposes. The aim of the present study was to explore the process of ethnic 
self-identification for a group of ten young people born in England to Greek-born 
parents. The way that participants themselves experienced and perceived the complex 
and dynamic interrelationship(s) between the components of their ethnic identity was 
analysed by employing interpretative phenomenological analysis. Ten in-depth 
interviews were conducted. These were transcribed and analysed for recurrent themes 
relevant to participants’ ethnic self-identification with their Greek minority in-group and 
with the mainstream English group. The central theme running throughout the analysis 
about participants’ perceiving themselves in bi-ethnic terms, qualifies the suggestions 
of previous researchers that some individuals are not limited to a single locus of ethnic 
identity. The way most of the participants talked about their bi-ethnic way ‘of being’ 
implied that ethnic identity is a dynamic product which is achieved rather than ascribed 
by parental descent. This process is not without conflict; however the nature of the 
conflict that most of the participants described was not the kind of conflict of having to 
chose between two conflicting ethnic identities, but rather the result of a complex and 
dynamic developmental process of attempting to construct meaning from two different 
social systems.
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I. Introduction
"... there is nothing that is written about periods, places, or cultures that cannot be discredited. One can always 
find strong emanations of the past in what is ‘new*... within every stasis, one may discern evidence of the new 
and novel. For the author of Ecclesiastes, ‘there is nothing new under the sun', in the eyes of a Zen priest, one 
may find infinite novelty in a single petal. Further there are always individuals or events that don't fit the 
proposed patterns ... And for every individual who does not fit the patterns of a period, we can always locate 
evidence to contradict the placement. For every rational personality there are seasons of indiscretion, and for 
every profligate, periods of caution.” (Gergen 1991, p. xii).
The prevalence of inconsistencies in history and personal life pointed out by Gergen 
portrays the dynamic dimension in the nature of life, world, communities and individual 
people. This study aims to reveal and discuss how this dynamic process applies to the 
way people define themselves in ethnic terms. Ethnicity is seen as one of the available 
options for a person to define him or herself. Nobody -not even the members of visible 
or beleaguered ethnic minority groups Wallman (1983)-- consistently identifies him or 
herself or is always identified by others in ethnic terms. Nevertheless within the social 
and psychological sciences it is asserted that ethnic identity is crucial to the self 
concept and psychological functioning of ethnic-group members.
Studying and demystifying identity appears to be one of the most complex challenges 
that psychologists are called to respond to. As Breakwell (1986) has argued theorising 
about identity is “like traversing a battle-field”. Despite the wide consensus on the need 
for interdisciplinary co-operation, research on ethnic identity suggests that the 
conceptualisation of the phenomena underlining ethnic identity differs depending on 
disciplinary preferences and the philosophy of science adopted by the researcher. 
These differences are reflected in the diversity of emphases regarding what is meant 
by ethnic identity.
Although there seems to be a shared broad understanding of ethnic identity, the 
specific aspects emphasised in the various definitions differ widely. In a number of 
articles reviewed by Phinney (1990) ethnic identity was defined as the ethnic 
component of social identity (membership in a social group). Some writers considered 
self-identification the key aspect; others emphasised feelings of belonging and 
commitment, the sense of shared values and attitudes, or attitudes towards one’s
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group. Other definitions emphasised the cultural aspects of ethnic identity (e.g. 
language, behaviour, values, knowledge of ethnic group history etc.). The active role of 
the individual in developing an ethnic identity was suggested by several writers who 
saw it as a dynamic product that is achieved rather than simply given.
Two of the most influential theoretical frameworks in the study of ethnic identity are 
"social identity theory" and “identity formation”.
Ethnic identity within the first framework is conceptualised as a type of social identity. 
The central assumption here is that in so far as that group membership is significant to 
self-definition the group will be evaluated positively. In other words, simply being a 
member of a group provides individuals with a sense of belonging that contributes to a 
positive self-concept. In-group favouritism, however, is not considered to be an 
automatic result of minimal social categorisation. The possibility that the dominant 
group in a society will hold the traits or characteristics of an ethnic group in low esteem 
is considered to be one of the reasons why ethnic groups present a special case of 
group identity. In that case ethnic group members are potentially faced with a negative 
social identity Tajfel (1978, 1981).
The issue of whether or to what extent membership in, or identification with, an ethnic 
group with lower status in society is related to poorer self concept, has been addressed 
and explored in many studies, particularly in reference to black people (Maxime 1993; 
Parham & Helms 1985; Powell-Hopson, & Hopson 1983; Pushkin & Norburn 1983). 
Social identity theory addresses the issue of potential problems resulting from 
participating in two cultures. Tajfel (1978) discusses the likelihood that identification 
with two different groups can be problematic for identity formation in ethnic group 
members because of the conflicts in attitudes, values, and behaviours between their 
own and the majority group. The issue here is whether individuals must choose 
between two conflicting identities or can establish a bicultural ethnic identity and, if so, 
whether that is adaptive.
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Within the context of the “identity formation” theoretical framework, ethnic identity is 
thought to develop through a process similar to the process of ego identity formation 
proposed by Erikson and Marcia (in Papalia & Olds 1986). Viewing the formation of 
ethnic identity as a process that takes place over time, as people explore and make 
decisions about the role of ethnicity in their lives, has resulted in the proposal of a 
number of conceptual models that describe ethnic identity development in minority 
people. (Cross 1978; Phinney 1989; Atkinson et al. 1989)
These models initially centred around the racial identity development of black people 
under social oppression. They described the development of a positive black identity 
by going through distinct psychological stages each of which is characterised by 
particular cognitive, conative, and affective elements. Studying the models describing 
the development of black ethnic identity and integrating them with their own clinical 
experience. Sue and Sue (1990) proposed a five stage developmental model which 
describes the experience of people from minority groups as they struggle to understand 
themselves in terms of their own culture, the dominant culture, and the oppressive 
relationship between the two cultures.
Perceived as more relevant to the psychological life experiences of black or other 
minority people than the traditional theories, these models have been seen as useful 
systems on which to base counselling-therapeutic interventions (e.g. Butler 1975). Sue 
and Sue (1990) provide information through which a clinician “is able to anticipate the 
sequence of feelings, beliefs, attitudes, and behaviours likely to arise [during 
counselling and which] acting as a guide and providing an understandable end-point 
will allow the client to more quickly understand and work through issues related to 
his/her own identity” (pi 08).
These models- if not blindly applied without regard for possible differences in 
individual client attitudes, beliefs, and behaviours— may indeed be a useful bank of 
knowledge from which a clinician can draw information that will enable him or her to 
better understand and help a client of a minority group. Their emphasis upon the need 
to help the client to move to a positive attitude towards his or her minority group
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membership and to establish a selective appreciation of elements characterising their 
ethnic group and the dominant group needs closer examination.
This role assumes that a clinician encounters people who can be identified as 
belonging to a specific ethnic group, minority or not, (since he or she “should” help 
them to develop positive feelings and attitudes about this group and a selective 
appreciation of elements found in the two groups)
Empirical evidence on ethnic self-identification suggests that this is a complex issue, 
however, since one’s ethnicity as determined by parental background may differ from 
how one sees oneself ethnically. Phinney (1990) reports, for example, that in countries 
settled by Europeans the use of an ethnic label (e.g. Polish-American ) is for the most 
part optional for people of European descent, and that many whites under these 
circumstances use no ethnic label and may in fact be unable to identify their country of 
origin. Even in the case, however, of people who are racially distinct, by features of skin 
colour, or whose culture (language, dress etc.) clearly distinguishes them from the 
dominant group -  and thus self-identification might be imposed- one might still find it 
difficult in terms of which ethnic label to use. For example, people whose parents or 
grandparents come from Mexico can call themselves Mexican-American, Hispanic, 
Latino or Chicano, each of which has a different connotation.
The important implications of working with a client who faces such a dilemma are 
obvious. When clients, for example, do not perceive themselves a member of the 
ethnic group that their ancestors belonged to, they might be involved in the complex 
process of ethnic identification instead of “denying” their ethnicity as a result of feeling 
“inferior or shameful”. An important issue here is whether ethnic identification “should 
be reached” because this is the healthy and adaptive way of “being” and whether there 
is an “end-point” in the process of one’s experience of the self as ethnic being. 
Implications for researcher are also crucial. Phinney (1990) reports, for example, that 
ethnic self-identification was not specifically assessed in half of the studies he 
reviewed. Obviously these studies might have included subjects who did not 
considered themselves members of the group under study.
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Of relevance here is the question of whether one’s ethnic identity is ascribed or 
achieved or whether it is both, in that it can be at least partially imposed by skin colour 
and parental background, but the meaning it acquires for one’s total identity is a matter 
of choice (Liebkind 1992). Regardless, however, of whether an ethnic label is chosen 
or imposed, people may still feel that a single label is inaccurate, inasmuch as they are 
part of two or more groups. Limited empirical evidence suggest that some people 
(especially second generation immigrants) might accept two self-categorisations, that 
is, group identities. In Ullah’s (1985) study of a group of second-generation Irish 
adolescents in England, about half considered themselves part English and part Irish 
and the remainder called themselves either English or Irish.
The term “bicultural competence” has been developed to reflect the ability to function in 
two different cultures by switching between two sets of values and attitudes (Rotheram 
& Phinney 1987). Both theoretical writing and research on biculturalism, appears to be 
inconclusive and sometimes controversial. That is biculturalism, usually examined by 
studying second generation immigrant youth and offspring of mixed marriages, has 
been considered detrimental to children’s development on one hand and as a sign of 
adaptability and creativity on the other.
The assumption underlining the first view is that identification with two cultures will 
necessarily result in conflict and may lead to problems in adjustment for the individual, 
especially when there is little common ground between cultures (Taft 1977). Adjustment 
of minority group members is viewed here as dependent on assimilation to the values 
and behaviours of the dominant social group and rejection of the ethnic minority. 
Bicultural individuals have been seen as experiencing a variety of adjustment problems 
associated with the process of cultural transfer (Ramirez 1969), and as vulnerable to 
developing neurotic behaviour if they fail to combine both sets of cultural values in a 
satisfying coalescence (Cleveland & Longaker 1972).
More recently the assumption of the inevitability of culture conflict and thus poor 
adjustment has been challenged by the assertion of the possibility of bicultural 
resolution whereby two cultures are synthesised so that an individual can select
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appropriate features of their two worlds, resulting in a degree of psychological flexibility 
that enables them to adapt their behaviour to the demands of different situations and 
therefore avoid conflict. Empirical evidence for the capacity to live harmoniously within 
two cultures comes from Salgado de Snyder et al (1982) which involved offspring of 
Mexican interethnic marriages and contradicted the conclusions of previous studies that 
children of intermarriages suffer from identity conflicts and low self-esteem as well as 
the assumption that offspring of mixed marriages do not identify with any given ethnic 
group.
Further evidence about biculturalism being an option and indeed an adaptive one 
comes from a study of Italian and Greek origin Australian adolescents who 
demonstrated a degree of psychological flexibility which enabled them to adopt to the 
demands of different situations and therefore avoid conflict. That is adolescents were 
found to be able to alternate between Greek and Australian roles (Callan and Gallois 
1983 as cited in Rosenthal 1984), to report at times feeling “strongly Italian or Greek” 
and at times “really Australian” (Rosenthal & Hrynevich 1985) according to situational 
requirements and circumstances.
Close examination of existing literature on ethnic identity and on identity in general 
suggests that ethnic self-identification is a complex process in our modern, or post­
modern, times- a time when the identity of everything around cannot be interpreted as 
“this or that”. Describing our post-modern times Gergen (1991) argues that there is 
nothing that is ‘pure’ and there is no thing-in itself to which our accounts of the world 
must be true. For example, traditional music composition featured a single melodic line 
or hummable melody, but one can now find that one melody, tempo or tonal range is 
superimposed upon the other in such a way that the resulting listening experience 
borders. This for some is a cacophony, but others see it as designed to expand the 
listener’s listening capacity by maximising the unexpected, or combining ‘the 
uncombined’.
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It might be that this point is too commonsensical to be the focus of serious academic 
attention or, as Wallman (1982) suggests, it might be that ethnic identity is now so “hot” 
a political issue that only single-stranded analyses of it catch the public ear. Either way, 
given that evidence about whether biculturalism is an option are controversial and that 
our understanding of the process of identifying oneself ethnically needs further 
investigation (Phinney 1990; Alvidrez et al 1996), the present study was designed to 
explore how a group of young people born in England by Greek-born parents 
experience themselves ethnically.
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IL Method.
The aim of the study was to explore the way that participants themselves experience 
and perceive the complex and dynamic interrelationship(s) between the components of 
their ethnic identity. The nature of this investigation indicated that a qualitative mode of 
research would be more appropriate. The aim of qualitative research projects is usually 
to explore a small well-defined group in detail (Bryman 1988; Smith 1995). Although 
this limits generalising findings to a wider population it was hoped that it would perhaps 
offer insight into the dynamic and complex process of ethnic identification, an issue that 
is crucial for both research as well as clinical practice purposes.
Participants.
Ten young people born in England to Greek-born parents were interviewed. Six of them 
were attending an English-Greek high school in London and were recruited by 
contacting the school and getting the Head Teacher’s permission to carry out the 
interviews. Contact with the other four was made through a “snowballing” technique. 
Three of them were attending an English high school and one a private one. None of 
the young people approached refused to take part in the study.
Procedure.
Participants (or the mother in the case of one participant who was bellow sixteen) were 
given an informed consent form (Appendixes la, lb) to sign and after establishing 
rapport the interview was conducted. Interviews were recorded on audio cassette and 
lasted between one hour and a half to two hours. The interview style employed was 
non-directive and a process of reflecting, clarifying and probing (e.g. how was this for 
you? Could you tell me more about... ), which aimed to facilitate the disclosure of each 
individual participant’s perspective, was used. Participants were given a choice as to 
the language (English-Greek) they wanted to use during the interview. This was 
possible because the interviewer was bilingual. All of them used English throughout the 
interview; however some reported words or phrases in Greek.
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Semi-structured interview scheduie.
The interview schedule (Appendix II) consisted of open ended questions. Questions 
aimed to elicit participants' experiences and perceptions on a number of elements that 
have been identified as part of one's ethnic identity structure and are informative about 
its nature, but also to encourage them to give an account of the experiences and 
elements that they themselves perceived as significant. The schedule also involved 
questions about relevant background information. Standardised prompts for questions 
that it was predicted that participants might have difficulty with were prepared and were 
provided only if the participant had a difficulty with the main question itself, (prompts 
can be seen in brackets after some questions in Appendix II). Finally the schedule 
ended with debriefing questions that explored participants’ psychological state after the 
interview.
Data conducted from the first two interviews were treated as pilot. This resulted in 
minor adjustments to the interview schedule.
Anaiysis.
Data was qualitatively analysed by employing interpretative phenomenological analysis 
(IPA). Being about discovering meanings, rather than eliciting facts ( Smith et al 1997), 
IRA was considered as the most appropriate method to explore what ethnicity meant for 
participants in the present study. Another contributory factor for choosing I PA was the 
fact that it puts greater emphasis on cognitive and affective processes, through which 
meanings occur, than more traditional modes of analysis. That is, I PA provides a 
systematic sequence of steps to discover such processes from a complex set of 
qualitative data (Smith 1995), like the one elicited in the present study.
Analysis of the data involved the following steps. Interviews were transcribed verbatim 
and then three of them were thematically analysed. Themes at this stage aimed to 
capture the essential quality of the texts in a broad sense. This resulted in a list of 
themes which were coded with a key word or a phrase that captured the essence of 
the semantic content and the language used; some of the themes were also pointing to 
associations, connections and explanations (interpretations) given by participants. This
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list of themes was then grouped together in a meaningful way. The coding process was 
then repeated for each interview in turn. That is, the analysis continued by identifying 
shared themes that reflected shared views or aspects of experiences reported by 
participants. Although the examination of the latter transcripts was largely oriented to 
aspects of the data relevant to the already identified groupings, an attempt to look at 
each transcript afresh was made, which resulted in the generation of additional themes. 
This, in turn, led to expansion or alteration of the existing groups of themes and 
sometimes to the emergence of a new groups of themes. The analysis then continued 
by closely examining the groups of themes and generating categories relevant to the 
shared views and aspects of participants experiences. A file of transcript extracts (from 
each individual interview) relevant to each of these categories was created and was 
closely studied with the purpose of exploring patterns and relationships within and 
between the categories.
Extracts used in the presentation that follows are some of the most articulate examples 
of common themes related to participants' ethnic self identification. Not every 
participant reported each particular theme. Individual variability indeed existed; however 
the aim here is to present shared similarities in the way participants defined and 
experienced themselves ethnically. An “adjectival quantitative phrases” quantification 
policy has been adopted, since in the analysis of purely qualitative data the use of 
percentages tends to underplay the significance of the identified themes (Krueger 
1994).
An attempt was made to capture and then in turn present the meaning that participants 
gave to their ethnic identity. This involved, however, the researcher engaging in an 
interpretative relationship with each transcript, since these meanings were not always 
transparently available, but became evident through a sustained engagement with the 
phenomenology of the transcripts and a process of analysis and interpretation. The 
resultant analytic account which follows should be therefore seen as the joined product 
of the reflection by both the participants (their story) and the author (her interaction 
with participants story). Important to note at this point, is that whether and, if so, in what 
way the interviewer’s ethnicity (Greek born in Greece) influenced this joined reflection
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was not directly investigated, or controlled. Nevertheless, ways that her ethnic “way of 
being” might have hindered or facilitated the gaining of insight in participants’ accounts 
of their ethnic identity were considered.
In the section that follows each theme is taken in turn and is linked with existing relative 
empirical work. Devoting one section in which to present results together with 
implications in relation to existing literature appeared to be a more natural way of 
demonstrating the way phenomenological and interpretative work took place when 
analysing the data.
In the illustrative quotations the omission of material is indicated by empty brackets and 
clarificatory material that has been added appears within square brackets. Interviewer’s 
questions or interventions also appear in square brackets. Names of participants have 
been changed to ensure confidentiality.
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III. Analysis.
Demographics.
Males and females were equally represented and the mean age of both was 16.95 
years (range: 15.5-18; SD=. 86). Information about parental occupation classified two 
participants in social class I and the others in social class II (SOC. 1990-91). In two 
cases participants were staying with their mother as a result of parental separation and 
the others were staying with both parents. All participants had at least one sibling.
The analysis, presented bellow, is part of the analysis of the large and complex set of 
qualitative data elicited by the previously described semi-structured interview schedule. 
The analysis presented here focuses on presentation and discussion of themes 
relevant in understanding the nature and the meaning of non-singular ethnic identity. 
This begins with a description of the way that the participants in the present study 
identified or, labelled themselves ethnically. A presentation of their perception of their 
Greek in-group membership follows and then the analysis continues with an illustration 
of participants dual sense of belonging. The theme “feeling part of both the English and 
Greek ethnic group, but at the same time different from each” is presented. A 
demonstration of the developmental and contextual nature of their bi-ethnic identity 
follows. The rest of the analysis deals with a brief account of participants’ perception of 
existence of racism in England.
Bicuiturai ethnic seif-identification fiabeilina).
The elements that the participants considered in choosing an ethnic label appeared to 
be consistent with a number of components that have been identified by quantitative 
research as being part of the structure of ethnic identity. That is, participants referred to 
one or more of the following elements: parental background (Greek); being bilingual 
(speaking both Greek and English); place of birth and residence (England); involvement 
in and understanding of social and cultural practices of both cultures.
All the participants, but two who chose “Greek”, chose a mixed ethnic label to describe 
their ethnicity. They did , however, differ in the emphasis they put on their minority 
(Greek) or mainstream (English) status.
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That is, some described themselves as part English
“I couldn’t say I was English, but I couldn’t say I was totally Greek. I mean my parents have, I 
mean we speak Greek in the house, we have like hold onto the Greek traditions obviously, you 
know, but I mean because I myself have been brought up in England, I could never say I was 
totally Greek, there is a part of me that is English” (Alexandra).
while others described themselves as part Greek
“England is the place I was born, grew up, but Greece, Greek is part of me ( ) I mean I speak 
English all the time, my parents speak Greek to each other and sometimes they speak in Greek 
to me, trying to encourage my Greek, but yeah so both [English-Greek], cause part of me is 
Greek 0  I have Greek friends, but I don’t feel foreigner among English people (Phil).
The way that most of the participants presented themselves as being part of both 
cultures is consistent with the phenomenon, discussed in the introduction, of individuals 
feeling that a single ethnic self-identification is inaccurate or not enough to describe 
their ethnicity.
Before moving on to describe how this bi-ethnic self identification was related to their 
ethnic identity and sense of belonging to each group, the way that they described their 
Greek in-group membership will be presented.
Greek in-group membership.
Participants reference to their belonging to the Greek ethnic group appeared to be 
accompanied by stronger feelings than their reference to their belonging to the English 
ethnic group.
As one participant put it:
“[proud of being Greek because of] the fact that we hold on to a very precious culture which has 
come down from thousands and thousands of years of history. Our past, our parent’s past, 
everything, I don’t know how to explain it, it’s Just something that you have and you know that it’s 
very precious and therefore you would be a fool either to hide it or lose it, you know? And I 
mean I couldn’t say the same thing about England. ( ) I am not embarrassed I am English, not at 
all, I am proud in that sense. I said before I’m proud of being both English and Greek, but I could 
quite, quite naturally, say that I am proud I am Greek, but I think proud is to strong for being 
English” (Alexandra).
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All participants referred to a feeling of pride in their Greek ethnic group which they 
associated with the country’s history and contribution to world culture.
“Our culture, the ancient Greek culture, for example, has been studied all over the world and 
admired by everybody, and copied in many cases, our language is the basis of most modern 
languages”(Nick).
“When I was doing, in school, you know when we were doing maths or something ( ) science or 
whatever and half of the words are Greek, I was thinking I am proud to be Greek because I’m 
thinking ah! this is a Greek word, you know, we wouldn’t have that without, without the Greeks ( ) 
” (Tasos).
Deriving pride from the importance of ancient Greek civilisation which they consider as 
their own (Our culture, the ancient Greek culture...; We have offered...) and from which they 
affirm positive elements of identity is consistent with findings from Rosenthal and 
Hrynevich’s (1984) study where for Greek-Australian adolescents the factor labelled 
“pride in cultural background” reflecting a positive valuing of ethnic origins, 
discriminated between them and Italian-Australian adolescents.
Awareness of Greek in-group membership appeared to be brought up when 
participants were elaborating on a number of the dimensions that have been identified 
in literature (e.g. Phinney 1990; Alvidrez et al 1996) as being part of the structure of 
one’s ethnic identity and indicators of one’s ethnic involvement (e.g. friendships; 
entertainment (way they have fun); practices; religious affiliation and practice; cultural 
activities and practices, family system; political ideology and language). Talking about 
their friends, for example, almost all of the participants reported having a “parea” 
(which is a Greek word for a group of friends) of Greek friends who they feel close. As 
Peter said:
“I’ve one or two friends that are English-English [born in England by English parents] that they 
are very good friends, ( ) but it doesn’t feel the same as with my Greek friends who I know all 
my life. Maybe, it’s just the fact that I’ve known them for so long, ( ) but sometimes I feel I’ll 
never be as close [to English friends], cause there are little things that English people um , you 
know, don’t understand or can’t do, that, for example if they came to my house to meet my 
parents or whatever, someone with a Greek upbringing understands little things that we have to
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do, you know, family commitments or traditions or whatever ( ) with friends from my “parea” we 
have so much in common I think we “match” (said this in Greek) more naturally.
As can be seen awareness of their membership in the Greek ethnic group elicited, or 
was elicited by, “feeling different” from the English mainstream culture. Participants’ 
cognitive consideration of “differences and similarities with others” was not limited to a 
comparison with English people, but rather expanded in a comparison with Greek 
people living in Greece. That is, the participants appeared to try to make sense of 
their ethnic identity by considering their similarities and differences with English 
people and at the same time with Greek people living in Greece.
Feeling similar to both but different from each one.
The sense of being “similar but different” from people living in Greece was described, 
for example, by Helen in the following way:
People that live in Greece their way of life is slightly different to ours, I don’t know, it’s just 
different. The way they have fun, the way they go out, even though it’s, in a way it is the same, 
the way they do it is different. It’s just, it is not different but it’s not the same.( ) It’s, I mean, it’s 
like different kind of cats, wild cats you’ve got a panther a tiger, and this and that they are all 
cats but they’re different, they eat differently, they do things differently, they just, even if they are 
the same they do things differently cause that’s their breed kind of thing.
In talking about how similar or different they feel to English and Greek people living in 
Greece, some participants talked about “a culture of their own” a culture that is 
different from English and different from the contemporary Greek culture as well. 
Talking about this “culture of their own” Alexandra said:
“( )people in Greece have been, not that they have been socialised in a different way but they 
have, they hold onto other things that people who have emigrated from Greece & Cyprus and 
have come to England have lost. And the people in England who are Greek, I’ll name Greek and 
Cypriot as Greek yeah?, that are Greek have kind of lost a lot, but they have created their own, 
their own kind of culture. Do you understand what I mean?. We do things in England that 
wouldn’t be done in Greece or Cyprus any more, because we hold on to some things that have 
been lost in those countries.
[Can you tell me an example of such a thing?]
137
For example in the Cypriot marriage, there is one tradition which is that the bride and the groom 
dance, and when they dance, there is one specific dance, where the family and the friends pin 
money on them. In Cyprus this used to be the case, years ago, you know, about sixty years ago 
or something, now that is no longer done in Cyprus. Do you understand? We kind of hold onto 
that. We have kind of created other things around it.
In this participant’s account of “the culture of their own”, one can see how specific 
cultural practices, (e.g. customs in marriage) that members of a minority group “hold to” 
act as a means for differentiation from the dominant (English) culture and sometimes 
from the culture of the country that the minority group originates.
Similarly to the theme about their Greek-in group membership, the theme of being 
“similar but different from each” was brought up when participants were elaborating on 
elements that have been identified in literature as being part of the structure of one’s 
ethnic identity and indicators of one’s ethnic involvement. Due to the limited space 
available in this paper the analysis here will focus only on how this theme was reflected 
when participants talked about the language that they use. This will mainly involve a 
presentation and discussion of the way that the participants in the present study 
described the relationship between the language they speak and how they experience 
themselves ethnically.
Helen who had identified herself as Greek-English and had reported that one of the 
reason why she chose a mixed ethnic label was the fact that she can speak both 
languages, later said:
I feel Greek, even though I speak much better English than Greek, but I don’t think that this 
really makes a difference, the language that you speak, also English is my first language. 
Although my mum would speak to me in Greek, I spoke English first. Whereas in Greek, I speak 
here [in school] a lot of it and in some way, you know, I pick it back, it’s just, it’s kind of hard 
because I can’t speak Greek but I feel Greek, and it is kind of like the Greek side of me can’t be 
expressed?. As much as I would have liked it to be. I think this makes a difference that I can’t 
speak the language really like Greeks , but I am Greek.
[Would you like to say a bit more about this difference between someone who speaks Greek 
fluently and someone who doesn’t although feels Greek, What would be the difference in you, for 
example, if you could speak Greek as you can speak English?]
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If I could speak Greek like I can speak English, It is not, it’s just, I suppose it is just expressing 
yourself. Whereas if you can’t, the language, you can’t be the person that you are completely, 
you hold back because you can’t speak the language, so you kind of sit down and you listen to 
what everyone else is saying rather than be what you really are kind of thing.
In this participant’s account of feeling Greek even though she is not fluent in the Greek 
language, one can see that language can function not only as a means or obstacle for 
communication ("you kind of sit down and you listen to what everyone else is saying ”), but 
also as a salient feature of one’s ethnic identity. That is, in the above quotation one can 
observe a three-step phenomenological process: 1. being bilingual acted as an 
important dimension for identifying herself as bi-ethnic (Greek-English ethnic self- 
labelling); 2.not being fluent in Greek operated as a way to distinguish herself from 
Greeks (“this makes the difference that I can’t speak the language really like 
Greeks”);however, 3. she went on to identify herself as Greek (but I am Greek”). This 
process appears to imply that the role of language is significant in this participant’s 
ethnic identity.
Language seemed to be an important component of ethnic identity for all the 
participants in the present study. The weighting given to language is consistent with 
earlier research where language differences have been found to be a basis for social 
categorisation ( Christian et al 1976; Rosenthal & Hryvnevich 1985), but is contrary to 
Giles et al (1979) who concluded that language did not contribute to Puerto Rican 
respondents’ social identity. In his extensive review of studies on ethnic identity 
Phinney (1990) reports that language has been considered by some as the single most 
important component of ethnic identity, but its importance clearly varies with the 
particular situation, and is inappropriate for some groups.
The role of language in ethnic identity is obviously a complex one. Two distinct 
attitudes towards a language, identified in this literature, are of relevance here. These 
refer to an “instrumental attitude” towards a language which implies that its usefulness 
is emphasised above its symbolic or emotional value, and an “integrative attitude” 
which implies identification with speakers of that language. However, this identification
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is not necessarily equivalent with ethnic identification, since the latter must be 
empirically assessed in each language context (Liebkind 1992).
The important question here is about the nature of the relationship between linguistic 
identity and ethnic identity. In the above quotation, for example, the participant appears 
to experience language as a fundamental component of her ethnicity, even though 
there does not seem to be a clear link between ethnicity (I feel Greek) and the use of or 
the proficiency in the language of the ethnicity she identified herself with at that point 
(English is my first language... I can’t speak Greek [as fluently as English] ). This seems to be 
consistent with Liebkind’s (1992) argument that language proficiency should not be 
confused with linguistic identity, since for example, a person can be said to have a 
bilingual identity only when he or she has an “integrative attitude” to two languages 
(identify with speakers of both languages) almost irrespective of his or her proficiency in 
these languages.
Another example where language appeared to evoke the sense of feeling “similar but 
different”, this time in relation to English culture comes from what Ann said when asked 
about situations where she has felt different to English people and about the ways 
that she thinks that she differs from English people.
[Can you think of any situation where you felt different to English people?]
I don’t think so. I think I was always able to adapt em with the English and the English language,, 
because I was born here so, I don’t feel different. I think because my first language is English ( ) 
sometimes I feel alienated in Greek rather in English.( ) when I go to Greece or Cyprus, I feel 
sometimes, because they can speak fluent ( ) I get something wrong ( ) did I say this right? or 
this and that.
[In what ways do you think that you differ from English people?]
Well for English people that are fully English I feel that um having, well I feel different, because 
of the fact that I am half Greek as well as half English. And I’ve got that second language behind 
me [Greek], I mean it is one thing to know to learn a language and it is another to actually be that 
language. For instance, I am learning French, I speak French, I am doing it for A level, but I 
don’t feel as if I am French, I mean regardless that I visit the country, I visit it em whenever, I 
don’t feel that I am French. Whereas Greek it is just part of my life, it is part of me, half of my 
body is Greek, so when I am with English people I just feel that, you know, I am half Greek I am 
different to them in some ways. So em I feel I’ve got that behind me.
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[Would your answer change if I were to ask you about the ways that you feel different from 
British people?]
It would stay the same. I don’t think it is the English people. It’s just the fact that I’ve got two 
languages, I am part of two countries, two cultures, it is not the fact that they’re English or British 
that I feel different towards them. Whereas if I were half- Spanish and half Greek and we were in 
Spain, for instance, I would have felt exactly the same way. Because I am part of them and yet I 
am part of the Greek culture.
Here, Ann appears to consider her proficiency in English and the fact that she was born 
in England (“I was born here., my first language is English”) as the major elements that 
makes her similar to the English (“I don’t feel different”). Then she appears to try to 
emphasise this sense by comparing her proficiency in English with that in Greek, which 
is less advanced than her English proficiency [I feel alienated in Greek rather in English] 
and less advanced than the one that Greek people have, [they can speak fluent]. Thus, 
the participant has so far described herself experiencing the first part of the theme 
“feeling similar ’^.
Later she appears, however, to move to the second part of the theme “but different. 
She uses her bi-ethnic identity [I am half Greek as well as half English] which she links with 
her bi-lingual identity [I’ve got that second language behind me], to justify her sense of 
feeling different from the English [I am different to them in some ways].
Important to notice here is that she makes implicit that bi-lingual identity is not sufficient 
for one to assume a bi-ethnic identity [I am learning French, I speak French... but I don’t feel 
as if I am French]. This link was possible for Ann because Greek language is like “part of 
[her] life, it is part of [her], half of [her] body is Greek”. Implicit here is that people perceive 
language as an important dimension of their ethnic identity only when they can identify 
with speakers of that language, independently of their proficiency in it. The observed 
process in which bi-lingualism appears to encourage or to have led to Ann’s bi-ethnic 
self-identification (as a result of identifying herself with the speakers of these 
languages) is consistent with Liebkind’s (1992) description of “integrative attitude” to 
two different languages.
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Analysis of the theme “feeling similar to both but different from each” illustrated that in 
their attempt to answer the question “who I am” the participants were also answering 
the question “who I am not”. Wallman (1983) has argued that the first question 
requires us to consider the second and that “we cannot make sense of the world 
without sorting the things and people of it into different categories of similarity and 
difference” . His argument continues to say “but we make nonsense of it if we imagine 
that the same similarities and differences count in the same way all the time” (p.71).
The way that the participants in the present study described how they experience 
themselves ethnically across time, places, and people they are with, appeared to be 
consistent with the second part of Wallman’s argument. That is, although some 
participants talked about a sense of “being similar to both the English and Greek 
cultural group but at the same time different from each” and described themselves as 
having a “culture of their own”, almost all of them express a sense of contextual 
belonging to both the English and Greek ethnic group.
Before presenting the way that participants talked about their contextual sense of 
belonging, it is worth illustrating their descriptions of its development.
Sense of belonaina.
Developmental
Some of the participants suggested that their sense of belonging to both ethnic groups 
(English-Greek) is something that has developed through time. That is, they outlined a 
process of identifying themselves with one ethnic-group, but later identifying 
themselves as belonging to both. The quotations that follow demonstrate this process.
The demonstration will start with a presentation of Alexandra’s account of her bi-ethnic 
identity and her description of its development will follow.
[How do you feel when you think of yourself as Greek-English?]
To some, to some extent it could be confusing, because you are in, kind of the middle of two 
countries that are totally opposite in one sense, you know, they are very different and you are 
swaying in the middle somewhere and you can’t say that you don’t belong to either because you 
belong to both, you know. My mother could say she is Greek and she could stand on that quite
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solidly, but I could never do that ( ). I mean, I suppose, to a certain extent there is a small... a 
small confusion in there or... em not a lack of identity but a small question-mark, you know. But 
other than that I feel proud of the Greek side and yeah to some extent maybe proud of the 
English side.
Here, one observes that the participant refers to the differences between English and 
Greek culture [totally opposite in one sense], indirectly identifies herself as “(you) swaying in 
the middle” and goes on to express a sense of belonging to both cultures. Interesting to 
note is that the issue about the potential problems resulting from participation or 
identification with two different groups (discussed in the introduction) does not appear 
to be relevant here, since the participant expresses being confused, but does not 
appear to be “in crisis”. As illustrated in the way she expanded on her feeling of 
confusion and in the way other participants talked about how they feel about belonging 
to two cultures (see analysis below) , it is possible that individuals do not feel that they 
have to choose between two conflicting ethnic identities, but rather develop a bicultural 
or contextual identity that leads to adaptation rather that “identity crisis”.
When Alexandra was asked to expand on what the “small question-mark” might be 
about she said:
“( )if I were in Greece, then I could say that I was more English than Greek, but if I was in 
England I could say I was more Greek than English. Therefore I am not myself totally sure. I 
mean it is not an issue that I face at all, you know, I kind of disregard it and I am myself and I do 
what I want, ( ) but I never really sat down to think what am I, you know, it is not something that 
someone does everyday.
[Did you always feel like this? I mean you said that sometimes you might feel a little bit confused 
and you also said that you feel proud of your both Greek and English side. Did you always have 
these feelings or did you feel different in the past, has something changed or was it always like 
this for you?]
I must say from about up to the age of about fifteen, I could say that I was Greek and the 
question would stop, you know, there was like a fullstop there. I was Greek and that was it. But I 
think as you grow you tend to understand about your surroundings more, and you, you kind of, 
you are down more to the idea of being both Greek and English. ( ) two years ago when I went 
to Greece I really felt it. Cause I mean my sister knows less Greek than I do and I was like, for a 
lot of the time I was doing the interpretation and it kind of struck me that you know, we say we 
are Greek but there is, you know, OK there is language, there is a small language barrier which
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doesn’t mean you are not Greek because you can’t speak the language totally, but .. um I don’t 
know... it struck me that there was this big difference.... you know, I think the fact that we share 
the same faith and the same culture the Orthodox faith, and the same culture really holds you 
onto to your Greek you know, your Greek side of things, so I mean, yeah from I suppose fifteen, 
sixteen I really started to consider it more.
[How did you feel when you started questioning. How was this for you? For example when you 
mentioned (interrupted)]
In Greece?
[Yeah in Greece for example]
( ) you realise you are neither one or the other but you are a bit of both, so you don’t know where 
you are. You know this is very difficult. I have a kind of a kind of brain that tends to like planning 
things out you know and kind of categorising things. So I could you know, up to about, up to a 
certain age I would say I am Greek and that was categorised, you know, but I don’t a bit further 
on ( ), especially when I went to Greece, that was, I was a bit confused, you know, I was like 
where do a fit now, which category.
The shift in the sense of group-belonging [“in Greece... I could say that I was more English 
than Greek, but... in England I could say I was more Greek than English’’] is described as 
evoking uncertainty, insecurity and as being difficult; however, her account of this as 
not being an “issue that she faces in her every day life” in association with the 
developmental process that she goes on to describe can be seen as a process where 
confusion and uncertainty lead towards a bicultural and contextual identity rather than 
“crisis”. That is, the participant appears to describe a process where she attempts to 
make sense of the world and of her ethnic identity by trying to categorise herself in one 
group. The question “who am I” used to have a straightforward answer [Greek] up until 
she was fifteen, but growing up and coming into contact with the group she had 
categorised herself in, challenged her categorisation and brought up the question ‘who 
am I not’ [we say we are Greek but...]. This can be seen as a conflict in her self- 
identification which results in her feeling confusion and uncertainty but “brings [her] 
down to the idea that [she] is both”, which is something that she feels positive about, 
since when asked whether she would change her ethnicity if given a choice she said:
I wouldn’t. I am quite happy. I mean I can’t see how I would want to change anything. I wouldn’t 
want to be totally Greek if you see what I mean. Because I like the idea of being of swaying in
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the middle although it is a bit confusing, I quite like the idea of seeing the views of both cultures, 
of the two different countries.
The developmental process of identifying themselves in one ethnic category, but later 
moving into a bicultural or contextual ethnic identity was described by a few other 
participants as well. Participants' initial sense of belonging to one group did not appear 
to be consistent in its direction. That is, some participants reported that they initially 
categorised themselves only as “Greek” and others only as “English”, before moving to 
identify themselves as “both”,
Ann’s account of categorising herself as English-British, but later moving to bicultural / 
contextual identity follows.
I never used to feel happy or proud about it [being Greek], I just used to feel normal. I used to 
speak Greek whenever I was on holidays that was about it. But being involved in Greek, in 
Greek language, people, it has made me feel so much better, so much prouder, it has given me 
confidence as well. ( ) I see my life as two different sections. One when I was much younger, 
before I came to school and after ( ). When I was young I considered myself British. So I don’t 
think I wasn’t thinking myself as having a lot of similarities with the Greek. It is only after I came 
to this school I started to think differently and considered myself half-half ( ). There is no time 
that I say to myself I am not Greek I am English. That’s because I am so proud of the fact that I 
am half Greek which it is stronger, it is far too strong to say that part of me is far to strong too 
say um, for my other half the English to defeat it. () i am proud of who I am, I am proud of being 
half English being half Greek (). I am Just proud of the nationality that I am.
( ) I don’t wish that I was all Greek or all English. I find it actually an advantage for me to be half 
English and half Greek. It gives me an extra advantage ( ), being able to adapt to two different 
cultures, two different traditions, that sort of thing, so, quite flexible really, because you have the 
English which is based here and the Greek which is Mediterranean, so it is quite flexible it is very 
good.
In this participant’s account of categorising herself in one ethnic group (British), but 
later moving into a bi-cultural self identification, one can see that this process is 
strongly influenced by the people around her. Moving to a school where most students’ 
parental or ancestors’ background is Greek and where students are exposed to Greek 
culture and history through specific courses or activities appears, not surprisingly, to
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have facilitated this participant’s change in her self-categorisation. Important here, is 
that she moved to categorise herself as bi-ethnic [half-half] and that she perceives her 
participation in two different cultures as “advantageous” and “flexible”. That is, she sees 
this participation as offering her a bilingual ability and enabling her to adapt to two 
cultures. The phrase “being able to adapt” by itself implies a process, a state that has 
been developed rather than an ascribed status.
Contextual
Participants’ sense of belonging appeared to shift not only across time but also 
depending on the place they find themselves and the people they associate with at 
different points in time. Variations in their sense of belonging appeared to be unrelated 
with the ethnic-self label that they had chosen at the beginning of the interview.
Demonstration of this will start by reporting what Ann said when asked who would she 
choose to go on holidays with. As already discussed she described a process of 
moving from assuming herself British to consider herself “half-half”. The quotation that 
follows illustrates the contextual nature of her bi-ethnic identity.
if it was to Greece I would say -  I would say perhaps Greeks, whereas if it were to another 
country like Spain or Italy or whatever I would say half Greek half English.
[Can you tell me the reasons why you would choose Greeks to go to Greece?]
Well, I think because I am going to go to a Greek country where it’s just Greek culture, Greek 
tradition, everyone speaks Greek, well mostly everyone, so therefore taking Greek people with 
me ( ), we would just fit into the Greek, become part of that Greek society, ( ) the point for me ( ) 
is not just going to see the sites or for any tourist. I think one should go deeper into it, and 
therefore going with, going into Greece, for instance, it’s better to adapt to it or try to anyway, 
and become part of the Greek society for as long as you’re going to be there. Whereas if I am 
going to Spain, for instance. I’ve got no relationships or no connections with Spain, but going to 
Spain for me would be, like a holiday. I think a bit of both. Um — I am not sure I think I prefer it if 
I go with both the English and Greek to a foreign country. I mean I don’t know.
[Mm yes It is just what comes to your mind]
I don’t know it’s I am stuck here. It is just the way I see it. I don’t know.
[What do you think that it is that makes you feel stuck when you are about to make a choice 
about the people you would like to go on holidays with?]
What makes me feel?
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[What might be the reasons, can you think of possible reasons why it is somewhat difficult for 
you to, to say who would you like to be with?]
Well being around Greeks, being around English I feel different and although I am half English 
half Greek, although it is part of me, I still feel more English if I am with the English people and I 
am talking in English and I feel different if I am with the Greek [people] and I speak to them in 
Greek all the time. So having these differences— I don’t know—  help me.
[Perhaps it is who you are with ?]
Mm What do you mean?
[For example in this school, as you are saying, that most people are Greek, it seems like you 
feel, you can feel close to them and (interrupted)]
Yes yeah, exactly, if I was in an English school, for instance, and I was still doing Greek, I would 
feel more English. Also depends with who I am with who I am with yeah.
Talking about being with Greek friends in Greece, the participant appears to implicitly 
talk about her feeling of belonging to the Greek ethnic group and to visualise herself as 
being able to be part of it, [we would just fit in to the Greek, become part of the Greek 
society]. The phrase “for as long as you are going to be there" brings up the contextual and 
non-fixed nature of her sense of belonging. Feeling “Greek” seems to be linked with 
situations where she is with Greeks and feeling English with situations where she is 
with English people. That is, her bi-ethnic self- identification shifts depending on the 
people she is with (and the language she speaks): [“although I am half English half 
Greek... I feel more English if I am with the English people and I am talking in English and I feel 
different if I am with the Greeks and I speak to them in Greek all the time’’].
It is worth noting that, during the interview, the description of this shift was not an easy 
task for this participant. She felt “stuck”. Her difficulty to continue can be seen as being 
related to the non congruent situation of having bi-ethnic identity which is of fixed 
quality. That is, Ann's ethnic identity appears to be dependent on particular 
circumstances, like who she is with and where she is.
Even though in the case of some participants the contextual nature of bi-ethnic identity 
emerged through the way that they talked about their sense of belonging and they 
appeared to become aware of it during the interview, others seemed to be more aware
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of it, readily reporting that they way they perceive themselves ethnically depends on 
contextual factors such as the place they are in and people they find themselves with.
Peter who had identified himself as “plain Greek” when asked for an ethnic label at the 
beginning of the interview, later said: “() it’s not always the same [feeling Greek or English], I 
mean I can be as Greek as I want when I am in Greece, you know, and have a good time and 
then when I am here [in England] I don’t have a problem. I mean living here all your life and 
being sort of related to another country ( ) I could live all my life in London happily ( ) but then 
again () I can change to be that different person.
A number of participants reported feeling “Greek in England and English in Greece” 
and attributed this shift in their self-identification to feeling “similar but at the same time 
different” from people in the two countries described before.
If someone asks me where you come from I will say Greece. It is... . Umm It’s funny because 
when I am in Greece I don’t feel like every other Greek that lives there and when I am in 
England I don’t feel like any English person I feel like Greek. So you see what I mean?
[What is it that makes you feel like the way you say when in Greece?]
Cause I am different. I am different from any Greek person that lives in Greece. Whereas if you 
think about it, in culture if you live in London and you go to a Greek school, gives you different 
values ( ) you learn Greek dances and you get the culture and all your history of Greece and it is 
a kind ( ). It’s just different (Helen).
In addition to situations where participants themselves observed themselves that they 
“differ”, situations where “others” appeared to have led participants to consider 
themselves as different were also described.
Examples of such situations included:
• being teased by Greek friends in Greece and, or, friends in England:
“the fact that I have been born here [England] sometimes and you know when you are in Greece 
others might call you English and this as a joke, but you don’t take it very seriously. But 
sometimes you might ask yourself Am I? But immediately you say OK” (Nick).
In school there’re two other Greeks ( ), every so often we have people cuss Greece, you know, 
insulting, teasing us about being Greek, and we fight together against them, you know it’s just 
joking, joking around in the common room, you know, we tease them about the nationality that 
they are (Phil).
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• Greek people picking up “Engiishness” in social contact:
“when I was in Greece, they [ Greek people] would immediately say Oh! you come from 
England, and I was like. Yeah how did you know? But obviously because of the way I speak I am 
quite broken, and I speak to my sister in English” (Sonia).
“Sometimes I will dress. I’ll put something on and I am ready to go out and my aunt [in Greece] 
would go ‘where do you think you’re going like this? you’re not in England’” (Marian).
It has already been demonstrated how ‘feeling different but also the same’ was a 
prevalent element in most participants’ bi-ethnic identity. Their ‘harmonious’ sense of 
belonging to both cultures supports the assumption that for some individuals successful 
integration of the minority and mainstream group cultures can be achieved ( Rotheram 
& Phinney 1987) and is not consistent with the assertion of experiencing conflict, that 
is detrimental for the development of ethnic identity, as a result of being involved into 
two different cultural groups . A possible explanation, or contributory factor, to this 
‘harmonious’ joining of the two cultures might be that most participants did not perceive 
the mainstream group (English) as holding a negative attitude towards their minority 
group.
Experiences imolvina that Greek minority is not in conflict with mainstream 
group.
Most of the participants reported being aware of the existence of racism, but outlined 
experiences that implied that they do not perceive the mainstream group and their 
minority group being in conflict or competing terms.
“Racism exist in England like in any other country ()... in the streets or in the news you hear that 
this young person was murdered because he was black and there were some others that they 
didn’t like him so they killed him ( )... it is a bit ironical, I mean the fact that there is racism 
between races that are not English like Turkish and Curds. ( ) I don’t think, I mean there is not a 
direct racial movement against Greeks. In the Universities, for example, from what my brother 
tells me, there is no racism because there are students from all races” (Nick).
“I never had any kind of racial problem against me myself. I know my sisters did, ( ) they used to 
call them Greek babbles, but that was in the secondary school, and my little brother even though 
he is now in the secondary school he might get a remark or two but it’s never serious in it. I think 
they [English] accept the Greeks more than they do the Pakistanis or the blacks” (Alexandra).
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IV. Overview.
This paper explored how a group of young people born in England to Greek-born 
parents experience themselves ethnically. As it has already been stated, the small and 
opportunistically, rather than randomly, selected, sample prevents from generalising 
findings to a wider population. That is, the identified themes in the present study can be 
seen as reflecting the particular participants' way of perceiving themselves in ethnic 
terms. As it is often the case with qualitative projects, this study did not aim to gain a 
representative sample, but rather aimed for an internally consistent and coherent one 
(Smith 1997). As it was hoped when planning the project, this offered tentative 
hypotheses and valuable insights into the dynamic and complex process of ethnic self- 
identification.
The consistent and central theme running throughout the analysis, for example, about 
participants’ perceiving themselves in bi-ethnic terms, qualifies the suggestions of 
previous researchers (discussed in the introduction) that some individuals are not 
limited to a single locus of ethnic identity. The way most of the participants talked about 
their bi-ethnic way ‘of being’ implied that ethnic identity is a dynamic product which is 
achieved rather than ascribed by parental descent. This process was not without 
conflict; however the nature of the conflict that most of the participants described was 
not the kind of conflict of having to chose between two conflicting ethnic identities, but 
rather the result of a complex and dynamic developmental process of attempting to 
construct meaning from two different social systems.
Another issue worth considering in evaluating the present study, is that of the individual 
and particular interactive and interpretative work that the researcher brought to the 
project. As already discussed in the method section, the researcher’s presence and 
involvement in each and every stage of the study (i.e. developing the interview 
schedule, carrying out the interviews and analysing the data) was one of the main 
instruments in the inquiry into participants’ experience and perception of ethnic identity. 
The interpretative phenomenological approach adopted in the present study is 
consonant with the position of qualitative researchers who perceive reflexivity of the 
researcher as a central component in the research practice at both epistemological and
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methodological level (e.g. Woolgar 1988). That is, in the process of analysing the data 
the researcher’s attempt to produce a meaningful account that knits together the 
multiplicities, variations and complexities of participants’ reports, involved a sustained 
engagement with the phenomenology of the transcripts and a process of interpretation 
that needs to be taken into consideration in evaluating the credibility of the results. For 
this reason, the reader is provided with a substantial amount of raw data that allows 
him/her to evaluate whether the presented analytic account is justified by the data 
collected.
In conclusion, the present study draws attention to the complexity in conceptualising 
ethnic identity. This was demonstrated by the contextual nature of almost all of the 
participants’ ethnic self-identification with their Greek minority in-group and with the 
mainstream English group. Awareness of the possibility that self identification with an 
ethnic group will not be a straightforward process for some individuals is crucial for both 
clinical practice and research purposes. Although clinicians often find that ethnic self- 
identification is unlikely to be among the presenting problem(s) for a client of either a 
minority or mainstream group, the process itself, or implications in this process, could 
be linked with one’s psychological difficulties (Andreou 1992). For researchers -  
whether studying ethnic identity directly or including ethnicity as a factor- the 
complexity of this process highlights the importance of carefully conceptualising , 
assessing and interpreting ethnicity.
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APPENDIX I (a)
INFORMED CONSENT FORM
My name is Maria Karataraki and I am a trainee on the PsychD in Psychotherapeutic 
and Counselling Psychology (a taught doctorate course) at the University of Surrey.
I am currently carrying out research, under the supervision of the Psychology 
department of the University of Surrey, dealing with young people born in England 
whose parents were born in Greece. I am looking at their perception and beliefs about 
themselves and about life in England. Your cooperation in this project would be greatly 
appreciated.
If you are interested in participating in this research I will interview you about the issues 
mentioned above. If you agree our discussion will be taped. The recording will then be 
transcribed and the tapes will be destroyed. Information on the transcription will be 
treated in the strictest confidence. Your name will not be cited anywhere in the research 
and if I quote information provided by you, it will be presented in such a way that you 
will not be identifiable (e.g. names of people or places will be omitted or disguised).
I will be happy to answer any questions you may have on the above.
Before asking you to sign below, I would like to inform you that you have the right to 
withdraw from the interview if at any point you feel like doing so for any reason.
Thank you very much for your willingness to participate.
Signature of Participant : ____________
Date:
Signature of Researcher:. 
Date:
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APPENDIX 1(b)
INFORMED CONSENT FORM
My name is Maria Karataraki and I am a trainee on the PsychD in Psychotherapeutic 
and Counselling Psychology (a taught doctorate course) at the University of Surrey.
I am currently carrying out research, under the supervision of the Psychology 
department of the University of Surrey, dealing with young people born in England 
whose parents were born in Greece. I am looking at their perceptions and beliefs about 
themselves and about life in England. Your co-operation in this project would be 
greatly appreciated.
This involves giving me your permission to interview your son/daughter about the 
issues mentioned above. If you agree my discussion with him/her will be taped. The 
recording will then be transcribed and the tapes will be destroyed. Information on the 
transcription will be treated in the strictest confidence. His/her name will not be cited 
anywhere in the research and if I quote information provided by him/her, it will be 
presented in such a way that he/she will not be identifiable (e.g. names of people or 
places will be omitted or disguised).
I will be happy to answer any questions you may have on the above.
Before asking you to sign below, I would like to say that your son/daughter will be 
informed that he/she has the right to withdraw from the interview if at any point he/she 
feels like doing so for any reason.
Thank you very much for your cooperation.
Signature: _________________
Date:
Signature of researcher:. 
Date:
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APPENDIX II
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 
Gender:
Date of birth:
Father’s occupation:
Mother’s occupation:
Who do you live with? (do you have any brothers or sisters?)
1. Which of these words you say that describes best your ethnicity.
• Present participant with a card that includes the following list and tell him/her, "you 
can chose one of these or another that is not in this list”
a. Greek
b. English
c. Greek-English
d. English-Greek
e. Other, (please specify).
• Can you tell me the reasons why you chose to call yourself (participant's choice)
2. What do you feel when you think of yourself as a (participant’s ethnic label). {You 
might feel proud, ashamed, confused, indifferent or...some other feeling).
♦ What do you think it is that makes you fell (feeling participant reported).
♦ Did you always feel like this? {Did you feel different in the past? What is the 
difference, what do you think brought this change?)
3. Do you/ or your family go to Greece? {Do you have family there?)
4. How do you find your stay there? (Do you have friends there? What are the things 
that you like, you enjoy & what are the things that you do not like?)
5. When you are here in England, what is the language that you use when you are 
with
• Family?
• Friends?
a)If answer is either Greek or English;
-are most of your friends Greek/or/ English? (depending on participant’s answer).
♦ Can you say more about why most of your friends are Greek/or English ( depending 
on participant’s answer {Is it that for some reason you prefer to have Greek/or/ 
English friends? oris it that you do not meet people from other ethnicity? Or?...)
if not covered:
What is it that you like about having Greek/or/ English friends? (depending on 
participant’s choice)
♦ How do you feel about having friends (of ethnicity that speak the language that the 
participant does not use with friends). What is it that you do not particularly like?
157
♦ Do you have friends from other cultures?
♦ How close do you feel to them? 
b)lf answer is both:
Do you have both Greek & English friends?
If yes:
♦ Is there anything that differentiates your friendships with Greek people from your 
friendships with English people?
♦ Would you say that you feel closer to your Greek or to your English friends, or 
would you say that there is no difference?
♦ Do you have any friends from other cultures?
♦ How close do you feel to them?
Right. When we started talking you identified yourself as (participant’s response). I 
will now ask you some questions about whether you always feel (participant’s 
answer) or whether this changes depending on the situation or the people you 
find yourself with.
6. Can you think of any situation where you have became very aware of being 
Greek?
♦ Can you think of any situation where you felt different to Greek people?
If Yes:
Can you tell me about it?
♦ Where were you,
♦ What happened
♦ What was it that made you aware of being (participant's response)
♦ How did you feel?
If No: Continue next question
♦ Can you think of any situation where you have became very aware of being 
English?
♦ Would your answer change if I were to ask you about situations that you have 
became aware of being British?
♦ Can you think of any situation where you felt different to English people?
If Yes:
Can you tell me about it?
♦ Where were you,
♦ What happened
♦ What was it that made you aware of being (participant’s response)
♦ How did you feel?
7. If Greek ethnic identification:
Have you ever found yourself in a situation that you felt reluctant to say that you are 
Greek or actually chose not to say so?
If Yes: Can you tell me about it?
♦ How did you feel when
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♦ What do you think made you feel 
If No: Continue to next question
If mixed ethnic identification:
When we started talking you identified yourself as (participant’s ethnic choice) I 
now want to ask you whether you
a. Have ever found yourself in a situation that you felt reluctant to say that you are 
Greek or actually chose not to say so?
If Yes: Can you tell me about it?
♦ How did you feel when
♦ What do you think made you feel 
If No: Continue to next question
b. Have ever found yourself in a situation that you felt reluctant to say that you are 
English or actually chose not to say so?
If Yes: Can you tell me about it?
♦ How did you feel when 
What do you think made you feel 
If No: Continue to next question
8. if Greek ethnic identification:
-Have you ever found yourself in a situation that you felt proud of being Greek?
If Yes: Can you tell me about it?
♦ What made you feel proud?
♦ Can you think of another example?
If No: continue to next question.
. if mixed ethnic identification:
a) Have you ever found yourself in a situation that you felt proud of being Greek?
If Yes: Can you tell me about it?
♦ What made you feel proud?
♦ Can you think of another example?
If No: continue next question.
b) Have you ever found yourself in a situation that you felt proud of being English?
If Yes: Can you tell me about it?
♦ What made you feel proud?
♦ Can you think of another example?
If No: continue next question.
9. If you were given the chance to be born again how willing do you think you'd be to 
be born with a different ethnicity if you were given the choice?
If Yes: -What this ethnicity would be?
-What is it about this ethnicity that makes you prefer it?
If No: -What makes you say that?
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Now I will ask you some questions about your relationship with English people 
and your thoughts about the English culture.
10. What do you think about English people in general. {What are the positive and 
negative things that you think about the English people/the things that you like & 
don’t like about them?)
• Would your answer change if I were to ask you what do you think about British 
people?
11. In what ways do you feel that you differ from English people?
• Did you always felt like this? {Did you use to feel different? In what way? What do 
you think that brought this change?)
• Would your answer change if I were to ask you about the ways you feel that you 
differ from British people?
12. In what ways do you feel that you are the similar?
• Did you always felt like this? {Did you use to feel different? In what way? What do 
you think that brought this change?)
As you know people living at London come from places all over the world. There 
are people from all sort of cultures, apart from the Greek and English. (After 
seeing participant agreeing with this statement) I will now ask you about your 
relationship and thoughts about groups of people that are not English or Greek
13. Which are the cultural groups that you come across more often in your every day 
life? {People you meet in street, the bus, the market, to friends and fellow students, 
neighbours etc.)
14. What do you think about people from these cultural groups? (/ mean are there 
cultural groups that you like more than others, cultural groups that you do not 
particulariy like? Or cultural groups that have an interest in?)
• What is it that you like, not particularly like, or interests you in (depending on 
participant's answer).
15. Is there a cultural group, different from Greek and English, that you feel close to? 
{You feel you share a lot of similarities with people from this group).
If Yes: What is it that makes you feel close to (participant's response)
If No: Continue to next question.
16. If you had the choice of being with 1) a group of English people, 2) a group of 
people from other culture(s) -  of your choice—; 3) a group of Greeks; or 4) a mixed 
group of any combination between the three, which one would you chose.
Participant is given a card with a list of the 4 choices // if other culture(s) chosen ask 
what would this culture be.
• 1. To go out with (cinema, youth club)
What is it that makes you chose (participant's answer) to go out?
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♦ 2. Form a group to work on a school assignment.
What is it that makes you chose (participant’s answer) to work with on a school
assignment?
♦ 3. Go on holidays.
What is it that makes you chose (participant’s answer) to go holidays?
♦ 4. Invite at your birthday party.
What is it that makes you chose (participant’s answer) to invite at your party?
I would now like to ask you whether the way your parents feel about being Greek
differs or is similar from the way you feel about being Greek (or half Greek if
mixed choice).
17. Do you think that the way you feel about being Greek (or the way you feel about 
the Greek part of you/ if mixed choice) differs completely, differs in some respects, 
is quite similar, or similar in some respects, from the way your parents feel about 
being Greek?
Differences:
♦ How do you feel about these differences? How have they affected your relationship 
with your parents? ( Do you argue with your parents’ because of these differences 
or not)
♦ Can you tell me an example 
Similarities:
♦ How do you feel about these similarities? How have these similarities affected your 
relationship with your parents? (Do they help towards a smoother relationship with 
them? )
♦ What do you think would happened if you didn’t share these similarities. {How 
would this affect you relationship with them, would you argue more or....)
If not covered:
-How would you say that your mother feels about being Greek?
What does she say about Greece, about Greek people?
Does she talk to you about her life when at Greece? / what does she often talk to 
you about?
How is this for you? {Enjoy, feel bored, irritated?)
What makes you feel
How would you say that your father feels about being Greek?
What does he say about Greece, about Greek people?
Does he talk to you about his life when at Greece? / what does he often talk to you 
about?
How is this for you? {Enjoy, feel bored, irritated?)
What makes you feel
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I will ask you a few more questions about your involvement with other Greek 
people living at London.
17. What is your religion?
If Greek orthodox:
• How important is your religion to you?
• How often do you go to a Greek orthodox church?
• How do you feel about going there (What is it that you like or not like when being 
there?)
If another religion:
• How important is your religion?
• How often do you go to church?
• How do you feel about going there (What is it that you like or not like when being 
there?)
19. Are you a member of any Greek club or society?
If yes:
• What was that made you decide to became a member?
• How often do you go there?
• How important is that for you?
• What are you doing there? (activities involved?)
If no:
• What do you think about the excising Greek clubs & societies?
20. What do you think about Greek people living at Eng\an67 {When you think of the 
Greek population living at England what comes in your mind? Positive negative 
things about them?)
21. How do you think that English people view Greeks? {What are the positive & 
negative things that an English might think about a Greek?)
• How do you feel about this? {Summarise participant’s answer, what do you feel 
when you think that English think of Greeks as (participant’s answer)? Do you 
agree, disagree, feel happy, irritated, proud, ashamed ?)
22. How do you think that people from other cultures living at England view Greeks?
• How do you feel about this? {Summarise participant’s answer, what do you feel 
when you think that people from other cultures think of Greeks as (participant’s 
answer)? Do you agree, disagree, feel happy, irritated, proud, ashamed ?)
There are two more questions.
23. Is there a particular person (might be more than one) that you would you say has 
influenced the way you feel as Greek or mixed choice? (A person that you think that 
has an impact upon your feelings towards being Greek or mixed choice.
•  Who was this person?
•  Where was he/she from?
162
♦ What was/ is your relationship with him/her? (Friend, relative?)
♦ In what way did he/she influenced your feelings about being (participant’s 
response).
22. Have you ever considered moving to Greece?
If Yes:
♦ What are the reasons that make you want to move at Greece?
If No:
♦ Do you plan to stay at England?
♦ What is it about England that makes you to want to stay.
If I don’t know yet what I will do.
What do you think that might affect your decision? {Your studies, family, friends).
Thank you very much for your time and co-operation.
Do you mind if we spend a minute to talk about how was the interview with you?
1. Were there any questions you found difficult to answer?
2. Any question(s) that upset you?
3. Any questions that you found interesting?
4. Would you change anything in the questions?
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TOWARDS AN UNDERSTANDING OF ISSUES SURROUNDING THE ROLE 
OF PERSONAL VALUES IN THE PYCHOTHERAPEUTIC ENCOUNTER.
Abstract,
The aim of the present study was to explore a group of psychoanalytic 
psychotherapists’ perception of whether and if so, in what way a therapist’s values 
might enter into the therapeutic encounter and influence the psychotherapeutic 
process. Responses of sixteen psychoanalytic psychotherapists registered in the 
United Kingdom Council for Psychotherapy and the British Confederation of 
Psychotherapists, to a brief semi-structured questionnaire were analysed by employing 
interpretative phenomenological analysis. Collected data was analysed for recurrent 
themes relevant to participants’ understanding of the meaning and clinical application 
of the notion of “value-free” psychotherapeutic practice and of the concept of 
“neutrality”, and of the experiences and issues that they themselves perceived as 
relevant to the process whereby a therapist’s personal values- with a focus on cultural 
values- enter into the psychotherapeutic process. Participants described “value-free” 
psychotherapy as unattainable and there was a strong theme of values always being 
operative and necessary in the psychotherapeutic process. Participants highlighted 
how a psychotherapists’ personal values might influence their therapeutic interventions 
in a way that could threaten the therapeutic alliance. However, they perceived the 
seeping of a therapist’s personal “vision of reality” in the therapeutic encounter as 
being an inevitable part of a therapist’s attempt to make sense of clients’ experiences 
and to engage in the process of constructing meaning about a clients’ difficulties.
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Introduction.
The characteristics of human behaviour which psychoanalysis has traditionally studied, 
such as dynamics, ontogenetics, motivation, conflict, and defensive functions contribute 
to an understanding of value systems. Despite a general consensus regarding the 
importance and centrality of value systems in understanding personality functioning, 
some psychoanalytic authors have argued that little attention has been paid to values 
and little attempt has been made to focus on them as a specific area for study. It seems 
like values have been taken for granted within psychoanalytic literature, although 
psychoanalysts have never been particularly known for taking anything for granted. 
(Meissner 1983; Michels & Oldham 1983).
The reluctance to consider values as focal point of study can be seen as the result of 
the ambiguity that surrounds the question of the role of the psychoanalyst’s own 
values as they enter into and impinge upon the psychoanalytic situation and 
relationship. The brief review that follows aims to present the ambiguity and debate 
over this issue. It involves mainly literature of published article-discussions (symposium 
presentations or discussions of published client-cases), which is the way that 
psychoanalysis is communicated (Ward 1977). The review starts with the particular 
historical emphasis given to the need on the part of the psychotherapist to embrace a 
“value-free” posture in the psychoanalytic situation, which can be seen as the origin, or 
what marked the beginning, of the debate.
“Value-free” analytic practice is one of the meanings entailed in the concept of 
“neutrality”, which is a key principle of analytic technique (Moore & Fines 1990). 
Neutrality comes from the Latin “neuter” which means neither one nor the other. The 
origins of “neutrality” within the psychoanalytic context is considered to be Freud’s 
“observations on transference-love" paper in which Freud was giving advice to 
beginning practitioners of analytic treatment on how to cope with what he considered a 
potentially “disastrous” clinical situation: a female patient falling in love with her analyst. 
In such a situation, Freud referred to treatment “carried out in abstinence” and he 
used the German word “indifferenz” and not the term “neutrality”, which is a word that
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was introduced in the English translation of this paper. (Freud 1914 as cited in 
Franklin 1990)
Many authors have hypothesised that Freud developed the concept of “abstinence” and 
“neutrality” as a form of self-imposed inhibition against troublesome erotic feelings 
towards women clients (Stone 1961; Moi 1990). Speculating about the underlying 
reasons why Freud developed these concepts and about the meaning they held for him 
is a difficult task, since in order to run into conclusions in regard to the meaning that 
any concept held for him, one needs to take into consideration all of his papers. Early 
inconsistencies in Freud’s conceptions remain unresolved and have resulted in diverse 
views of abstinence and neutrality (reviewed by Wolf & Leider 1984; Schachter 1994).
As stated previously, one of the dimensions in the definition of neutrality is that related 
to the role of values in psychoanalysis, which is a subject that has always generated 
considerable controversy. Of relevance here is the historical debate about whether or 
not psychoanalysis shares the qualities of objectivity inherent in the ethic or value- 
orientation of the scientific method. The variance in the conceptualisation of mental 
health and the inevitable overlap between a therapist’s mental health and cultural 
values, will now be discussed as an example of how the aforementioned controversy 
and debate manifest themselves in relevant literature.
Hatrmann (1959), who is considered to be one of the pioneers in placing the issue of 
values on a scientific and impersonal basis wrote:
“...the approach of the analyst as analyst is basically, so far as values are concerned, the same 
as he has become used to elsewhere in psychoanalytic psychology. His attitude is that of the 
psychological student of moral—or other—valuations and their interrelation with other individual 
or social-psychological phenomena. His objectivity is scientific objectivity, his truth is scientific 
truth (p10)”.
Hartmann’s emphasis on value neutrality reflects a general epistemology of science 
based on positivistic assumptions. His perspective of assuming that psychoanalysis is a 
natural science, so that its values inherently become the values of scientific 
methodology has been challenged by various authors. In one of the most extensive
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discussions of the meaning of “neutrality” Dorpatt (1977), for example, uses what he 
calls “logical reasoning” to argue that:
“both the subject matter [emotions, conflicts and ideals] and the methods of psychoanalysis 
[description, explanation and interpretation] unlike the natural sciences, cannot logically be free 
of values” (p55).
Meissner (1983) also challenges Hartmann’s position, but argues that the ideals in the 
value orientation of the scientific method (based on the inherent qualities of objectivity, 
the capacity for detached and disinterested observation, and the rational search for 
truth as the highest value) have “become part of the warp and the woof of the 
psychoanalytic ethic” (pp579). He quotes the following comments by Ramzy (1983, as 
cited by Meisner 1983):“Such prerequisites and qualities of scientific approach are not only 
taken for granted by psychoanalysts and adhered to in theory and practice as much as is 
humanly possible, but also the analytic systems of training, the rules of technique, and all that 
makes up the various psychoanalytic area of observation or application are replete with those 
features that characterize scientific spirit. The terms may differ and the context may vary, but the 
study and the correction of magical ways of thinking, or of feelings of omnipotence and 
omniscience, the knowledge about transference or countertransference, or reality-testing or 
defence mechanisms are essentially an adoption, an elaboration, and an application of those 
intellectual and moral values which constitute scientific method” (p. 579-580).
In this regard, then, psychoanalysis could be seen as a technology whose therapeutic 
aim is the achievement of so called “health values” and the diminishing of value 
conflicts. Hartmann (1959) has expressed this:
“...in the therapeutic situation something appears that we can account for only if we decide to 
make a distinction between the therapist’s general moral codes and the one he is guided by in 
his therapeutic work which could be called his “professional code”. In his therapeutic work he will 
keep other values in abeyance and concentrate on the realization of one category of values only: 
health values (p5).
Hartmann’s position that health values were to be distinguished from the analyst’s own 
personal values and that the analyst would enter the analytic situation (supposedly like 
his scientific colleagues) by keeping his personal values in the background and 
engaging in the analytic process only in terms of the “health values”, stimulated the
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development of a bulk of papers on what “health values" consists of. These can be 
seen as being divided in two categories: those concerning dimensions of psychological 
functioning to be used as indicative for clients' mental health and those regarding the 
therapeutic techniques employed in the course of analysis.
Jahoda (1958) reviewed the extensive literature on mental health and illness, including 
psychoanalytic contributions and categorised the psychological meaning of various 
criteria put forward for assessing mental health. She grouped these criteria under the 
following six headings: “attitudes towards self”, “growth, development, and self- 
actualisation”, “integration”, “reality-orientation”, “autonomy”, “perception of reality” and 
“environmental mastery”. Jahoda goes on to point out that there are many diverse 
types of person who can be regarded as healthy, and concludes that it is necessary to 
adopt a “multiple criterion” approach to the assessment of mental health, since no 
single criterion is adequate for the assessment of mental health. Jahoda then 
addresses a “value dilemma”:
“How culture or social class bound is the value orientation of those who have suggested the 
criteria? Would people living in an Oriental civilisation have considered contemplation and 
detachment as suitable criteria? Would the mental health label be more appropriately attached to 
self-assertive aggressiveness, to fit dominant values in the working class in Western 
civilizations? (p78).
Although Jahoda’s conceptions of mental health have become the benchmarks against 
which to measure therapeutic achievement in most of the psychotherapeutic 
approaches (Prall 1993), including the psychoanalytic (Sandler & Dreher 1996), her 
suggested cultural and value contextualisation of conceptions of health and normality 
has led to a dispute in the psychoanalytic literature. This centres around the question 
of whether or not the psychoanalyst’s personal-cultural values enter into and impinge 
upon the psychotherapeutic work and relationship.
Before proceeding to present literature examples reflecting this dispute it is imperative 
to note that culture tends to be defined operatively and differently by different writers. 
Talking about authors who do research on issues related to cross-cultural therapy. Sue 
et al. (1992) reports that there are those who define culture broadly to include race.
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ethnicity, class, affectional orientation, religion, sex, age, and so forth. Other authors 
limit their definition of culture to ethnicity and race and focus their discussion on 
“Visible Ethnic Minority Groups” (African -Americans, Asians, American Indians etc.) 
and on racial concerns (usually racism).
Another point worth raising before returning to the demonstration of the aforementioned 
dispute within the psychoanalytic literature, is that some of the authors who address 
“cultural issues” in relation to psychological therapy do not define culture at all. One of 
these authors is Krapf (1965). He does not offer an explicit definition of culture, 
although he appears to define culture in broad terms, but expresses a position on the 
role of values in psychoanalysis. That is, he stresses that it is correct to criticise those 
“who (generally without knowing it ) introduce their own cultural values into concepts of mental 
health which are presented as universally valid. But the psychoanalytic concept is not open to 
this objection, for it rests upon the person’s capacity to choose between modifying his behaviour 
and his environment” (p444). He goes on to say that above all, the individual's mental 
health is characterised by his/her capacity for “flexible adaptation”, which results in “the 
setting-up of an equilibrium of the psyche with reason and ego predominating” (p444).
Krapfs argument reflects a position of many authors who appear to believe that the 
psychoanalytic concept of mental health is not influenced by the analyst's cultural 
values, because they are in some way made to “disappear” by psychoanalytic 
principles. Others (e.g. Sandler & Dreher 1996) argue, however, that it is vital to 
recognise that these principles are themselves values. That is, the very emphasis 
placed by Kraft, for example, on the person's capacity to choose between modifying his 
behaviour and his environment introduces (perhaps without knowing it) the values of 
Western civilisation, in which freedom of choice is highly regarded.
Defining cultural values in a broad sense to include a therapist's “technical” values, that 
is values inherent in the psychoanalytic approach, has led to a wave of papers in 
which there is at times tentative at others strong argument, that these values enter 
and impinge upon psychotherapeutic work and relationship. These values include the 
search for truth, knowledge, and understanding, and those emphasising orientation
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towards reality, maturity and change. Literature exploring these matters suggest that 
these attitudes could affect the therapeutic process in complex ways (Bornstein 1983).
Defining culture in a broad sense to include race, ethnic background, social class and 
gender, some authors argue that within the psychoanalytic situation culture is a 
functional reality which influences emotions and level of understanding of both analyst 
and client, (e.g. Allport 1986; D’Ardenne & Mahtani 1989). These authors suggest that 
it is essential that psychotherapists are aware of their own cultural views and biases 
before working with clients' point of view.
Thomas (1992) draws special attention to this kind of awareness in regard to 
psychoanalytic psychotherapists' racial views. Discussing the therapeutic process of 
the dyads of the white therapist and the black client, the black therapist and the white 
client, and the black therapist and the black client he says:
It is extremely difficult for any form of racism, accrued from a lifetime of socialisation, to be 
brought to personal awareness, yet this is indeed what needs to take place, so that our practice 
in not dominated by what can be termed “societal racism”. In order to work effectively across 
cultures and with people of different colour, psychotherapists, I would suggest need first to attend 
to their own racism and cultural groups. Personal attitudes and assumptions need to be re­
worked and re-examined (pi 34).
Thomas (1992) considers awareness and exploration of personal cultural and racial 
attitudes and assumptions as indispensable for the process that the therapist needs to 
go in order to disentangle themselves from the structural racism of the society in which 
they live. He argues, however, that the working through of such issues appears to be 
relatively unimportant within the context of analytic psychotherapeutic training, “perhaps 
because training analysts and supervisors alike have little awareness of the 
significance of race and racism in the therapeutic process'' (pi 33). On a similar line of 
argument, Kareem (1992), views racism as operating through primitive feelings such as 
envy, hate, jealousy, greed, anger, violence, suspicion and fear, and says that 
although psychotherapists are supposed to have learned how to deal with these 
feelings most of them “maintain that racism is not an issue for them, simply because it 
is political (and thus 'external') issue” (p24).
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Given that literature about whether or not psychoanalytic psychotherapists consider 
their own cultural and racial values as able to affect their therapeutic work is 
controversial, and that our understanding of the role of the psychoanalyst’s own values 
as they enter into and impinge upon the psychoanalytic situation and relationship 
needs further investigation, the present study was designed to explore a group of 
psychoanalytic psychotherapists’ experience of whether and if so, how their own 
values, with a special focus on cultural values, enter into their therapeutic work with 
clients and the meaning that such a process holds for them.
The present author’s view is that it is impossible to understand any psychotherapeutic 
situation without considering both the psychotherapist's and the client's role in the 
psychotherapeutic relationship. Disentangling any one of these might lead to loss of 
meaning, in a similar way that the gestalt (whole) can be lost if one focuses exclusively 
on either the figure or the ground. In this study the decision to focus on the 
psychotherapist's role in the psychotherapeutic encounter does not mean that the 
client's role is ignored or minimised. Focusing on the psychotherapist's value system, 
reflects an effort to deal with the complexity and multidimensionality of the therapeutic 
situation and a tentative attempt at illuminating links between theory, practice and 
research.
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Method,
The aim of the study was to explore whether and to what extent a group of 
psychoanalytic practitioners perceive their psychotherapeutic work as “value-free”. 
Focusing on their perception of the way that their own cultural values might impinge on 
the psychotherapeutic situation, the study also aimed to explore participants' 
experience and perception of whether and, if so, in what ways a therapist's values 
might enter into the therapeutic encounter and influence the psychotherapeutic 
process.
The research literature only provides papers based on case studies. These offer 
limited information on commonalties and shared understanding among psychoanalytic 
psychotherapists on the role of personal values in the psychotherapeutic encounter. 
Without sufficient information on which to develop questionnaire response categories, 
the choice of a structured approach was not appropriate. The need to obtain detailed, 
exploratory and contextualised data for this investigation indicated that a qualitative 
mode of research would be most useful. The aim of qualitative research is usually to 
explore a small well-defined group in detail (Denzin & Lincoln 1994; Smith 1995). 
Although this limits generalising findings to a wider population, it was hoped that this 
inquiry would perhaps offer insights into the issues involved in the complex process 
of values entering into the psychotherapeutic situation.
Participants.
A brief semi-structured questionnaire (discussed bellow) was posted to two hundred 
registered psychoanalytic psychotherapists living in the London and South Ehgland 
areas. These were randomly selected from the registers of the United Kingdom Council 
for Psychotherapy and the British Confederation of Psychotherapists (registered 
analytic and psychodynamic psychotherapists were numbered and every sixth was 
chosen). Of the two hundred questionnaires dispatched, forty eight (24%) were 
returned. Of these, only sixteen (8 %) were completed. In the remaining returned 
questionnaires, all individuals offered apologies and most explained that time pressure 
and work overload was the reason why they had not completed the questionnaire.
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Data collection procedure:
Each participant was sent an envelope that included the semi-structured questionnaire 
and a cover letter (see Appendix A) which provided information about the researcher 
and the nature of the research (e.g. purpose, confidentiality etc.). There was a separate 
section with explanatory notes and instructions for completion (Appendix B). A 
stamped and addressed return envelope was also included.
Initially the study aimed to treat the data elicited by the semi-structured questionnaire 
as a source of themes which were going to be utilised for the construction of a semi­
structured interview schedule that would be used during in-depth interviews with a small 
group of psychoanalytic psychotherapists. Participants were thus sent a note asking for 
their consent to be interviewed (Appendix D). There were two positive responses. The 
small number of participants that agreed to be interviewed and the fact that the 
questionnaire elicited rich qualitative data led to the treatment of the semi-structured 
questionnaire as the sole source of data in this study. A letter explaining this decision, 
was send to the two participants that had agreed to be interviewed. (Appendix E). The 
method of eliciting qualitative data by sending a questionnaire to participants has been 
successfully employed by other researchers (e.g. Milton & Coyle 1998).
Semi-structured questionnaire.
The questionnaire (Appendix 0) consisted of questions designed to obtain relevant 
demographic information, followed by six open-ended questions. These aimed to 
gather information on participants’ understanding of the meaning and clinical 
application of the notion of “value-free” psychotherapeutic practice and of the closely 
related concept of “neutrality”, and to encourage them to give an account of the 
experiences and issues that they themselves perceived as relevant to the process 
whereby a therapist’s personal values- with a focus on cultural values- enter into the 
psychotherapeutic process. Finally the questionnaire ended with a debriefing question 
about their experience of participation in the research.
A first draft of the questionnaire was discussed with two qualified psychoanalytic 
psychotherapists and five psychotherapeutic and counselling psychology trainees 
involved with qualitative research. Received feedback was considered and resulted in
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adjustments to the questions and to the inclusion of tentatively phrased prompts which 
aimed to further explain each question.
Analysis.
Data was qualitatively analysed by employing interpretative phenomenological analysis 
(IPA). Being about discovering meanings rather than eliciting facts (Smith et. al 1997), 
IRA was considered as the most appropriate method to conduct a phenomenological 
inquiry into participants' perception of how their personal values (with emphasis on 
their cultural values) might enter into their practice and into the meaning that such a 
process holds for them. Another contributory factor for choosing I PA was the fact that 
it puts greater emphasis on cognitive and affective processes, through which meanings 
occur, than more traditional modes of analysis. That is, I PA provides a systematic 
sequence of steps to discover such processes from a complex set of qualitative data 
(Smith 1995), as the one that elicited in the present study.
Analysis of the data involved the following steps: Answers from all questioners were 
typed and five of these transcripts were thematically analysed. Themes at this stage 
aimed to capture the essential quality of the texts in a broad sense. This resulted in a 
list of themes which were coded with a key word or a phrase that captured the essence 
of the semantic content and the language used; some of the themes also pointed to 
associations, connections and explanations (interpretations) given by participants. 
These themes were then grouped together in a meaningful way. The coding process 
was then repeated for each of the remaining transcripts in turn. That is, the analysis 
continued by identifying shared themes that reflected shared views or aspects of 
experiences reported by participants. Although the examination of the latter transcripts 
was largely oriented to aspects of the data relevant to the already identified groupings, 
an attempt was made to look at each transcript afresh, often resulting in the generation 
of additional themes. This led to expansion or alteration of the existing groups of 
themes and to the emergence of new groups of themes.
The analysis continued by closely examining the groups of themes and generating 
categories relevant to the shared views and aspects of participants' experiences. A file 
of transcript extracts (from each individual transcript) relevant to each of these
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categories was created and was closely studied with the purpose of exploring patterns 
and relationships within and between the categories. The meaning of individual themes 
were not always discrete and so the resulting categories were often not mutually 
exclusive.
Extracts used in the analysis that follows are some of the most articulate examples of 
common themes related to participants' understanding of the way values are involved 
in their psychotherapeutic practice. Not every participant reported each theme. 
Individual variability indeed existed; however the aim here is to present shared 
commonalties and idiosyncracies in the participants' accounts. To avoid a fragmentary 
analytic section and to provide context, quoted extracts are often lengthy. This means 
that, at times, the reader will find issues that have been discussed in earlier sections 
resurfacing in subsequent ones.
An attempt was made to capture and then in turn present participants' experience of 
how values are involved in their psychotherapeutic practice. This involved, however, the 
researcher engaging in an interpretative relationship with each transcript, since these 
meanings were not always transparently available, but became evident through a 
sustained engagement with the phenomenology of the transcripts and a process of 
analysis. The resultant analytic account which follows should be therefore seen as the 
joint product of the reflection by both the participants (their story) and the author (her 
interaction with participants' stories).
The researcher's experience of working psychotherapeutically (under supervision) in 
Britain, with a client population from a variety of cultures, while herself coming from a 
foreign (Greek) cultural background, has highlighted for her the complexity and vitality 
of considering how a therapist's own cultural values enter into and influence the 
therapeutic process. Ways that her-own cultural values and her relatively limited, yet 
intense exposure to psychoanalytic psychotherapy (which involves academic 
readings, one year clinical practice under psychoanalytic supervision, and her 
psychoanalytically oriented personal therapy) have hindered or facilitated the gaining of 
insight in participants' accounts could become a research project in its own right.
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Finding herself in an active effort to understand how her personal values enter into 
and affect her own clinical practice was what initiated and maintained, but also 
influenced, her involvement in every phase of this study: in developing the 
questionnaire used for data collection and in interacting with this data in order to 
discover themes and to construct analytic text.
The individual interpretative work that the researcher brought to the present study was 
one of the main instruments in the inquiry into participants’ experience and perception 
of the role of personal values in the psychotherapeutic encounter. The interpretative 
phenomenological approach adopted is consonant with the position of qualitative 
researchers who perceive reflexivity of the researcher as a central component in the 
research practice at both epistemological and methodological level (e.g. Woolgar 
1988). That is, in the process of analysing the data, the researcher attempts to 
produce a meaningful account that knits together the multiplicities, variations and 
complexities of participants' reports. This involves a sustained engagement with the 
phenomenology of the texts and a process of interpretation that needs to be taken into 
consideration in evaluating the credibility of the results.
Discussing the progression of data collected into the final report within research 
supervision, was the major way of checking that the analytic account that follows is 
credible of the data collected. The extracts included in this analytic account present the 
reader with raw data in order to allow him/herself to evaluate whether the 
interpretations that the researcher made are warranted by the data collected in this 
study (Smith 1997).
An “adjectival quantitative phrases” quantification policy has been adopted, since in the 
analysis of purely qualitative data the use of percentages tends to underplay the 
significance of the identified themes (Krueger 1994).
In the illustrative quotations the omission of material is indicated by empty brackets (...) 
and clarificatory material that has been added appears with square brackets. Cited 
extracts are part of the written responses provided by the participants and are thus
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sometimes in note form and have a somewhat staccato quality. Completed 
questionnaires were numbered after received by the researcher. To ensure 
confidentiality, participants are referred to by this number.
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Analysis.
Demographics:
The sample consisted of seven males and nine females. The mean age of both was 
57.56 years (range: 41-77, SD:8.86). Four participants reported England as their place 
of birth, eight reported UK, two Holland, one Scotland and one Germany. Seven 
participants ethnically defined themselves as English, one as British, one as Scottish, 
three as European, one as Jewish, two as English-Jewish and one as English-1/4 
Norwegian 1/8 Irish. One person did not give a racial self-description, eleven defined 
themselves as white, one as Jewish, one as Anglo-Saxon-French, one as “Pinto-Grey”, 
and one as human. Nine participants were practising (after qualification) using a 
psychoanalytic/dynamic approach for more that fifteen years and seven between ten 
and fifteen. Thirteen of the participants were currently involved in private practice and 
three in both private and NHS practice. Four were also involved in academic teaching 
and three in voluntary psychotherapeutic work.
I. Way in which participants defined cultural and ethnic values.
The initial aim to explore participants’ perception of how a therapist’s cultural values 
might enter into and impinge upon his or her psychotherapeutic work, made it 
imperative to explore participants’ conceptualisation of “culture” and “values”.
Analysis of participants’ responses to the question which aimed to investigate this 
issue, revealed that all but one (who did not offer a definition at all) of the participants 
defined cultural and ethnic values in broad terms. That is, describing their 
understanding of these concepts, most of the participants referred to “race”, “class”, 
“education”, “religion”, “gender”, “family system and upbringing practices”, “cultural 
conventions, customs and practices”; some referred to “moral values” and a few to 
“political stance”.
Values were understood as being “norms”, “assumptions”, “attitudes”, “perspectives” 
“beliefs”, “practices”, and “conventions” which are “familiar” “shared” “collective” 
“pertinent to a particular society”, “taken for granted” “not questioned”, “given”, and 
“common”.
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The large number and multiple nature of dimensions (gender, religion, ethnic 
background and so forth) that participants related “culture” with, suggested that an 
attempt to focus the analysis on any one of them would result in a misrepresentation of 
their accounts. It was thus decided to proceed by considering culture in a broad sense 
and by focusing on participants’ accounts of how values are generally involved in their 
psychotherapeutic work.
Before proceeding into presenting this, it is worth reporting that almost all of the 
participants’ accounts of their understanding of cultural values implied that “culture” was 
viewed as a ‘cognitive and affective structure’ which has a powerful effect upon one’s 
self-concept and interpersonal relationships. Resulting similarities and variations in 
people’s sense of self and way of relating was seen as something of particular 
importance and interest within the context of the therapeutic situation.
As participant 16 said, for example, “while all humans value eating in some way the different 
values vis-a-vis preparation and cleanliness, spices, dieting, and sharing, vary between different 
cultures and can give rise to important misunderstandings which can undermine the sense of 
self. Different values in child-upbringing and interpersonal loyalties are key examples of such 
ethnic/religious differences which affect the practice of psychotherapy.”
The reported inextricable and penetrative influence of the “cognitive and affective 
cultural structure” in one’s self-concept and relating patterns can be seen as raising 
crucial questions for both clinical practice and research design. Can we disentangle the 
dimensions entailed in an individual’s “culture”? Can we isolate them for the purpose of 
studying and understanding their impact upon this individual’s way of acting and 
interacting? Is it possible to deconstruct the “cultural structure” in an attempt to 
construct meaning? These questions involve difficult, sensitive and complicated 
matters.
The author of the present study believes that considering a “total” or a more “focused” 
approach in studying “cultural structures” is not necessarily contradictory, since both 
can offer legitimate issues and views that can enrich our understanding of people’s 
cultural structures. The decision, thus, not to isolate a cultural dimension does not
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imply a position on the above questions. As previously stated, it is simply a reflection of 
how the author perceived the participants' accounts on the matter.
Against the imposition of values.
In almost all of the participants' accounts, there was a strong affirmation that the 
imposition of values is contrary to the nature and philosophy of the therapeutic, 
analytic, work they are involved in. Participants appeared to adhere to what Moore and 
Fine (1990) state as being central to psychoanalytic neutrality, namely to avoid the 
imposition of one’s own values upon the client, and to take the client’s capacities rather 
than one’s own desires as a guide.
For example, one participant said; “Neutrality means trying to make meanings of value for 
and with the patient-not imposing our understanding willy-nilly” (Participant 5).
Commenting on “neutrality” another participant said: "it is more important for the patient to 
find his/her own value system, so it would be best to keep to that matter than to the system of 
the therapist (...) I think the analyst who cares about the growth of their patient will not try to 
dominate, or push his or her ideas” (Participant 14).
In the above quotation, not imposing values is related with a desirable dimension in the 
meaning of “neutrality”: that of facilitating a client’s personal “growth”. Most of the 
participants considered “neutrality” in the sense of keeping a non value-imposing 
attitude as important and ‘therapeutic’.
Talking about the therapeutic aspects of “neutrality” another participant said:
“ (...)offers the patient space to encounter their own issues and make their choices & decisions 
without judgement or approval from another (i.e. taking full responsibility for their own direction). 
I believe it is therapeutically useful for a patient to develop confidence in their own perceptions 
and judgements & leads to a greater sense of their own individuated self & sense of personal 
responsibility”. (Participant 9)
Clarkson (1995) states that the most frequently-heard admonition with which most 
training schools would agree is the dictum: ‘Do not impose your values on your clients 
or patients!’. This is purported to be a grievous and probably unforgivable professional
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sin, leading to charges of exploitation, zealotry and missionary urges. In short, it is 
considered very unprofessional.
As discussed in the introduction, within the psychoanalytic school of thought, the 
principle of refraining from imposing one’s values on clients was first enunciated by 
Freud’s “neutrality” and “abstinence” recommendations. The following sections will 
demonstrate the way in which the participants in the present study challenged and 
denounced “neutrality” in terms of meaning that the psychotherapist or analyst can or 
should be value-free.
Value-free psychotherapeutic, analytic practice as unattainable and undesirable.
Values are alwavs operative and often necessarv.
Although all the participants in the present study considered the imposition of personal 
values as unprofessional and contrary to their therapeutic, psychoanalytic, work, there 
was a strong theme of values always being operative and often necessary .
The following quotation is an example of the operative nature of values both as 
perceived by a participant herself and as implied in her account.
“I believe that a therapist has a responsibility to help increase the patient’s ability for self 
understanding (as the therapist sees it) (...). Part of ‘understanding’ involves enabling the client 
to see a wider range of perspectives than they may previously have thought of. Part of the 
process does involve communicating my own understanding, which necessarily will contain the 
integration of my own values, e.g. Many clients with low self-esteem have never experienced a 
positive mirroring of themselves. On occasion I will reflect to a client my belief that human 
beings contain both good and bad & that accepting and integrating both these aspects is the 
necessary path to achieve wholeness (Participant 9).
In this account the participant considers her values as being operative because she 
perceives them as being embedded in her ‘understanding’. Assuming the 
communication of her understanding as imperative and necessary for the therapeutic 
process (“enabling client., have thought of”) to occur in the first place, implies that in the
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above example, it is the “injection” of this psychotherapist’s values into the therapeutic 
process that makes this process possible.
The above quotation demonstrates the operative nature of values in another way as 
well. That is, perceiving the therapist as having a responsibility “to help increase the 
patient’s ability for self understanding” itself implies the operative nature of values in 
this participant’s psychotherapeutic work. That is, the value of “self-knowledge and 
understanding”, considered as inherent in the psychoanalytic situation (as discussed in 
the introduction), appears to be in operation. Moreover the participant’s belief that 
“human beings contain both good and bad... achieve wholeness” can be seen as 
reflecting the value of ‘integration’ also considered inherent in the psychoanalytic 
situation.
Many participants explicitly stated that the psychotherapeutic, analytic, process is itself 
value-laden. For example,
“We also communicate our values through the very enterprise of psychotherapy; i.e. a belief in 
the unconscious; the role of free association, the value of memories etc” . (participant 13).
“’Values-free’ practice: impossible: values are always communicated, even through emphasis 
put on free association, unconscious, dreams etc.” (2).
A recurrent theme throughout participants’ responses was that it is not a matter of 
whether or not we communicate our values, but of being aware of how we do so. The 
following section will focus on the way participants conceptualised the “how” aspect of 
this theme.
How values might be conveyed.
A lot of the participants addressed the impact of the values held by a therapist upon 
three milestone processes in psychotherapeutic work, i.e., assessing, providing 
interventions and building up a therapeutic alliance.
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Assessing versus judging.
In their accounts of why psychotherapeutic work is not , or cannot be, value-free 
several participants referred to the indispensable task of assessing a client’s behaviour. 
In talking about assessing, these participants referred to a moral dimension involved in 
the task of assessing which they differentiated from a judgmental attitude.
For example, participant 7 said:
“No I don’t think I can adopt a stance which will be totally value free. Awareness & retaining a 
capacity to assess is important. I don’t believe therapy should be morally free—human 
understanding as with behaviour always has a moral dimension. This is different from therapist 
sometimes becoming caught up in a moralistic attitude... Neutrality does not mean being blank 
and accepting of everything & anything. If I became neutral in that way, I would be working as if 
neutered! (7)
Another participant said:
“Completely value free practice = impossible... understanding, explaining self, behaviour etc. 
inevitably involve moral appraisals. Of course moral appraisal = different from being 
judgmental(...) essential psychotherapist not to pass judgement". (Participant 8)
Since Dorpat (1977) reports that in psychoanalytic literature, it is common to use the 
word ‘moral’ in a broad sense to mean ‘values’, it is perhaps possible that participants 
referred to the operative nature of values in their psychotherapeutic task of 
assessment, which they differentiated from being judgmental. Of relevance here is 
Dorpat’s comment that “in our reports and explanations of human actions, we use such 
terms as adaptive or maladaptive, destructive or constructive, productive or 
nonproductive, appropriate or inappropriate” (57). He calls these terms “value 
appraisals” and “value judgements” and considers them as an integral and essential 
part of an analyst’s work, but explains that “value (or moral) appraisal, assessment, or 
judgement does not imply approval, consent, or condemnation of the human action in 
question” (Dorpat 1977 p. 57).
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Value-laden interventions and their impact on the therapeutic alliance.
Many participants viewed therapists' personal values as influencing their interventions, 
which, in turn, was perceived as having an impact on factors considered essential for 
the building and maintenance of the working alliance.
Interventions were seen as being a threat for the working alliance when they were the 
result of pathologising the client’s behaviour, because of not understanding the 
culturally-value driven nature of this behaviour. In such cases the therapists’ own 
values were viewed as leading them to expect that a client’s experience should follow 
a specific pattern.
An example of a therapist’s possible expectations on the pattern of a client’s grief 
follows:
“A Western Buddhist practitioner would consider it important at the time of someone’s death to 
respect the passing of the person’s spirit to offer a peaceful environment -  ie meditation would 
be an appropriate response to someone’s death. A therapist who did not understand this might 
wrongly interpret the client’s stance- attitude as a denial of their grief. This would hinder the 
client’s progress, because they would feel misunderstood and mistrustful of the therapist’s 
capacity to offer them help” (participant 10).
Always interpreting rather than, at times, acknowledging the client’s real life 
experiences was also seen as likely to result in a disturbance to the establishment and 
maintenance of the working alliance. The following extract is an example of viewing 
‘interpreting’ as an indication of denial, on the therapist’s part, of the emotional impact a 
real-life experience might have:
‘A white therapist’s racist but unconscious views hindered the progress of a black client’s 
therapeutic work. By interpreting the client’s response (quitting job as a result of having been 
bullied // victim of racial comments) instead of accepting the validity of the experience of racism, 
the client felt unheld and misunderstood.” (participant 5)
Dealing with real life experiences in the therapeutic encounter was seen as a complex 
issue. This became evident in reported examples where the therapist was perceived as 
acknowledging a client’s real-life experiences, but was proceeding to evaluate, or to 
question this experience. Describing this, one participant said:
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“There are many examples of patients’ political radicalism being analysed away as infantile 
disorders when a conservative therapist can see no good reason for the social changes 
espoused by the patient’s programme. [ A similar situation arises when] problems of upsetting 
the trust [emerge] when a patient feels their therapist may be questioning their religion and thus 
the trustworthiness of any containment they may get from it (...) the issue of ‘psychotherapist’s 
values’ may have differing implications on building basic trust (participant 16).
A final way in which a therapist’s personal values were seen as influencing his or her 
interventions in an undesirable way, was when the therapist was perceived as 
assuming a “pre-knowledge” of a client’s real life experiences.
“middle class supervisee was seeing lady from similar background. She [supervisee] talked 
when she needed to be silent and open. Wanted to communicate ‘understanding’ (...). Even 
when read/seen/experienced patient’s experience cannot be assumed” (Participant 4).
Participants’ perceptions of how personal values influence therapeutic interventions 
discussed so far, demonstrate their understanding of the way that values can seep 
into the therapeutic encounter through the overt content (what is actually said) of a 
therapist’s verbal interaction with clients. Many participants highlighted, however, that 
values may impinge on the therapeutic encounter through the covert content (non­
verbal dimension of speech) of a therapist’s verbal interaction with clients.
Covert content.
Most of the participants referred to the covert content of the verbal interaction 
between the therapist and the client as being one of the reasons why their 
psychotherapeutic practice is not value-free. They talked about values being 
communicated through sometimes unspoken, yet experienced (at either a conscious or 
an unconscious level) affect.
For example participant 6 said:
“I am sure we all communicate value systems, our known and unknown assumptions, own 
prejudices (those owned & those disowned). One cannot make a comment without having an 
attitude to the content... Body posture affective tone, turn of phrase all ensure that the state of 
mood is available to the patient”.
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As can be seen here, the participant appears to pinpoint that the meaning that one (i.e. 
a client) makes out of a verbal interaction (i.e. between therapist and client) involves 
something more than the content of what is said (i.e. what the therapist says). She calls 
this something “attitude to the content” and assumes that it is disclosed by “body 
posture affective tone, turn of phrase” and that it conveys something about the 
person's (i.e. therapist's) “state of mood”. The “state of mood”, is in turn, perceived as 
bound to (I am sure we all communicate...”, “one cannot make a comment without...”) 
proclaim something about that person’s (i.e. therapist’s) “value systems”, “assumptions” 
and “prejudices”. The use of the “known” -“unknown” and “owned”-" disowned” 
adjectives, is noteworthy, since it perhaps implies that the participant talks about 
values, assumptions and prejudices that therapists might or might not be aware of.
The way in which another participant described how experienced affect is 
communicated through the covert content of her verbal interaction with clients is 
presented below. This participant’s account was seen as raising a crucial issue, that of 
whether the affect conveyed by a therapist’s covert content of his/her interaction with 
clients is considered desirable or not.
Some sort of values apply to everything and there is no way all can be hidden—especially if one 
is engaged in a task which can be done better or worse (...). I have definite values about what I 
consider psychological health, and while never openly defining or commenting on these to the 
person in therapy I make no efforts to modulate my tones of voice etc so as to disguise 
completely any pleasure or concern I might have about any changes in their attitudes and 
behaviour towards or away from this ideal. They are thus bound to pick something from me. A 
classical example is when someone has a tense angry session but reaches a point of weeping 
after 40 minutes: even though I say nothing valueladen the non-verbal communication between 
us at this point means there is no way they can miss noticing that I feel the tears are a good 
thing—they have progressed to the depressive position (Participant 16).
Saying that she makes “no efforts to modulate [her] tones of voice etc” can be seen as 
implying that the participant perceives the previously described communication of 
value-laden affect as desirable (possibly because of perceiving it as having an 
advantageous-therapeutic effect).
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If the hypothesis that participant 16 considers the communication of her affect as 
desirable, in the particular clinical circumstances that she refers to, is correct, it is 
interesting to note that she does not appear to identify a desirable direction in her 
affect. That is, she is willing to ‘show’ both pleasure and / or concern, or probably more 
accurately she is not willing “to disguise completely” either pleasure or concern.
The issue of which feelings psychotherapists consider as desirable to openly display 
and which not and the underlying reasons for their choices could be the focus of a 
separate study. Data collected in the present study did not provide enough evidence for 
the development of any hypotheses around this issue. Nevertheless, there was one 
feeling which was denounced by all of the participants: that of being judgmental.
For example:
“Every patient is different and yet each one needs a space in which to grow, free from criticisms 
and judgement”.(participant 14)..
The patient’s feelings, phantasies etc. are not to be regarded as performances in an 
examination, to be liked as good or bad (participant 2).
“I always try to be non-judgmental so that the patients defences can be lessened” (participant 5).
Many participants perceived, however, the possibility of a therapist feeling (and thus 
perhaps in some way being) judgmental as being the result of the influence of his/her 
personal values. This was, in turn, seen as often being communicated through the 
covert content of a therapist’s interaction with a client.
For example:
“(About 36 years ago!) I was working with a family where the father left home to live with another 
woman, leaving his wife and children behind to cope alone. He asked to come to see me at the 
family service Unit where I was working. I look back and realise how judgmental I felt about him, 
and although I am sure that I never expressed disapproval, I feel that this was partly why he 
never came back to see me again after our first meeting. I was at the time a practising Christian 
and was unable to appreciate the family dynamics involved in the situation because of my 
disapproval, (participant 14)
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The issue of covert content carried along with the overt content in any communication 
message in human interaction is discussed by Satir (1967). He talks about a 
“metacommunication”, which is a statement about the relationship between sender and 
receiver or a message about the context in which the communicative message is being 
delivered. Lago and Thompson (1996) report that 85% of the meaning of a 
communication is visual and that the words alone count for a mere 15%. These writers 
also describe cultural differences in non-verbal behaviour (e.g. movements, eye- 
contact, touching etc.) behaviour and discuss the implications of such differences in 
cross cultural therapy.
A final point worth noting before proceeding, is that participant 16’s reference to 
“psychological health” (see page 21) raises the complex issue of values being implicit 
in what a therapist considers to be “mental health”. As discussed in the introduction, 
throughout the psychoanalytic literature we encounter varied and sometimes contrary 
presuppositions about what is “health”, which reflect variations in personal and 
theoretical values.
Bevond overt and covert verbal interaction
Participants’ accounts of how personal values seep into the therapeutic encounter 
were not limited to the verbal interaction between psychotherapist and client. That is, 
almost all of the participants referred to values being explicit and, thus perhaps, 
unintentionally communicated by their own and their consulting room’s physical 
appearance and presentation and by almost any behaviour and way of managing 
‘practical’ or ‘frame” issues.
For example:
“Our values are clear to see in the way we dress, arrange our consulting room, open the door, 
the place we live, the hours we work etc. etc.” (Participant 13)
“Values are always there & experienced in clothes, furniture, decor, (...) management of changes 
in time, fee etc. etc.” (Participant 12)
In the above quotations the use of phrases such as “clear to see” and “are always 
there” imply that participants perceived that values proclaim themselves.
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The issue of values impinging on the psychotherapeutic situation through such 
elements, has not been the subject of empirical study (at least in the studies the 
present researcher is aware of). Some writers have, however, briefly addressed the 
issue (e.g. Meissner 1983). The exception to this is Rowan (1988) who talks about 
furniture proclaiming a whole cultural world of values reverberating as strongly around 
the psyche of clients as the living rooms of their childhood.
As it will become more apparent in the next section, the way in which the participants 
of the present study described the involvement of values in their therapeutic, analytic, 
work opposes the tendency among many psychoanalytic theoreticians (e.g. Hartmann 
1959) to think of values as always being subtle and dangerous obstacles to empathetic 
understanding and ‘appropriate’ intervention. Sandler and Dreher (1996), talk about a 
gradual shift in psychoanalysis away from a ‘value-free’ position. They attribute this 
shift to an increasing understanding that psychotherapeutic, analytic work cannot be 
conducted in a similar way that a natural scientist might conduct his work. That is, as a 
detached and objective observer. Denouncement of both objectivity and detachment 
was a recurrent theme in most of the present study’s participants’ reports.
Involved as opposed to obiective or detached.
A lot of the participants’ reports on their understanding of and way of applying 
‘neutrality’, implied that they diverged from the traditional perspective which assumed 
psychoanalysis a natural science and its values the values of scientific methodology. 
That is, they perceived neutrality in the sense of the analyst holding scientific 
objectivity and knowing “the truth” as unattainable. For example participant 4 said:
“ I do not think this is possible [to be neutral] in psychoanalysis. However, respect for integrity of 
the other requires regular reflecting back to the client of their issues, to the best of the therapist’s 
ability, with the understanding that this is “as therapist’s sees it” ie not “the truth”.
Moreover, most of the participant’s way of describing their participation in the 
therapeutic encounter implied that they take an active role in their interaction with 
clients, which differs from the role of an objective spectator.
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For example,
“Neutrality does not mean to me never becoming involved or even caught up in the inter­
personal dynamics in a session. I believe I need to be open enough to become caught up & 
involved to an extent in order to experience what is going on. However, neutrality for me has to 
do with retaining a capacity for awareness of how I am involved and being able to evaluate that 
in a neutral and careful way” (Participant 7)
Participants’ strong denouncement of objectivity brings up the issue of a possible gap 
between theoretical psychoanalytic concepts and psychoanalytic practice. That is, the 
debate within psychoanalytic literature with regard to whether or not psychoanalysis 
shares the qualities of objectivity inherent in the ethic or value-orientation of the 
scientific method (discussed in the introduction), is perhaps a theoretical debate. This 
does not mean that such a debate has not influenced psychoanalytic practice, but that 
it is possible that developmental-historical dimensions emphasised in this theoretical 
matter have been experientially bridged. This becomes evident in literature on the 
psychoanalytic process in which psychoanalysts are considered to be constantly 
engaging in self-analysis and to experience themselves as an “agent” that is actively 
engaged and involved in the analysis or understanding of both themselves and clients 
(e.g. Meissner 1993). Participants description of how they are involved in the 
therapeutic process was consistent with the aforementioned perception of 
psychotherapists as actively involved “agents”. This is further illustrated and discussed 
in the following section.
Participants also mirrored the discernible shift in psychological research, at least in 
qualitative studies, away from the pursuit of scientific objective “truth” and towards a 
recognition of the active involvement of the researcher in the construction of “truth” 
(Henwood & Pidgeon 1994). That is, participants’ perception of themselves as being 
‘involved as opposed to objective or detached’ to what clients present, is consistent 
with qualitative researchers’ injunction that they do not remain wholly impartial, 
detached, and uninvolved with their research participants. Qualitative researchers 
recognise the presence of the researcher as an instrument in a study’s enquiry and 
stress “the need to relativize their own position in relation to their research project to 
include an awareness of their own contribution to the exercise”(Smith 1997 p. 194-195).
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Had the data been collected through interviews, it would have been interesting to have 
asked participants whether they considered their work as “scientific”. Considering 
Woolgarts (1993) work on the sociology of scientific knowledge, which challenges the 
typical perception of science as representing “pure” and “objective” knowledge about 
the “true” nature of the physical world and which triggers a radical change in our 
understanding of science, makes one wonder about which scientific values and 
scientific methodologies are we talking about, when we argue on whether or not 
psychological research and practice does or should hold scientific “truth” and 
“objectivity”.
Acknowledgement of psychoanalysts' active involvement in the construction of “truth” 
about a client’s difficulties, can be seen in Bion’s writings on “the desirable stance of 
the psychoanalyst” where he talks about a “faith that there is an ultimate reality and 
truth— [that of] the unknown, unknowable, “formless infinite’” (Bion 1970 p. 30), which 
can become at least partly known through its evolution into “objects” of which the 
individual personality can become aware. According to Bion, the channel for this 
evolution and the transformation of the apprehension of the ultimate reality, or a bit of 
it, is the analyst’s “direct attention and perception”, and his or her capacity to bring 
together hitherto meaningless fragments of the client’s experiences into thinking 
process, and communicate this back to the client.
As it has already been discussed, in expressing the view that psychoanalytic 
psychotherapy is not “value-free”, many participants referred to the process of making 
meaning of clients’ experiences and presenting the client with a comprehensive 
understanding of this meaning (their understanding). Participant’s accounts on other 
ways in which values are inevitably communicated, conveyed a tension between this 
awareness and the aim not to impose values.
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The conflict of attempting not to impose values, while knowing that values are being 
conveved.
Participants' accounts of the previously presented ideal of not being judgmental and 
their accounts of instances when they perhaps were judgmental, is one of the ways 
that the tension between the aim not to impose values and the inevitability of conveying 
values became apparent. Reflecting on neutrality some participants described a 
struggle between a desirable way of “being” and a self-awareness that makes this way 
of “being” ideal.
For example:
"we all need to struggle, in the therapeutic encounter, with our wish to control and impose, as 
against our ideal of being open, able to learn & be surprised. The concept of ‘neutrality’ can 
remind us of this struggle”.
Striving to remain open to the unknown appeared to be part of many participants 
attempts to manage this tension. This goal has actually been advocated by Bion to 
whom several participants referred to.
For example:
“My guidance is Bion’s “without memory or desire’ which I take to be a cue for listening & 
observation & a preparedness to be surprised & forgo all previous assumptions & pseudo­
knowledge”. (Participant 12).
Bion (1974 as cited in Casement 1985) advocated the need for analysts’ to be open to 
the unknown in every individual client, but made it explicit that when an analyst is 
genuinely faced by the unknown, he or she is likely to experience a strong sense of 
anxiety. Tolerating this anxiety was perceived as leading to the discovery of fresh 
insight. He said: “’In every consulting room there ought to be two rather frightened 
people; the patient and the psycho-analyst. If they are not, one wonders why they are 
bothering to find out what everyone knows’” (as cited in Casement 1985 p.4).
Data elicited through the semi-structured questionnaire did not allow, however, an in 
depth exploration of participants’ “struggle” to remain open to the unknown. 
Nevertheless some of the participants’ accounts suggested that not attaining this ideal 
is not only acceptable, but can also be therapeutic, as long as the therapist attempts to
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become aware of the way and the reasons why he or she has moved away from this 
ideal. Reflecting on the ideal of not imposing values participant 5 said:
“the best we can do is be aware of: a. what we bring to the sessions
b. what the setting conveys about us
c. what a particular patient evokes
d. what the instant might project on to the therapeutic 
milieu.
Another participant said:
“There comes a time in most of the therapeutic work that I have done, where the issue becomes 
focused on the differences in cultural values; i.e. one is seen as someone who is distant/ 
different /  insensitive etc. . I think it would be a mistake to always think of these moments as 
hindering treatment; they are part of treatment” (Participant 13).
Thinking that differences in cultural values might lead to a biased view of the client, but 
perceiving this process as “part of treatment" is noteworthy in the above account. 
Although available data did not allow a detailed exploration of this process, few 
participants referred to what appeared to be a therapeutic benefit of exploring how a 
client might respond to their value-laden behaviour.
For example:
“W e all have values, make judgements, and suffer vulnerability, fear and desires. All patients 
(except perhaps the most remotely inaccessible psychotic ones) are alive to the personhood of 
the analyst/ therapist. They will make use of it— for good or ill- & that is the job =to discover the 
patient’s use of the object”. (Participant 6).
Obviously, such observations require that a psychotherapist is aware of the values 
that make up his or her “personhood”. The issue of self-awareness in relation to 
personal held values appears to be of crucial significance here. Clarkson (1995) 
argues that one of the major professional tasks in psychotherapy is to articulate, 
explore and clarify values, “whether these are values we [psychotherapists] bring to 
the enterprise, the values the clients bring or those the circumstances impose and with 
which we comply.” (pi 79). Clarkson goes on to say that “where the explication and 
exploration of these values are hedged, dodged or excused, they exist nonetheless— 
probably more virulent in neglect than in the care-full monitoring of their pervasive 
potency for good or ill” (pi 79).
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Many participants referred to the importance of articulating and exploring values. The 
accounts of some of them reflected, however, this might be a challenging process.
For example, participant 2. said:
“Essential to do, I find, is being able to initiate or facilitate talking about our value / cultural 
differences. An endless task, discussing the unspoken assumptions about life which differ in 
different cultures. The great hinder is denial of difference, on the profession’s side or on the side 
of the patient.
Another participant said:
“When therapist’s values are in the open there is less chance of compliance & more likelihood 
of dissent, which can potentially lead to insight(...) it is challenging [values to be in the open]; 
however I like my patients to challenge my values—it makes me consider them— both patients 
& values’’ (Participant 1).
Unfortunately the nature of data collection did not allow further exploration of what 
makes it challenging when “values are in the open”. Future research can investigate the 
following two situations: a: cases when there is a radical divergence between client’s 
and therapist’s value systems, which can be a situation that opens up a potential for 
basic conflicts between client and psychotherapist regarding value-orientations that 
may make psychoanalytic work impossible or extremely difficult (Meissner 1983) and b: 
cases when there is a congruence in their value systems, which is a situation that can 
elicit certain forms of blindness or collusion on the therapist’s part that may lead him 
or her to fail to recognise and process significant value conflicts (Meissner 1983).
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Overview,
A major consideration in evaluating the present study is the low response rate (8%). A 
reason for this, as suggested by the returned but unanswered questionnaires, could lie 
in the time constraints experienced by the recruited individuals. It is, however, possible 
that individuals who did not answer the questionnaire might have held considerably 
different views from those who answered it. Had there been no constraints on time and 
finances, the rate might have been increased by following up non-respondents by letter 
or telephone and/or by sending out more questionnaires.
The low response rate does not allow the generation of any conclusions regarding 
whether the historical debate on psychoanalysis’ “objectivity” reflects the existence of 
different views on the role of personal values as they enter into and impinge upon 
the psychoanalytic situation among contemporary psychoanalytic psychotherapists. 
Nevertheless the coherent and internally consistent nature of the sample employed in 
the present study allows future researchers to use the emerged themes and 
categories of themes from this study as the basis for designing a structured 
questionnaire. For example, response categories could be developed by using the 
themes reflecting participants’ experience and perception of how personal values 
might be conveyed (e.g. in assessing client’s behaviour, through value-laden 
interventions, and covert- overt verbal interaction). Since closed-format questionnaires 
can be answered quickly the advantage of employing such a questionnaire is the 
likelihood of attaining a large response rate.
Sandler (1983) points out that the investigation of the extent to which different 
psychoanalysts share the same meaning-space for a concept or theoretical matter is 
essential, since it can facilitate a relatively satisfactory communication in that particular 
area. Therefore it is important to search for a clearer understanding of the dimensions 
of the meaning of the process, whereby a psychoanalytic psychotherapist’s personal 
values enter into the therapeutic encounter and influence their clinical work with 
clients, with regard to a meaning-space common to all analytic psychotherapists or a 
large group of them. This, however, does not compromise the value of considering the 
findings of the analysis of the meaning that the above process held for the particular
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individual psychoanalytic psychotherapists who participated in the present study. As 
Sandler (1983) reports, “it is also possible to look with profit at the dimensions of 
meaning of a theoretical notion or term within the mind of any individual psychoanalyst" 
(p36).
The finding that participants acknowledged the seeping of their personal “vision of 
reality” in the therapeutic encounter as being an inevitable part of their attempt to 
engage in the psychotherapeutic encounter raises important implications. Loewenthal & 
Snell (1997) argued that it is vital for psychotherapists to consider under what 
circumstances the world is an alive and meaningful place for them. They asked: “Is it 
when we can assertively go after that which appears important to us... or does it begin 
with putting the other first... in a way that recognises the otherness of the other...?” 
(p4). This links the subject matter of values with the one of ethics; however not the 
ethics in the sense of “codes of conduct” which dictate “not to impose your values”, but 
the ethics which consider the ethical issue of social influence that lies at the heart of 
the therapeutic endeavour.
The impact of personal values on therapeutic interventions and of their related effects 
on factors that are considered essential for the building up and maintenance of the 
working alliance between client and therapist, as suggested by the findings of the 
present study, is worth being taken up by future research. Further exploration and 
clarification of the involved processes, could be attained via conducting a survey or in 
depth individual interviews with a group of psychoanalytic psychotherapists. Since it 
has been suggested that the choice of therapeutic approach is value-laden (Messer 
1985), a more varied sample, for example psychotherapists from a variety of theoretical 
schools, may also allow further differentiation of factors involved in these processes.
Baudry (1991) points out that theory, due to its general nature, cannot take into 
account individual differences and continues to argue that “the personality of the 
analyst has a far greater impact on the course of treatment than our theory allows” 
(p.917). Future research could, thus, explore whether there are specific elements in 
psychotherapists' ‘character’-  with a focus on held values that lend form to the
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psychotherapist’s perception and shape his/her view of the world and therefore his/her 
responses to clients- which could potentially facilitate or hinder the therapeutic 
process. A complementary exploration of clients’ experience and perception of this 
issue as perceived by psychotherapists, but also as encountered by clients themselves, 
would obviously be of paramount importance.
In conclusion, it is important to note that the present study draws attention to the 
possibility that a practising psychotherapist might find him or herself experiencing 
conflict in attempting to actively involve themselves in the construction of “truth” 
about a client’s difficulties, while at the same time struggling not to impose their values 
onto clients. If one accepts that learning about, conducting and being in 
psychotherapy is an ongoing process which acknowledges ambivalence and allows the 
working through of conflict, so should be our understanding of the impact of a 
psychotherapist’s personal “vision of reality” on his or her clinical work. It is hoped that 
future research will address the shortcomings of the present study and will further its 
attempt to contribute to the accumulation of empirical and conceptual evidence on this 
issue.
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(Cover Letter)
Maria Karataraki
PsychD in Psychotherapeutic &
Counseiiing Psychology 
Psychology Department.
University o f Surrey 
Guildford, Surrey 
GU25XH.
Tel: (01483) 454907or259176 
e-maii: psm 1mk@surrey. ac. uk
14, January 1998.
Dear
I am a trainee on the PsychD Psychotherapeutic and Counselling Psychology 
(taught doctorate course) at the University of Surrey and I am carrying out a 
research project, under the supervision of the Psychology Department. I am 
looking at psychoanalytic psychotherapists’ perceptions of the concepts of 
“neutrality” and “value-free clinical practice”. In addition I am exploring how 
therapists’ own cultural/ethnic values might impact upon patients’ therapeutic 
progress.
The participants of this project have been randomly selected from professional 
registers for Psychotherapy. I appreciate that you are very busy, but I would be 
most grateful for your assistance in completing the attached questionnaire. This 
involves seven questions.
The questionnaire ensures anonymity, (e.g. your name will not be cited 
anywhere; questionnaires and returned envelopes are not numbered etc. ) and 
all information provided will be treated in the strictest confidence (no individual 
or organisation will be identified in any written report).
I hope that this project will be of benefit to professional practice and I therefore 
hope that you will feel able to respond. If you wish to receive a summary of the 
analysis that will be produced from this project, please make sure you complete 
the last section of the questionnaire. Although it might seem that anonymity is 
compromised this way, confidentiality will be kept in all written reports. 
Alternatively, you might let me know that you would like a copy by contacting me 
at the above address or phone number.
Finally, I would be grateful if you could return the questionnaire as soon as 
possible (preferably before 13^ of February 1998), in the stamped addressed 
envelope provided.
Many thanks for your participation and co-operation.
Best Wishes,
Maria Karataraki.
Counselling Psychologist In Training.
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(Explanatory notes & Instructions for completion )
When completing the questions that follow in the next pages, please draw upon 
your own clinical experience in as much detail as you feel able. Please note that 
the prompts in brackets are only suggestions as to what you might comment on. 
Please feel free not to reflect on them, if your understanding of the concept in 
question does not involve the issues implied by these sub-questions.
If you need more space than is provided on the questionnaire form, please 
continue on the back of the sheets of paper, indicating which question your 
answer belongs with.
If you do not answer a question, I will assume that it was not relevant to your 
clinical experience. If you encounter a question to which you feel an earlier 
answer applies, just note this and refer back to your earlier answer.
Any comments about the content and clarity of the questions will be appreciated. 
(Please use the space provided at the end of the questionnaire).
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(Questionnaire: demographic information and open ended questions).
GENERAL INFORMATION. 
Please tick as applicable or write in the space provided.
1. Male Female
2. Age:___ years
3. Country of birth:
4. I am involved in:
NHS practice
Private practice
Both NHS & private practice.
Other (please specify)_____
5. Please give information about:
a. Your ethnicity:
[Please feel free to use a non-singular ethnic label (e.g. English-lndian), if  you 
think that such a label best describes your ethnicity].
b. Your race.
[If you feel that your race is not described by the labels black o r white, please 
use the label that you think that best describes your race].
6. Years of practice (after qualification)using a psychoanalytic/dynamic 
approach.
Less than 5 years.__________ ___
Between 5 and 10 years. ___
Between 10 & 15 years. ___
More than 15 years. ___
APPENXIX C. (continued) 203
7. Whose theory do you mainly consider when you make a formulation about a 
patient’s difficulties? (you may tick more than one)
Freud’s theory 
Klein’s theory 
Winnicott’s theory 
Jung’s theory 
Bion’s theory 
Integrative;
a)from differing psychoanalytic theories (please specify)
b)from differing theories, not necessarily psychoanalytic (please specify)
Other (please specify)
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1. What do you understand by the concept of nei/fra/iïy within the 
psychoanalytic/ therapeutic context?
[You might want to comment on the way or the extent to which your ideas about 
what “neutrality” means, concur or differ from the classical Freudian idea of the 
therapist acting as “a blank screen” or like “a mirror”.
Do you think that the therapist’s neutrality is a necessary / sufficient way to 
evoke transference?]
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2. Do you apply “neutrality” in your own practice?
If yes, in what way? What do you consider to be therapeutically useful about 
applying “neutrality”?
If no. could you explain the reasons why you choose not to? What is the 
therapeutic gain from not applying “neutrality” in your practice?
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3. Please reflect on whether you believe that psychoanalytic 
practice should be value-free or not. That is, do you believe 
that it is possible for a therapist to avoid “communicating” 
his/her values?.
rif you think that a therapist might sometimes unintentionally communicate 
his/her value system: You might want to comment on the ways that you think that 
this might happen. (Perhaps give an example & comment on the effect of this 
upon therapeutic progress.)]
fif you think that a therapist can adopt a therapeutic stance which will allow 
him/her never to communicate his/her value system:
You might want to comment on the ways that you think that this could be 
ensured . (Perhaps comment on the effect upon therapeutic progress, if this is 
not achieved)].
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The following three questions focus on issues related to the effect that 
a therapist’s own cultural and ethnic values might have upon his/her 
clinical work with patients.
4. What do you understand by a person’s cultural/ethnic values?
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5. Describe an Incident, If you are aware of one, where a 
therapist’s cultural/ethnic values hindered treatment. 
Alternatively, report circumstances under which you think that 
a therapist’s cultural or ethnic values might hinder a patient’s 
therapeutic progress (Please indicate whether the incident(s) 
come from your own clinical experience, the clinical experience of 
colleagues, or other sources).
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6. Describe an incident, if you are aware of one, where a 
therapist’s cultural/ethnic values facilitated treatment. 
Alternatively, report circumstances under which you think 
that a therapist’s cultural or ethnic values might facilitate a 
patient’s therapeutic progress(Please indicate whether the 
incident(s) come from your own clinical experience, the clinical 
experience of colleagues, or other sources).
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Feelings About Completing This Questionnaire.
Please take a moment to reflect upon what it has been like to 
complete this questionnaire. How has it felt?______________
[Please provide information on specific positive or negative aspects of your 
experience. Any comments about the content and clarity of the questions will 
also be appreciated].
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MANY THANKS FOR YOUR TIME AND 
CO-OPERATION.
If you wish to receive a copy of a summary of the analysis that will 
arise from this study, please complete the section below. 
(Remember that you can also request such a copy by contacting me 
at the address or phone number provided in the pink coloured cover 
letter).
Please send me a summary of the analysis at the address below.
Name:__________________________________________________
Street:
Town/City:.
Post-Code:
Please e-mail me a summary of the analysis at the following e-mail address:
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(Consent to be interviewed)
Maria Karataraki
PsychD in Psychotherapeutic &
Counseliing Psychology.
Psychology Department 
University o f Surrey 
Guildford, Surrey 
GU25XH.
Tei: (01483) 454907or259176 
e-maii: psm 1mk@ surrey ac. uk
***** IMPORTANT NOTE ******
The project aims to further explore psychoanalytic psychotherapists’ 
perceptions of the issues raised in the questionnaire by conducting 
individual interviews with them. During these interviews 
psychotherapists will be given a chance to further clarify and expand 
on these issues.
Your further co-operation will be greatly appreciated.
If you are interested in participating further, please return the attached 
blue form labelled “AGREEMENT FOR FURTHER PARTICIPATION”. 
Although it might appear that anonymity is compromised by returning 
this form with the questionnaire, returned questionnaires will be 
separated from the form upon receiving them.
Alternatively, you may let me know that you are interested in further 
participating by contacting me at the above address or phone number.
Interviews will be carried out between March and April 1998 and 
information obtained during them will also be treated in the strictest 
confidence.
Thanking you in advance.
Maria Karataraki
Counselling Psychologist In Training.
PLEASE DO NOT HESITATE TO CONTACT ME, IF YOU WOULD 
LIKE ANY FURTHER INFORMATION BEFORE DECIDING 
WHETHER OR NOT YOU WISH TO PARTICIPATE FURTHER.
(I will be happy to answer any questions you might have).
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Maria Karataraki
PsychD in Psychotherapeutic &
Counseliing Psychology.
Psychology Department.
University o f Surrey.
Guildford, Surrey 
GU25XH.
Tei: (01483) 454907or259176 
e-maii: psm 1mk@ surrey ac. uk
AGREEMENT FOR FURTHER PARTICIPATION,
I agree to participate further in the research, by volunteering to be 
interviewed.
• In order to arrange a convenient time and place for the interview, please 
contact me at the following address or telephone number or e-mail address:
Name:___________________________________________________________
Street: _____  ___
Town/ City:. 
Post-Code:
Telephone (please include area-code): 
E-mail address: ____
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(Letter explaining decision not to carry on with Interviews)
Maria Karataraki
PsychD in Psychotherapeutic &
Counselling Psychology.
Psychology Department.
University o f Surrey.
Guildford, Surrey 
GU26XH.
Tei: (01483) 454907or259176 
e-maii: psm 1mk@ surrey ac. uk
31 March 1998.
Dear,
Thank you for answering the questionnaire on psychoanalytic psychotherapists’ 
perceptions o f the concepts o f “neutrality” and “value free practice” and on ho 
therapist’s own cultural/ ethnic values m ight impact upon client’s therapeutic 
progress. I also greatly appreciate your agreement for further participation.
The small number of psychotherapists that have agreed to be interviewed, has 
led to slight changes in the data collection procedures of the project. Interviews 
are not going to be treated as a primary source of data. The rich data collected 
from the questionnaires is going to be analysed and depending on the nature of 
the emerged themes, interviews might be used to clarify or further elaborate on 
these themes.
I am currently conducting a preliminary analysis and might get back to you 
sometime in May to arrange a convenient time and place for the interview.
Once again thank you very much for your time and co-operation.
Best Wishes,
Maria Karataraki.
Counselling Psychologists in training.
P.S. It was my pleasure to see that you are interested in receiving a summary of 
the analysis, which I will send you upon the completion of the project.
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Conference paper.
Karataraki, M. (1996). Clinical Psychoiogists’ Perceptions of Counseiiing Psychology: 
Implications for the Profession and for Training. Paper presented at the Annual 
Conference of the BPS Division of Counselling Psychology, York, UK.
Abstract: This paper was conceived as a result of a smali-scale research project 
carried out jointly by Clinical and Counselling Psychology trainees. We intend here to 
highlight some of the questions and issues that conducting this research has raised for 
us as Counseiiing Psychology trainees. The overlapping roles of psychologists, the 
breadth of training, and the confusion surrounding the contribution of Counseiiing 
Psychology are important issues for debate within the profession. For trainees, this 
implies a need to consider carefully what they are (and are not) being trained to do.
This abstract refers to two papers presented at the conference. One was presented by 
Richard Golsworthy and the other by the present author. A slightly amended version of 
the later can be seen in the report presented in pages 38-37 of this portfolio. The 
original paper differed in terms of style and included details.
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